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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES OF THE 




This study makes use of a previously untapped source 
of scientific literature, the speeches given by the presi­
dents of the American Psychological Association since its 
founding in 1892, as the basis for a systematic historical 
analysis taking Watson's prescriptive approach. The 75 
APA presidential addresses were selected for analysis be­
cause (1) they express the thinking of very eminent psy­
chologists, (2) they are likely to be sensitive to current 
issues and developments in the discipline, and explicit 
about the author's preferences and biases, and (3) they 
provide temporal continuity from 1892, thus making it possible 
to investigate trends in the history of American psychology. 
For these reasons, it was assumed that the APA presidential 
addresses constitute a body of scientific literature which 
reflects the major conceptions in American psychology.
Watson's historical approach provided the conceptual frame­
work for the analysis. This approach is based on the concept 
of prescriptions, or attitudes taken by psychologists toward 
matters of psychological concern. They may be thought of as 
intellectual dispositions, orientative assumptions, or modes 
of conceptualization. The ultimate goals of the study were 
to trace the status of the prescriptive conceptions in the 
development of American psychology, and to assess their
xii
status in contemporary American psychology.
The method used to achieve the goals of the study was 
content analysis. Three judges, including the author, each 
coded each of the 75 APA presidential addresses in terms of 
Watson's 36 prescriptive concepts. The concepts and rules 
governing the coding process were made explicit in the 
Coding Manual, which was followed by all three judges. The 
prescriptions whose expression took the form of acceptance 
by authors were used as the basis for tracing changes in the 
status of contrasting prescriptions over time.
It was found that American psychology, viewed in 
historical perspective, may be characterized by certain 
accelerated prescriptive trends. These are: the use of 
methods open to verification by another competent observer 
(Methodological objectivism), the consideration of psychologi­
cal data as behavior of individual (Contentual objectivism), 
the stress upon knowledge which is countable or measurable 
(Quantitativism), the emphasis upon discovering general laws 
(Nomotheticism), the emphasis upon changes with time (De- 
velopmentalism), and the seeking of knowledge for its useful­
ness in other activities (Utilitarianism).
American psychology, viewed in historical perspective, 
shows certain prescriptive trends which have decreased over 
time. These are trends in the emphasis on awareness of men­
tal structure or activity (Conscious mentalism), the viewing 
of psychological data as mental structure or activity of 
individual (Contentual subjectivism), the consideration of 
psychological categories as contents (Structuralism), the 
stress upon psychological events taking place within the 
body (Centralism), and the use of methods not open to 
verification by another competent observer (Methodological 
subjectivism).
In addition to increasing and decreasing prescriptive 
trends, findings were presented concerning prescriptions 
which exhibit patterns of rise and fall, and which show a 
consistent pattern of acceptance in the development of 
American psychology.
In terms of contemporary American psychology, it was 
found that certain prescriptions of contrasting pairs of 
prescriptions are so dominant that they have no counter­
dominant prescription. These are Empiricism, Determinism, 
and Naturalism. Other prescriptive conceptions in contem­
porary American psychology are dominant but do have counter­
dominant prescriptions: Methodological objectivism is dom­
inant, and Methodological subjectivism counter-dominant; 
Quantitativism is dominant, and Qualitativism counter-dominant; 
Functionalism is dominant, and Structuralism counter-dominant; 
Developmentalism is dominant, and Staticism^ counter-dominant;
xiv
Nomotheticism is dominant, and Idiographicism counter-dominant; 
Contentual objectivism is dominant, and Contentual sub­
jectivism counter-dominant; and Dynamicism is dominant, and 
Staticisrr^ counter-dominant. Still other prescriptive con­
ceptions manifest no dominance, since the members of the 
pair are about equally widely accepted. These are Deductivism- 
Inductivism, Purism-Utilitarianism, and Molarism-Molecularism.
xv
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study has two interrelated purposes. The specific 
purpose is to analyze the contents of some special documents 
in psychology, the speeches given by the presidents of the 
American Psychological Association since its founding in 1892. 
The broader and more significant purpose is to determine the 
status of the conceptual bases of American psychology in 
historical perspective. Consequently, this introduction con­
siders the documents of central importance and then widens 
in scope to include the use of those documents for a study 
of psychology's conceptual bases.
The Historical Documents 
Each year an eminent psychologist is elected to the 
office of president of the American Psychological Association 
(APA), the major organization for psychologists in the United 
States (Appendix A). Until 1918, the president was nominated 
by the Council (a six-member body elected by the membership) 
and elected by the membership. Beginning in 1918, the presi­
dent has been nominated and elected by the membership. Be­
ginning in 1946, he has been elected as the president-elect, 
to begin office the following year.'*' Basically an honorary 
1
J. D. Hildreth, personal communication, December 1, 1971.
2position, the presidency nevertheless implies an importance 
to a wide range of people —  the membership, the scientific 
community, the profession, and even the general public. The 
single most overt expression of this office is the presiden­
tial address delivered to the membership at the end of the 
year of office (Appendix B). Most of the addresses have been 
a scholarly discussion of some aspect of the president's own 
work, although some, especially those given in the early 
years of the Association, were a discussion of the current 
state of the discipline. Some of the characteristics of the 
APA presidential addresses which enhance their value as 
historical documents may be elaborated as follows.
(1) They express the thinking of very eminent psych­
ologists . Election to the office of president of the APA is 
an honor received by few psychologists. A recent study of 
"Important Psychologists, 1600-1967" (Annin, Boring, & Watson, 
1968) makes it possible to assess the relative eminence of 
45 of the 78 APA presidents, both individually and collectively. 
This assessment (Gibson, 1972) compared the eminence of 45 
deceased APA presidents with 129 of the most important de­
ceased American psychologists since 1600 (Watson & Merrifield, 
in press). It was found that (a) the mean of the judgments 
for the APA presidents was considerably higher on a scale 
from 11 to 27 than that of the most important American psych-
3ologists (23 vs. 19), and (b) a much higher percentage of 
APA presidents was judged at the highest level of eminence 
(38% vs. 13%). These comparisons testify to the eminence of 
the APA presidents as operationally defined with reference to 
the Annin et al. study and the Watson and Merrifield study 
(Appendix c).
(2) They are likely to be sensitive to current issues 
and developments in the discipline, and explicit about the 
author's preferences and biases. Compared to journal articles 
which report empirical research or make theoretical statements, 
and whose underlying assumptions are deeply implicit, the APA 
presidential addresses are a more personal, reflective, and 
evaluative psychological document. One would thus expect to 
find in the addresses, for example, concerns with the defin­
ition of psychology, with the diversity of viewpoints in 
psychology, and with psychology's status as a science and pro­
fession. This characteristic of the addresses maximizes their 
utility as primary source materials for a study of American 
psychology.
(3) They provide temporal continuity from 1892, thus 
making it possible to investigate trends in the history of 
American psychology. The addresses have been published 
annually since the first meeting in 1892. They have appeared 
historically in three different journals, first the Psychological
4Review (1892-1938), then the Psychological Bulletin (1939-
1946), and then the American Psychologist (1946-1970).
However, there are four exceptions to the continuity of the
APA presidential addresses. (1) In 1892, G. Stanley Hall gave
the first address, "The History and Prospects of Experimental
Psychology in America", but it was never published, and un-
2
fortunately the manuscript cannot be located. (2) In 1918, 
John W. Baird was too ill to prepare an address. (3) In 
1924, G. Stanley Hall died early in his year of presidency.
(4) In 1968, Abraham H. Maslow was too ill to prepare an 
address. Other than these four years, there is a published 
address for every year, making 7 5 addresses through 1970, the 
terminal year of this study.
As a study of presidential addresses, this study has 
two precedents. The first was a study of the presidential 
addresses of the American Historical Association, 1884-1945 
(Ausubel, 1950). The second was a study of the 25 most re­
cent presidential addresses of the American Psychiatric Asso­
ciation, 1944-1968 (Mora, 1969). In spite of the similarity 
of topic, the present study differs from these two studies 
by using an explicit conceptual framework for analysis and 
by employing quantitative methods to secure historical per- 
2
W. A. Koelsch, personal communication, May 11, 1972.
5spective. But the present study is not only a study the 
APA presidential addresses, it is also a study using the 
addresses for another purpose.
The Conceptual Framework 
One of the characteristic features of psychology among 
the sciences is the presence of disagreement and controversy. 
Psychologists are not neutral toward either the subject matter 
or methods of their science —  they have definite preferences 
and biases. In 1925, Madison Bentley felt it discreditable 
for an "established science to sustain such radically diver­
gent views upon the essential nature of its material" (1926, 
p. 75). Bentley considered that one of the APA's greatest 
services to psychology was the annual occasion it offered for 
psychologists with opposing views to meet under a truce on 
neutral ground. In 1929, E. G. Boring published a paper en­
titled "The Psychology of Controversy", in which he said 
that the history of science including psychology is "one long 
series of theses, set off by ardently advocated antitheses, 
with ultimate syntheses terminating controversy and making a 
step forward" (1929, p. 98). The ferment of the 1920's has 
subsided, of course, but it is still true today that psych­
ology is characterized by a diversity of viewpoints, approaches, 
methods, and activities.
6Much more than other scientists, psychologists rely 
on habits of thought which are partly a matter of temperament 
and partly due to the influence of their teachers, their 
reading, and the ethos of the school which they attended.
These habits of thought, or conceptions, serve the function 
of orientation; they allow the psychologist to procede about 
his business without getting bogged down with questions about 
the ultimate nature of the subject matter or its proper avenue 
of approach. The conceptions which serve this function and 
which can be traced historically over an appreciable period of 
time, thus forming trends or themes, have recently been iso­
lated by Watson (1967, 1971) and termed prescriptions. Pre­
scriptions are basically attitudes toward some matter of 
psychological interest. They may be thought of as attitudinal 
perspectives, intellectual dispositions, basic orientative 
assumptions, or modes of conceptualization, and they play an 
important role in enabling the psychologist to deal with the 
problems of subject matter and methodology. Examples of 
psychological conceptions which serve as prescriptions are 
the tendency to view psychological data as behavior of the 
individual, seeking knowledge for its own sake, and stressing 
knowledge which is countable or measurable. These concep­
tions, or prescriptions, may be explicit or implicit, dominant 
in the Zeitgeist at a particular time or opposed to it, or
7salient or non-salient in a school of psychological thought.
One of the ways prescriptions may be conceived as 
functioning is in contrasting pairs. Since the opposition 
of prescriptions is sometimes present in history, it is one 
of the meaningful ways of using the prescriptions in approach­
ing historical material. This approach makes it possible to 
compare the relative strength of contrasting prescriptions 
empirically. Watson wrote: "At some time, past or present, 
when both of the opposed prescriptions had or have supporters, 
it is possible to make some sort of an estimate of their rela­
tive strength? in other words, we may speak of dominant and 
counterdominant prescriptions" (p. 439). A dominant pre­
scription is one which, compared with the contrasting pre­
scription, is held by a significantly larger portion of the 
psychological community. A counter-dominant prescription is 
one which is held by a portion of the psychological community 
but is less widely accepted than the contrasting prescription. 
In this study an attempt will be made to trace changes in 
dominance and counter-dominance of contrasting prescriptions 
over time.
Prescriptions influence and are inextricably bound 
up with the more formal procedures of scientific practice. 
Watson has selected and defined the most historically im­
portant psychological conceptions. These conceptions were
8selected on the basis of knowledge of the whole history of
psychology, and no claim is made that they are all relevant
to any one historical period. The group is selective in that
it includes only those conceptions which meet the criteria
of serving an orientative function and existing over an
appreciable period of time; it is also comprehensive in that
it is based upon the history of psychology from ancient times
on and is intended to encompass the whole history of psychology.
For these reasons, Watson's prescriptive conceptions will be
adopted as the conceptual framework for this study. Watson's
entire list of 36 prescriptions arranged in contrasting pairs
follows. Elaborations of these definitions were made by the
writer for the purposes of this study, and these elaborated
3
definitions are contained in Appendix D.
Conscious mentalism - Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on 
awareness of mental structure or activity —  
unawareness)
Contentual objectivism - Contentual subjectivism (psychologi­
cal data viewed as behavior of individual —  as 
mental structure or activity of individual)
Determinism - Indeterminism (human events completely explicable 
in terms of antecedents —  not completely so explicable)
Empiricism - Rationalism  ^ (major, if not exclusive source of 
knowledge is experience —  is reason)
3
In the case of Mechanism, an additional meaning was given 
to supplement Watson's original definition. This was the 
only substantive change in the prescriptive system.
9Functionalism - Structuralism (psychological categories are 
activities —  are contents)
Inductivism - Deductivism (investigations begun with facts 
or observations —  with assumed established truths)
Mechanism - Vitalism (activities of living beings completely 
explicable by physiochemical constituents —  not so 
explicable)
Methodological objectivism - Methodological subjectivism (use 
of methods open to verification by another competent 
observer —  not so open)
Molecularism - Molarism (psychological data most aptly de­
scribed in terms of relatively small units -- 
relatively large units)
Monism - Dualism (fundamental principle or entity in universe 
is of one kind —  is of two kinds, mind and matter)
Naturalism - Supernaturalism (nature requires for its operation 
and explanation only principles found within it —  
requires transcendent guidance as well)
Nomotheticism - Idiographicism (emphasis upon discovering
general laws —  upon explaining particular events or 
individuals)
Peripheralism - Centralism (stress upon psychological events 
taking place at periphery of body —  within the body)
Purism - Utilitarianism (seeking of knowledge for its own 
sake —  for its usefulness in other activities)
Quantitativism - Qualitativism (stress upon knowledge which is 
countable or measurable —  upon that which is different 
in kind or essence)
Rationalismo - Irrationalism (emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sense and intellect —  intrusion 
or domination of emotive and conative factors upon 
intellectual processes)
Staticism-) - Developmentalism (emphasis upon cross-sectional 
view —  upon changes with time)
10
Staticisnu - Dynamicism (emphasis upon enduring aspects —  
upon change and factors making for change)
The ultimate goal of this study is to trace the status 
of the prescriptive issues in the development of American 
psychology by using quantitative methods. Thus, this study 
assumes that the APA presidential addresses constitute a body 
of scientific literature which reflects the prescriptions in 
American psychology, and it aspires to derive an empirically- 
based characterization of the dominant prescriptions in con­
temporary American psychology by viewing them in historical 
perspective. Qualitative exposition based on the addresses 
and additional materials will be used to supplement the quan­
titative analysis.
Relevant Literature 
Although there are several quantitative studies taking 
the prescriptive approach, at least in part (Ross, 1970; 
Mirabito, 1970; Fuchs & Kawash, 1971), none is directly 
relevant to the present study. There are, however, two quan­
titative studies of historical trends in psychology which are 
relevant to the present study, one based on an analysis of 
journal articles (Allport, 1940; Bruner & Allport, 1940) and 
the other based on ratings of psychological theorists (Coan 
& Zagona, 1962; Coan, 1968).
11
The first major study was a joint project by Gordon 
W. Allport and Jerome S. Bruner, who classified the contents 
of the 14 leading psychological journals in America at ten-year 
intervals from 1888 to 1938 to assess changes in the nature 
of psychology. The total number of articles classified was 
1,627. The classifiers disregarded the titles and delved 
into the body of each article. There were 32 categories em­
ployed in the content analysis. These covered type of subjects, 
fields, techniques, conceptual modes, and issues. The number 
of articles classified under each category for each of the 
years 1888-1898, 1908, 1918, 1928, and 1938, was converted to 
percentages to facilitate comparison. While an article could 
in theory be entered under all 32 categories or none at all, 
in practice most of the articles were entered in from 5 to 15 
categories. This study, including the findings from each of 
the 32 categories, was published in 1940 as "Fifty Years of 
Change in American Psychology". Nine of the categories em­
ployed in this study are essentially the same as prescriptive 
conceptions or similar enough to prescriptions to be compared 
with them. For example, the category named "Use of statistics" 
can be compared with the quantitative prescription, the cate­
gory "Applied psychology" compared with Utilitarianism, and 
"Articles dealing with the single case" with Idiographicism.
When Allport gave his presidential address before the
12
APA in 1939, "The Psychologist's Frame of Reference", he chose
to present some of the most representative findings from the
study undertaken with Bruner and to discuss the implications
of those findings. As it happens, the categories which Allport
chose to present in his address included all but one of the
nine categories which are relevant to the present study.
Allport's summary thus provides a preview of the findings
which will later be discussed in relation to the present study.
Reviewing the evidence, we find mental faculties 
and hypostasized psychic processes vanishing 
rapidly, though here and there still masquerading 
behind new terms. The body-mind problem, never 
solved, has been declared popularly null and void.
Dualism evokes rejection responses of considerable 
vehemence. (Indeed, of all philosophical pollens, 
psychologists seem most allergic to this.) The 
appeal of the unconscious is dwindling. Higher 
mental processes as exhibited in the speech of 
human beings are relatively neglected, marked pre­
ference being shown for studies of non-verbal be­
havior and for animal subjects. A schism is 
apparent between pure and applied psychology, and 
there is a growing disregard for studies of single 
cases. It also looks as if modern psychology were 
becoming appreciably unhistorical.
Among accelerated trends we find a striking 
rise in the employment of statistical aids, in the 
use of animal subjects, in the spread of physio­
logical research. At the same time there is a 
growing recognition of the importance of context, 
which has led to many fruitful studies of dynamic 
segregation. Methodological studies have mounted, 
characterized especially by philosophical theorizing 
concerning the nature of psychological constructs. 
Operationism is the current watchword of an austere 
empiricism. Synoptic systems, such as those of 
McDougall and Stern, have given way to miniature 
systems, and embracing theories expounded in the 
grand manner have yielded to diminutive theories
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implemented with great precision. Immediate ex­
perience is rigidly excluded from most modern 
systems, and in its place surrogate operational 
functions are sought (1940, pp. 11-12).
The findings of the Bruner-Allport study were also summarized
by Allport at a more general level than the specific categories
which were employed. Strong support was found for Bills'
(1938) characterization of the psychology of 1938 as increasingly
empirical, mechanistic, quantitative, nomothetic, analytic,
and operational.
The second relevant study (Coan & Zagona, 1962; Coan,
196v3) was designed to investigate both historical trends in 
psychological theory and dimensions independent of time. The 
study tested several hypotheses made earlier by Brunswik (1952). 
Brunswik hypothesized that there are two independent dimensions 
of psychological theory, the subjectivity-objectivity dimension 
and the molar-molecular dimension. Beyond the issue of the 
number of dimensions of psychological theory, Brunswik made 
two other hypotheses: (1) "There seems to be a continuous
change-over from subjectivism to objectivism in psychology", 
and (2) "Within each of these two avenues of approach there 
seems to be a development . . . from a static and molecular 
to a dynamic and molar type of approach" (1952, p. 50).
In order to test these hypotheses, Coan used a rating 
method in which the names of 54 psychological theorists were 
rated on 34 variables by 42 psychologists with appropriate
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background in the area of history and systems of psychology.
The data were subjected to centroid analysis and six factors 
emerged. The first two factors were interpreted as Subjecti- 
vistic versus Objectivistic and Holistic versus Elementaristic, 
thus confirming Brunswik's two basic dimensions. However, 
the four additional factors were needed to account adequately 
for the structure of psychological theory.
To test Brunswik's hypotheses concerning trends, 
ratings of the 10 most important theorists per decade from 
1880 to 1959, were obtained (Coan & Zagona, 1962). After ob­
taining ratings of these theorists on the 34 variables, the 
factor scores for each set of 10 theorists were averaged and 
a comparison made of the resulting means across decades. The 
results supported Brunswik's first historical hypothesis but 
not his second. There was a progressive increase in objectivism, 
but the trend in holism showed a rise and then fall, with the 
peak in the 1920's. Further evidence concerning changes in 
these two dimensions may be obtained from the present study.
In addition, two other of Coan1s factors are relevant to the 
present study: the Quantitative versus Qualitative factor
and the Dynamic versus Static factor.
Predictions
Before tracing the status of the prescriptive issues 
in the development of American psychology, it is possible to
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make some predictions regarding the evolution of certain pre­
scriptions. The predictions which follow were formulated on 
the basis of general knowledge of the history of psychology 
and a list of the titles of the presidential addresses, but 
before reading or coding the addresses. Although some are 
conventional beliefs and others are original propositions, all 
are genuine contingent statements. The first few predictions 
concern the nature and scope of the addresses, while the 
others concern the status of the prescriptive issues in the 
development of American psychology. Predictions are made con­
cerning trends in seven of the 18 pairs of contrasting pre­
scriptions. The status of the other 11 pairs is not predicted. 
The findings with respect to temporal changes will be dis­
cussed in two chapters: one devoted to predicted prescriptive
trends (Chapter IV) and one devoted to descriptive prescriptive 
trends (Chapter V).
Prediction 1: There will be a decrease over time in
addresses characterized as expository, whose burden does not 
directly depend upon empirical data, and a simultaneous in­
crease in addresses characterized by the presentation of 
information based upon empirical or even experimental data, 
or the presentation of a viewpoint deriving from empirical 
data. Furthermore, this transition will occur around 1930, 
so that the addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly
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expository-oriented and those after about 1930 will be pre­
dominantly research-oriented. The rationale for this pre­
diction is that 1890 through the early 1930's was the 
particularly controversial period of schools in psychology, 
and the 1930's to the present the somewhat more tolerant 
factual period in American psychology.
Prediction 2 ; Fewer prescriptions will be expressed 
in the research-oriented addresses than in the expository 
addresses. The rationale for this prediction is that exposi­
tory addresses provide more freedom for an author to comment 
on issues and viewpoints than do research-oriented addresses.
Prediction 3 ; The proportion of prescriptions which 
are expressed implicitly, whatever its value relative to those 
expressed explicitly, will be larger in the research-oriented 
addresses than in the expository addresses. The rationale 
for this prediction is that many prescriptions are implicit 
in the activities of psychologists as research workers, and 
therefore research-oriented addresses would be expected to be 
based upon more underlying assumptions and conceptions than 
expository addresses.
Prediction 4 ; There will be a decrease over time in 
addresses which encompass psychology as a whole, or treat a 
problem which transcends specific areas and is significant 
for psychology as a whole, and a simultaneous increase in
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addresses which are limited to a specialized area or problem 
within psychology. Furthermore, this transition will occur 
around 1930, so that the addresses before about 1930 will be 
predominantly broad in scope and those after about 1930 will 
be predominantly narrow in scope. The rationale for this pre­
diction is that before the early 1930's was the period in the 
history of American psychology in which the various schools 
each claimed comprehensiveness for its psychological system, 
and after the early 1930's the more specialized factual period 
in American psychology.
Prediction 5 ; Since the prescriptive approach was for­
mulated to encompass the history of psychology from ancient 
times on, there is undoubtedly extreme variation in the ex­
pression of prescriptions in the relatively short history of 
American psychology. In this period, the following pre­
scriptions will be among the most prominent of the 36 pre­
scriptions, irrespective of temporal considerations: Conscious
mentalism, Contentual objectivism, Contentual subjectivism, 
Empiricism, Methodological objectivism, Methodological sub­
jectivism, and Nomotheticism. The following prescriptions 
will be among the least prominent of the group: Vitalism,
Monism, Dualism, Naturalism, Supernaturalism, Idiographicism,
Rationalism-, Irrationalism, Staticism , and Staticism .
^ 1 2
This prediction is based on the writer's general background
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reading and personal judgments.
Prediction 6 : Contentual objectivism will be in­
creasingly accepted after 1913, the date of the formal 
founding of behaviorism with the publication of John B. Watson's 
article "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," to the 
point where it is so pervasive a conception in contemporary 
American psychology that it is the major ingredient in the 
definition of psychology. Contentual subjectivism will de­
crease in acceptance after 1913 but will recover to the 
point where it is an important part of contemporary American 
psychology, although still overshadowed by Contentual objec­
tivism. In other words, Contentual objectivism is dominant 
and Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant in contemporary 
American psychology. The aspect of this prediction concerning 
Contentual objectivism is based on general reading of standard 
sources in the history of psychology (Heidbreder, 1933;
Boring, 1950; Brunswik, 1952; Marx & Hillix, 1963; Watson,
1971) and the findings of other studies (Allport, 1940; Coan, 
1968) , while the aspect concerning Contentual subjectivism 
is based on the writer's own speculation.
Prediction 7 ; Methodological objectivism and 
Methodological subjectivism will follow roughly the same 
pattern as Contentual objectivism and Contentual subjectivism 
in the history of American psychology, except that Methodologi-
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cal subjectivism will show a progressive decline after 1913 
rather than gradual recovery. The basis of this prediction 
is general reading of standard sources in the field (e.g., 
Heidbreder, 1933; Boring, 1950; Brunswik, 1952; Marx &
Hillix, 1963; Watson, 1971) and the findings of other studies 
(Allport, 1940; Coan, 1968).
Prediction 8: Peripheralism and Centralism will show
roughly the same pattern as Contentual objectivism and Con­
tentual subjectivism in the history of American psychology 
(Allport, 1940; Coan, 1968), although they will not be as 
widely accepted as the latter.
Prediction 9: Functionalism will increase in accep­
tance after the turn of the century and continue its pervasive 
influence up to and including the present. The most explicit 
expression of this prescription occurred shortly after the 
turn of the century in the form of a broad, loosely articu­
lated movement known as functional psychology. Functionalism 
does not exist as a system of psychology today; it has been 
absorbed into the mainstream of American psychology. For this 
reason it has often been said that contemporary American 
psychology is functional in character (Heidbreder, 1933;
Marx & Hillix, 1963; Watson, 1965; Chaplin & Krawiec, 1968; 
Watson, 1971). Structuralism in the form of the school of 
structural psychology will collapse around the turn of the
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century, but Structuralism as a prescription will continue 
to be a viable conception, regardless of whether the data of 
psychology are conceived as mentalistic, behavioral, or 
physiological. This last aspect of the prediction is based 
on the writer's speculations stemming from prescriptive theory.
Prediction 10: Quantitativism will increase in accept­
ance (Bills, 1938? Allport, 1940; Watson, 1965), with a con­
current decrease in acceptance of Qualitativism.
Prediction 11: Nomotheticism will be dominant and
Idiographicism counter-dominant throughout the history of 
American psychology up to the present (Allport, 1940; Watson,
1965) .
Prediction 12: Purism will be accepted throughout
the history of American psychology. Utilitarianism will be­
come accepted shortly after the turn of the century and then 
will increase steadily in acceptance, but will remain counter­
dominant in contemporary American psychology (Misiak & Sexton,
1966) .
Prediction 13; There will tend to be a higher pro­
portion of explicitly accepted prescriptions before 1930 than 
after, because during the period of the schools of psychology 
the issues were controversial, whereas afterward psychologists 
became more tolerant of alternative viewpoints and less likely
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to defend their own. Therefore, the proportion of implicity 
accepted prescriptions will increase as one moves closer to 
the present.
Prediction 14: The following prescriptions will be
among the most widely accepted prescriptions in comtemporary 
American psychology (1951-1970), irrespective of temporal 
considerations: Conscious mentalism, Contentual objectivism,
Contentual subjectivism, Empiricism, Methodological objectivism, 
Nomotheticism, Purism, Utilitarianism, and Quantitativism.




This chapter contains information pertaining to five 
aspects of the method used in the study: (1) the general
procedure of content analysis, (2) the coding system: defini­
tion of categories, (3) the training period and pilot study,
(4) the reliability of the judges, and (5) the treatment of 
the data.
General Procedure of Content Analysis
This study assumes that history can be approached 
using some of the same methods as are used in scientific re­
search. One of such methods is known as content analysis. 
According to a recent evaluation, content analysis is "any 
technique for making inferences by systematically and ob­
jectively identifying specified characteristics of messages" 
(Holsti, Loomba, & North, 1968) .
In this content analysis, the messages were 75 APA 
presidential addresses, and the specified characteristics to 
be identified were the 36 prescriptive concepts. Each address 
was studied to see which prescriptions the author expressed 
and how they were expressed. The results of this process 
were systematically recorded on a coding form.
The writer's procedure for studying the addresses had
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two aspects, one qualitative and one quantitative. As each 
address was read, beginning with Ladd's address in 1893, the 
writer noted particularly forceful expressions of prescriptions 
and any other statements of particular significance, such as 
expressions of wisdom, humor, or prediction. Addresses which 
stood out for reason of clarity or originality were also 
noted. The data from this qualitative study were recorded 
in a special notebook with the intention that it would later 
be integrated with the quantitative findings.
After each individual address was read, the writer 
filled out the formal coding form, and this data constituted 
part of the quantitative data in the study. The rest of the 
quantitative data was obtained from two other judges, who were 
paid for their services. Each of the three judges read and 
coded the entire set of 75 addresses. It was assumed that by 
using three judges, each contributing one-third to the total 
pool of data, the study would be based on a firmer founda­
tion than if only one judge was used.
All three judges had been students in the Department 
of Psychology at the University of New Hampshire. In addition 
to the writer, the other judges were Elizabeth S. Goodman 
and Marilyn Merrifield. All three of the judges possessed an 
initial familiarity with the history of psychology in 
general and prescriptive theory in particular, although a
24
pilot study to be discussed later showed that this background 
was not essential to achieve reliable codings.
Three xeroxed copies of each address were made, one 
for each judge. The judges were instructed to note the ex­
pression of prescriptions in the text, if possible, by 
putting an abbreviation for the prescription in the margin. 
After reading the entire article, each judge filled out a 
coding form to provide data on that address.
It was decided to make the codings of the other two 
judges as objective as possible. Two methods of control 
were employed. (1) The addresses being coded were not iden­
tified by author, title, or year of publication. This in­
formation was clipped off each address prior to coding, and 
the address identified by a number. (2) The order of the 
addresses was randomized prior to coding, to avoid sequence 
effects. By using these methods, codings based solely on 
the contents of the individual addresses were assured from 
the other two judges.
In order to standardize the coding procedure, it 
was necessary to be as explicit as possible about the basis 
upon which the judges were to make their decisions. With 
this aim in mind, a manual was written and distributed to 
the judges. The Coding Manual (Appendix D) contained the 
coding system, an illustrated dictionary of prescriptions,
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and some general guidelines for coding. In the illustrated 
dictionary each prescription was defined in the original way 
by Watson (1967) and then elaborated by the writer. Some­
times additional definitions, which were taken from standard 
dictionaries of psychology, were also included. Further 
clarification of each prescription was attempted by the use 
of multiple examples —  an average of about eight examples 
per prescription —  culled from the literature. Each judge 
was given a copy of the Coding Manual to serve as a basis for 
learning the coding procedure and for future reference.
In sum, the experimental design of the study consisted 
of three judges each coding each of 75 presidential addresses 
in terms of 36 prescriptive concepts. The results of this 
coding process were systematically recorded on coding forms. 
The concepts and rules governing the coding process were made 
explicit in the Coding Manual, which was followed by all three 
judges. The next section describes the coding system as it 
was presented in the Manual.
The Coding System: Definition of Categories
The initial task of the judge was to determine, for 
a given address, whether each of the 36 prescriptions was 
Present or Absent. This initial judgment took priority over 
all other judgments. If a prescription was judged Present, 
the judge immediately made some further judgments about it.
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If judged Absent, the prescription was left blank on the 
coding form.
If the prescription was Present, the judge made three 
additional judgments about it. In order of occurrence these 
judgments concerned the author's position or attitude toward 
the prescription, its degree of centrality, and its form of 
expression.
First, the judge indicated which of three possible 
categories (existing along a single dimension) best described 
the author's position. These categories were Acceptance, 
Neutral, and Rejection. Definitions of these categories 
follow.
Acceptance - The prescription is supported, advocated, 
or otherwise accepted by the author.
Rejection - The prescription is disapproved, repu­
diated, or otherwise rejected by the author.
Neutral - The prescription is expressed, but the 
author does not take a position or reveal an attitude of 
acceptance or rejection. This does not mean that the author 
has no position, but rather that the prescription, as ex­
pressed, is not accepted or rejected. If the author neither 
accepts nor rejects the prescription, then it is neutral in 
status with respect to that particular manifestation.
The second judgment was an attempt to determine the
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importance, significance, or emphasis of a prescription in 
an address. Each prescription was scaled on the Dimension 
of Centrality. The assumption underlying the Centrality Di­
mension was that the more central a prescription is, the 
greater the amount of evidence for it in the address. The 
Centrality Dimension was presented as follows.
Central Peripheral
1 2 3 4
Salient Notable Moderate Incidental
The specific meaning of the categories on this scale is as
follows.
(1) Salient - This category is reserved for prescrip­
tions which stand out conspicuously from the others in terms 
of their centrality to the address.
(2) Notable - This category is for prescriptions 
whose expression is notable but not salient in the address.
(3) Moderate - This category is for prescriptions 
whose expression is moderate in comparison to the overall 
significance of the address.
(4) Incidental - This category is for prescriptions 
expressed incidentally in the address, _i.,e., as a minor 
concomitant.
The third judgment concerned the form of expression 
of a prescription. Some prescriptions are verbalized explicitly.
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Others are not explicit but nevertheless present in the ac­
tivities of the psychologist, including the activity of sci­
entific writing. In addition to identifying explicit prescrip­
tions, this study aimed to identify prescriptions which the 
author took for granted, but in doing so to be sensitive only 
to stimuli presented in the address. With this aim in mind, 
the following criterion was suggested.
An author accepts a given prescription implicitly 
if the ideas expressed in the address are logically 
dependent upon the prescription or if his view­
point could not reasonably be maintained without 
assuming the prescription.
This criterion called for the judicious use of inference on
the part of the judges, so that the communication being coded
was not limited to manifest or surface meaning, but included
latent meaning as well.
Although it was recognized that explicit and implicit 
forms of expression of a prescription are extremes on a con­
tinuum, the judges were instructed to indicate toward which 
extreme the prescriptions fell. Was it primarily explicit or 
primarily implicit in mode of expression? To help answer 
this question, some additional meaning was attached to the 
Explicit and Implicit categories.
Explicit - In this form of expression of a prescrip­
tion the writer shows recognition that there is an issue in­
volved, or that the concept he is using needs to be defined
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(not necessarily labeled). If the concept is named, it 
should be included in this category —  but the name need not 
be the "formal" name of the prescription. For example, a 
writer may describe himself as a behaviorist, in which case 
the description warrants a coding of "Contentual objectivism 
—  Acceptance —  Explicit" even though that name (Contentual 
objectivism) is not used.
Implicit - This form of expression of a prescription 
means that the writer thinks in a certain way without 
clarifying the concept which he is employing and without 
using a special name to designate his position. Thus in the 
implicit form of expression the prescription is simply taken 
for granted, but it is capable of being understood from the 
author's language. For example, a writer talks about co­
efficients of correlation, etc., or presents numbers as 
data, but does not articulate his commitment to the quanti­
tative prescription. Or an author presents some kind of 
evidence or data but does not show recognition that he is 
following the empiricistic prescription. Or an author bases 
his study on many subjects but does not say he is interested 
in general laws (Nomotheticism). Or an author contributes to 
knowledge but does not make explicit that he is interested 
in knowledge for its own sake (Purism).
In addition to the coding system, the judges were
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supplied with some general guidelines for coding. The most
important guideline specified:
The prescriptions should be treated singly and 
individually. This means that when a judge is 
coding an address he should consider each of the 
36 prescriptions separately as much as possible, 
so that whatever relations exist among prescrip­
tions are permitted to emerge from the data.
In sum, a judge was to decide on the Presence or 
Absence of each of the 36 prescriptive concepts. Prescrip­
tions which were judged to be expressed in the addresses were 
considered further in terms of the author's position (Accep­
tance, Neutral, Rejection), the Centrality Dimension, and 
their form of expression (Explicit or Implicit). The results 
were systematically recorded on the Coding Form (Appendix E).
Training Period and Pilot Study 
Special considerations were followed to see that the 
judges were properly informed about their task. A training 
period was initiated which consisted of two phases, study 
of the Coding Manual and actual practice coding of psycho­
logical articles. Each of the judges was given a Manual to 
study, and discussion sessions were held to raise questions 
about its contents or about any phase of the coding task.
Then followed practice coding of selected articles. The 
articles used were not the APA presidential addresses but 
similar in nature to them. Two presidential addresses of
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another psychological society, the Southern Society for 
Philosophy and Psychology, published in the same journals as 
the APA presidential addresses during roughly the same years 
were used. These two addresses were chosen for practice 
coding because they expressed many prescriptions and therefore 
afforded many opportunities to make judgments.
There were four reasons for undertaking the training 
period. (1) To provide some "feedback" to the judges on how 
their codings compared with each others', as a means of 
maximizing the initial agreement on concepts. (2) To compare 
methods used to compute reliability, and program the computer 
to follow these methods. (3) To get an idea of the level of 
reliability among the judges before they began coding the APA 
presidential addresses. (4) To measure the extent to which 
the codings could be made solely on the basis of information 
in the Coding Manual, exclusive of any prior psychological 
knowledge.
The training period made possible the achievement of 
the four goals. (1) Informal discussion sessions were held 
to analyze and discuss agreements and disagreements in the 
codings, and these sessions contributed to the judges' under­
standing of the task. (2) Scott's Index of Inter-Coder Agree­
ment (1955), which measures the extent to which the coding 
reliability exceeds chance, proved to be a satisfactory method
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for determining reliability (See Appendix F), and the data were 
computer-analyzed. (3) Initial levels of reliability were 
high enough to procede with the coding of the APA presidential 
addresses. (4) The extent to which the codings could be made 
solely on the basis of information in the Coding Manual, ex­
clusive of prior psychological knowledge, was measured. The 
last two of these goals provided the basis of a pilot study 
and therefore require elaboration.
Some measure of the reliability among judges was 
needed before they began coding the APA presidential addresses. 
The two articles used in the pilot study provided for 72 
possible Present or Absent codings. All three judges were in 
agreement on 50 of the 72 decisions, or a percentage of agree­
ment of .69. In terms of inter-judge reliability between each 
combination of two judges, the finding, expressed in terms of 
average percentage agreement, was .80. Expressed in terms of 
Scott's Index of Inter-Coder Agreement (1955), which measures 
the extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance, the 
corresponding average value was .60. These reliability levels, 
.80 and .60, were considered sufficient to warrant coding the 
APA presidential addresses.
The final purpose of the pilot study was to measure 
the extent to which codings could be made solely on the basis 
of information in the Coding Manual, exclusive of prior
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psychological knowledge. This was felt to be necessary be­
cause the three judges all had some initial knowledge of the 
history of psychology in general and prescriptive theory in 
particular. A person was selected who did not possess a for­
mal background in psychology beyond two courses {Meribeth 
Simpson), and she underwent the same training experience, had 
the same coding practice, and was paid the same rate as the 
other three judges. The findings were that the "non-psycholo­
gist" judge obtained slightly lower inter-judge reliabilities 
than the "psychologist" judges did among themselves, but far 
greater than would be expected by chance alone. This was true 
when reliability was measured using both the conventional 
percentage agreement and Scott's Index. With the conventional 
percentage agreement the "non-psychologist" versus "psycholo­
gist" reliabilities were .75 versus .80, and with Scott's 
Index they were .50 versus .60. These findings suggest that 
a "non-psychologist" can be trained to perform the coding 
task almost as reliably as "psychologist" judges. The im­
plication of this finding is that the results of the APA 
study are not esoteric but are objective and continuous with 
all other scientific knowledge.
Reliability of Judges 
The last section described a pilot study which has as 
one of its goals the determination of the level of reliability
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among the judges before they began coding the APA addresses.
The information concerning reliability reported in this sec­
tion was obtained from the actual data which formed the basis 
of the study. Therefore, it provides an estimate of how 
likely it is that similar findings would result if the same 
study was done using different judges.
There are three kinds of information pertaining to 
the reliability of judges: (1) information concerning the use
of the coding categories by the three judges, (2) inter-judge 
reliability information, and (3) intra-judge reliability in­
formation. The complete data providing the findings for these 
three kinds of information are contained in Appendix F, while 
the findings themselves are described below.
The average number of prescriptions coded Present in 
each address out of 36 possibilities was relatively consistent 
for the three judges: 12.3, 13.0, and 15.5 prescriptions per
address, respectively {Appendix F-6) . That is, the judges 
used roughly the same criterion for "Present" when coding pre­
scriptions. As far as the categories pertaining to the author’s 
position are concerned (Appendix F-7), all judges used the 
Acceptance category by far the most frequently: 75%, 83%, and
76%, respectively. The Neutral and Rejection categories also 
contained proportions of codings which were similar for the 
three judges. For the Neutral category, the proportions were:
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16%, 11%, and 16%, respectively; for the Rejection category, 
they were 7%, 5%, and 6%, respectively. In terms of the Di­
mension of Centrality, the judges differed considerably on the 
criteria of "Salient" and "Incidental". The proportions of 
prescriptions receiving Salient codings were; 41%, 21%, and 
15%, respectively; for the Incidental codings they were: 14%,
25%, and 37%, respectively. In terms of the form of ex­
pression (Explicit or Implicit), all three judges considered 
most prescriptions to be expressed explicitly: 68%, 64%, and
72%, respectively. These findings show that, except for their
judgments on the Centrality Dimension, the judges employed 
roughly the same criteria to identify prescriptions and the 
role they play in scientific discourse. However, more pre­
cise information is needed concerning reliability.
Reliability among the judges was measured for the two 
major decisions made by the judges: Presence or Absence of
prescriptions and the author's position (Acceptance, Neutral, 
Rejection). In terms of Presence-Absence, the average percen­
tage of agreement between the judges was .76 (Appendix F-8).
A second reliability coefficient on the same data was obtained 
by using the more conservative measure proposed by Scott (1955), 
called jai. It yielded an average reliability of .50, which 
shows that the value resulting from the conventional percen­
tage of agreement measure was not simply due to chance. In
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terms of the author's position, the average percentage of 
agreement between the judges was .82, and the average jai 
coefficient was .47 (Appendix F-9).
Inter-judge reliability is a measure of the extent to 
which different judges agree on the coding of documents. But 
how likely is the same judge to agree with his own codings at 
a later time? To estimate test-retest stability of an indivi­
dual judge over time, a sample of four addresses was selected 
and re-coded. The average length of time between first and 
second codings was about one month. The four addresses used 
for re-coding were selected at random from within each se­
quence of 20 addresses coded by each judge. In terms of 
Presence or Absence, the intra-judge percentage of agreement 
reliabilities for the three judges were: .88 (Judge 1), .78
(Judge 2), and .90 (Judge 3) —  yielding a mean of .85 
(Appendix F-10). As expected, this value is somewhat larger 
than the corresponding average inter-judge reliability of .76. 
There is more agreement between two codings done at different 
times by the same person than between codings done by two 
different persons. In terms of the author's position, the 
intra-judge reliabilities were .97 (Judge 1), .91 (Judge 2), 
and .84 (Judge 3) —  yielding a mean of .91 (Appendix F-ll). 
This value is also larger than the corresponding value of .82 
reported for inter-judge reliability.
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Treatment of the Data 
The treatment of the data and the forms in which the 
findings will be presented require explanation. This section 
provides the necessary explanation.
Nature and Scope of Addresses
Most of the APA presidential addresses have been a 
scholarly discussion of some aspect of the president's own 
work, although some, especially those given during the early 
years of the Association, were a discussion of the current 
state of the discipline. In order to provide an overview of 
the tradition of APA presidential addresses and to relate them 
to changes in the history of psychology in general, the 
addresses were analyzed along two logically independent di­
mensions, one involving the nature of the address and one in­
volving the scope of the address. Each dimension required 
a dichotomous decision on the part of the judge.
The nature of the address was determined by classi­
fying each address as having an Expository-orientation or 
a Research-orientation. The criterion of an address which 
is primarily or completely Expository-oriented is the presence 
of an exposition of the meaning of some aspect or all of 
psychology, whose burden does not directly depend upon concrete 
empirical data. This criterion is meant to differentiate,
38
among other things, addresses which pertain to the funda­
mental conceptual bases of psychology from those which pre­
sent findings within an established conceptual framework.
This class of addresses includes discussions of major problems, 
issues and methods in psychology; discussions of the relation 
of psychology to other sciences; expositions and critiques 
of psychological doctrines and concepts; theories not de­
rived from empirical data; and general historical summaries.
The criterion of an address which is primarily or completely 
Research-oriented is the presentation of information based 
upon empirical or even experimental data. This class of 
addresses includes research summaries; presentations of the 
results of an original investigation; theories or concepts 
based upon empirical data; and reviews of the research litera­
ture. In other words, an address coded as Research-oriented 
is essentially the same as a research article published in 
a standard psychological journal.
The scope of the address was determined by classifying 
each address as Broad or Narrow. A Broad address was de­
fined as one which encompasses psychology as a whole, or 
treats a problem which transcends specific areas and is signi­
ficant for psychology as a whole. A Narrow address was de­
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fined as one which is limited to a specialized area or problem 
within psychology.
For both nature and scope, each address was coded 
three times, once for each judge. When all three judges coded 
the address the same way, the common coding determined the 
final classification of the address. In cases of disagreement, 
the decision concerning the nature and scope of an address 
was based on the criterion of 2/3 of the codings. For example, 
if two judges coded a particular address as Expository in 
nature and one judge coded it Research, the address was con­
sidered to be Expository in nature. The same criterion was 
used to determine the scope of an address.
Prescriptive Issues in the Development of American Psychology
A prescription is not a static entity but a conception 
whose status changes over time. It has already been noted that 
prescriptions tend to function in contrasting pairs. What 
then has been the changing status of prescriptive issues in the 
development of American psychology? This question can be an­
swered by plotting the changes in the Acceptance codings of 
contrasting prescriptions on individual graphs. The Acceptance 
codings made up 78.3% of the total number of Present codings 
(Appendix F-7). Each graph would represent the changing 
status of a pair of prescriptions as a function of time.
40
If the prescriptions are to be plotted on graphs, one 
must be reasonably sure that the addresses expressing the pre­
scriptions sample the interests of American psychologists at 
the time the addresses were delivered. The presidents of the 
APA were sleeted after they made their contributions to 
psychology. Hence, some of their addresses, particularly the 
ones that are related to their own work, could reflect areas 
of interest that were strong some time before the addresses 
were given. However, this is not a serious problem, because 
the addresses which are related to the president's own work 
are not simple summaries; they contain significant new mater­
ial which is a contribution in its own right. Also, the 
presidents are surely as innovative and original as American 
psychologists who were not elected to the presidency; hence, 
their work, including their addresses, may be slightly ahead 
of time rather than behind time. For these reasons, it is 
unlikely that there is a systematic "time lag" with research 
areas in the addresses.
While no single address is representative of American 
psychology for a particular year, a series of ten addresses 
may be considered representative of a decade. Ten addresses 
each coded by three judges provides a data-base of 30 codings, 
which is large enough to provide reasonably stable findings. 
Yet it provides more precise information than 20-year units
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would. Hence, the status of the prescriptions was plotted by 
decade-units.
When decades are used as units to plot the status of 
prescriptions in addresses, there are 10 addresses per decade 
for four of the eight decades, but because of the missing 
addresses mentioned in the Introduction, there are three decades 
with nine addresses and one decade, 1891-1900, with only eight 
addresses. This makes it necessary to transform the number 
of Acceptance codings for each decade to percentages. Since 
each address was coded three times, the percentage is based 
on three times the number of addresses available for the 
decade, _i._e., on 30, 27, or 24 codings. On the graphs to be 
presented later, the ordinates are labeled "Percentage of 
Acceptance Codings of All Addresses in Decade".
To ease the interpretation of the results, a percentage 
may be thought of as a number of Acceptances in 10 addresses.
For example, a prescription which achieves a status of 45% 
for a certain decade may be thought of as being accepted in 
4.5 out of 10 addresses. Also, a difference of 20% in the 
status of a prescription in two adjacent decades is equivalent 
to about six Acceptance codings out of about thirty, and is 
probably a change worthy of interpretation.
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III. NATURE AND SCOPE OF ADDRESSES: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The findings in this chapter will be preceded by 
the relevant predictions and followed by discussion.
Nature of Addresses 
Prediction 1 : There will be a decrease over time in addresses
characterized as expository, whose burden does not directly 
depend upon empirical data, and a simultaneous increase in 
addresses characterized by the presentation of information 
based upon empirical or even experimental data, or the pre­
sentation of a viewpoint deriving from empirical data. 
Furthermore, this transition will occur around 1930, so that 
the addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly ex­
pository-oriented and those after about 1930 will be pre­
dominantly research-oriented. The rationale for this pre­
diction is that 1890 through the early 1930's was the 
particularly controversial period of schools in psychology, 
and the 1930’s to the present the somewhat more tolerant 
factual period in American psychology.
When the 75 APA presidential addresses are dichotomized 
in terms of their nature, there are 58 Expository addresses 
and 17 Research addresses. The temporal changes in the nature
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of the addresses are shown in Figure 1. The findings shown 
in Figure 1 support part of Prediction 1 but not all of it. 
There is a decrease in Expository addresses and an increase 
in Research addresses, which is most pronounced for addresses 
before and after 1930. However, the addresses after 1930 are 
not predominantly Research-oriented, as was predicted; only 
about 40% of them are.
The trends depicted in Figure 1 are probably a re­
flection of the changing nature of American psychology from 
an immature to a mature science. The nature of the president's 
work, and the addresses which relate to his work, have changed 
significantly: later addresses rest upon a firmer empirical 
basis. They are more likely than earlier ones to present a 
strictly scientific, rather than a purely conceptual, con­
tribution.
Nature and Prescriptions 
Prediction 2: Fewer prescriptions will be expressed in the
research-oriented addresses than in the expository addresses. 
The rationale for this prediction is that expository address­
es provide more freedom for an author to comment on issues 
and viewpoints than do research-oriented addresses.
On the average, there were 13.87 prescriptions ex­
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expressed in the Research-oriented addresses. A _t test 
showed that the difference between the means was not signifi­
cant at the .05 level. It is concluded that Expository 
and Research addresses express about the same number of pre­
scriptions.
Prediction 3 : The proportion of prescriptions which are
expressed implicitly, whatever its value relative to those 
expressed explicitly, will be larger in the research-oriented 
addresses than in the expository addresses. The rationale 
for this prediction is that many prescriptions are implicit 
in the activities of psychologists as research workers, and 
therefore research-oriented addresses would be expected to be 










Table 1 shows that 28% of the prescriptions in the 
Expository addresses were expressed implicitly, whereas 
47% of the prescriptions in the Research addresses were 
implicit. A chi square test done on the cell frequencies 
indicated that the difference was significant at the .01 level,
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It is concluded that the proportion of implicity expressed 
prescriptions is significantly larger in the Research addresses 
than in the Expository addresses.
Scope of Addresses 
Prediction 4i There will be a decrease over time in addresses 
which encompass psychology as a whole, or treat a problem which 
transcends specific areas and is significant for psychology as 
a whole, and a simultaneous increase in addresses which are 
limited to a specialized area of problem within psychology. 
Furthermore, this transition will occur around 1930, so that the 
addresses before about 1930 will be predominantly broad in scope 
and those after about 1930 will be predominantly narrow in scope. 
The rationale for this prediction is that before the early 
1930's was the period in the history of American psychology in 
which the various schools each claimed comprehensiveness for 
its psychological system, and after the early 1930's the more 
specialized factual period in American psychology.
When the 75 addresses are dichotomized in terms of 
their scope, there are 47 Narrow addresses and 28 Broad 
addresses. The temporal changes in the scope of the addresses 
are shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows that about 72% of the 
addresses given during the first 20 years of the Association, 
1891-1910, encompassed psychology as a whole or were signifi­


































Fig. 2. Presidential addresses of the 
American Psychological Association with broad 
scope and narrow scope in four periods.
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later were limited to a specialized area or problem within 
psychology. The transition does not occur around 1930, as 
was predicted. The greatest specialization in the tradition 
of the APA president's address occurred relatively early, in 
fact as early as the second and third decades of the century. 
This fact is based upon the results of a chi square test done 
on the cell frequencies which showed that the shift from the 
first period (1891-1910) to the second period (1911-1930) was 
significant at the .01 level, while none of the other shifts 
in adjacent periods were significant.
Nature and Scope Considered Jointly 
The foregoing discussion has focused on the changes 
in the nature and scope of the addresses separately. The 
distribution of addresses on both dimensions jointly is con­
sidered in this section. These two dimensions dichotomously 
treated result in four possible combinations. The average 
number of addresses for each combination is shown in Table 2. 
A chi square test indicated that there was a significant 
difference between observed and expected frequencies at the 












Table 2 shows that two possible combinations are 
most frequent, one combination is moderately frequent, and 
one possible combination is without any addresses at all. The 
two most frequent types are the Expository-Broad and the 
Expository-Narrow. Of the addresses classified as Expository 
in nature, about half were Broad and half Narrow in scope.
All of the addresses which were classified as Research-oriented 
were Narrow in scope.
The changes which have taken place in the APA tradition 
with respect to the three types of addresses are shown in 
Figure 3. The years 1891 to 1910 were characterized by 
expository addresses which were broad in scope, while the 
years 1911 to 1930 were mostly expository addresses which were 
narrow in scope. The last 40 years have seen varying proportions 
of all three types of addresses, with no one type predominant.
Overall, the results show that two major transitions 
have occurred in the tradition of APA presidential addresses.
The first was a transition toward specialization, which 
occurred shortly after the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Before that time the presidents thought in broad 
terms and frequently discussed the philosophical foundations 
of psychology or psychology's relation to other sciences.
Hall's first address, "The History and Prospects of Experi­
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Fig. 3. Presidential addresses of the 
American Psychological Association with three 
orientations in four periods.
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Examples of broad addresses include: "The Problems of 
Psychology" (Ladd, 1893), "Psychology and the Other Sciences" 
(Cattell, 1895) , "Psychology and History" (Milnsterberg, 1898) , 
"Psychology and Social Practice" (Dewey, 1899), "Psychology 
and Physics" (Sanford, 1902), "Theory and Practice" (Bryan, 
1903), "The Province of Functional Psychology" (Angell, 1906). 
After 1910, the addresses became more limited in scope. 
Although far too numerous to mention in their entirety, some 
of the specialized addresses may serve as illustrative: 
"Ideo-Motor Action" (Thorndike, 1912), "The Mental Test as a 
Psychological Method" (Terman, 1923), "A Developmental Theory 
of Intelligence" (Garrett, 1946), "Creativity" (Guilford,
1950), "Analytic Studies of Drive and Reward" (Miller, 1961).
The second transition which occurred in the APA 
tradition was less pronounced than the first and occurred 
later. It was the trend away from addresses which were 
expository in nature toward more formal research presentations 
This trend showed its greatest shift in the 1930's and 1940's, 
and has progressed to the point where almost 40% of the 
addresses since 1931 have been research-oriented.
Taking these two trends together, it may be concluded 
that the tradition of APA presidential addresses has been 
characterized by a progression from broad expositions about 
psychology to narrow research investigations within psychology
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Of course, there have been some recent distinguished ex­
ceptions to this transition which preserve the early spirit 
of the founding fathers, such as the addresses by Cronbach 
(1957), Hebb (I960), Bruner (1965), Miller (1969), and Albee 
(1970).
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IV. PREDICTED PRESCRIPTIVE TRENDS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter and the next examine changes over time
4in the status of contrasting prescriptions. Before individual 
changes can be interpreted, however, the average Acceptance 
of all 36 prescriptions for each decade must be known, to see 
if there is any general trend in the Acceptance of prescriptions 
over time. The average Acceptance of all 36 prescriptions 
across judges for each decade was calculated, and the results 
are shown on the graphs which follow. The results are rela­
tively consistent across decades at about 30% of the codings 
of all addresses in each decade. This means that there was 
no general trend of prescriptions to increase or decrease in 
Acceptance; therefore, significant deviations from the hori­
zontal line representing the average of all prescriptions may 
be interpreted as individual phenomena.
This chapter is devoted to findings concerning those 
pairs of prescriptions for which some prediction was made; 
the next chapter examines findings concerning those pairs of 
prescriptions for which no prediction was made. However, for 
convenience findings of interest other than those strictly 
4
Prediction 5, which concerns the prominence of prescriptions, 
is examined in Appendix G.
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relating to the predictions are discussed here. The outline 
of the discussion is as follows. First will be considered the 
acceptance over time of the first prescription of the contrasting 
pair. Then will be considered the acceptance of the second 
prescription. These two considerations pertain to the 
acceptance of the prescription in relation to all prescriptions, 
as represented by the horizontal line on the graphs. Third 
will be considered the acceptance of the two contrasting pre­
scriptions relative to each other, to see if one prescription 
is dominant over the other. The discussion will procede from 
a consideration of the findings of this study, to a considera­
tion of the relation of the findings to other quantitative 
studies of historical trends in psychology, to some illustra­
tions of the conceptions in the history of American psychology. 
Sources other than presidential addresses will be used fre­
quently when needed.
The reader is reminded that the definitions of the 
prescriptions may be reviewed by consulting the Introduction 
(for Watson's definitions) or Appendix D (for Watson's 
definitions elaborated by the writer).
Contentual objectivism - Contentual subjectivism 
Prediction 6: Contentual objectivism will be increasingly
accepted after 1913, the date of the formal founding of be­
haviorism with the publication of John B. Watson's article
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"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," to the point where 
it is so pervasive a conception in contemporary American psy­
chology that it is the major ingredient in the definition of 
psychology. Contentual subjectivism will decrease in acceptance 
after 1913 but will recover to the point where it is an im­
portant part of contemporary American psychology, although 
still overshadowed by Contentual objectivism. In other words, 
Contentual objectivism is dominant and Contentual subjectivism 
counter-dominant in contemporary American psychology. The 
aspect of this prediction concerning Contentual objectivism 
is based on general reading of standard sources in the history 
of psychology (Heidbreder, 1933; Boring, 1950; Brunswik, 1952; 
Marx & Hillix, 1963; Watson, 1971) and the findings of other 
studies (Allport, 1940; Coan, 1968), while the aspect concerning 
Contentual subjectivism is based on the writer's own speculation.
Figure 4 shows a pronounced overall increase in the 
acceptance of Contentual objectivism. The initial sharp 
increase occurred around the second decade of the century, 
with a somewhat irregular pattern developing after that.
The initial increase corresponds to the inception of be­
haviorism. Overall, the results show that psychological 
data were conceptualized in behavioral terms by the 1930's, 
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Fig. 4. Author's acceptance of Contentual 
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism in 75 APA 
presidential addresses coded by three judges.
(The average acceptance of all 36 prescriptions is 
shown by the horizontal line.)
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during the last forty years. This aspect of the findings 
corresponds with the prediction.
Figure 4 also shows that Contentual subjectivism has 
decreased consistently in acceptance from a position of para­
mount importance in the 1890's. The remarkable feature of 
this pattern is the consistency with which the decrease has 
taken place, with each succeeding decade showing a slightly 
lower degree of acceptance of the prescription. The predicted 
acceptance-decrease-recovery pattern, with the decrease 
corresponding to the rise of Contentual objectivism, does not 
occur. Instead, the finding is one of an initially strong 
commitment to the study of mind or experience by psychologists, 
followed by constant weakening of that commitment to the point 
where experience is part of the subject matter of contemporary 
psychology but of less importance than behavior.
In terms of the relative acceptance of the two pre­
scriptions, the findings are that Contentual subjectivism 
was dominant and Contentual objectivism counter-dominant 
during the first 40 years, 1891-1930, and the reverse true 
during the last 40 years, 1931-1970. Within this general 
finding, there are several further points of interest. The 
years 1891 to 1910 show the almost complete dominance of the 
mentalistic prescription over the behavioral one, but this 
gave way to a much weaker degree of dominance during the next
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two decades, 1911-1930, when behaviorism came in vogue. Even 
after behaviorism had begun, subjective phenomena were con­
sidered a vital part of the subject matter of psychology and, 
although losing some ground, they have never ceased to be so. 
But during the last forty years Contentual objectivism has 
been dominant and Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant, 
a finding which accords well with the initial prediction.
These findings showing a shift from the use of 
mentalistic concepts in psychology to behavioral ones are 
consistent with those of several other studies {Allport, 1940; 
Bruner & Allport, 1940; Coan, 1968). Bruner and Allport (1940) 
found a sharp decline over time in the treatment of mental 
processes as entities and a simultaneous increase in their 
treatment as constructs. Coan1s (1968) first factor, Sub- 
jectivistic versus Objectivistic, showed a progressive in­
crease in objectivism. The findings from the three studies 
support the hypothesis of Brunswik (1950), who predicted a 
continuous change from subjectivism to objectivism in psy­
chology.
One of the greatest problems in the history of 
psychology has been the problem of defining the subject matter 
of psychology. Psychology was classically defined as the 
science of the conscious mind. Fullerton, for example, 
stated: " [The psychologist] is . . . concerned with the
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contents of consciousness, mental phenomena and their inter­
relations, and whatever else (if there be anything else) 
sufficiently resembles mental phenomena to be found in a 
consciousness"(1897, p. 4). This view prevailed for about 
three decades in American psychology, from the 1880's through 
the first decade of the twentieth century.
During the first decade of the twentieth century the 
definition of psychology as the science of consciousness began 
to be questioned. The first suggestion made by an APA president 
that psychology should study something other than consciousness, 
was made by C. H. Judd in his address in 1909.
The science of psychology will not find itself 
until it turns away from impressions and sensory 
details and recognizes that the inner processes 
of conscious organization so transform sensory 
elements that there is in sensation little of 
value for the student of consciousness. Behavior 
on the other hand is the expression and end of all 
inner organization. To study behavior more com­
pletely is therefore the most urgent of our problems,
— in a very important sense it is our chief problem 
(1910, p. 95).
Of course there were those who thought psychology should 
embrace both the mental and the behavioral (Warren, 1914), 
or who employed the awkward term "mental behavior" to 
designate psychology's subject matter (Terman, 1923; Miles,
1932), or who preferred to include both the mental and the 
physiological within psychology (Langfeld, 1931). But the 
growing tendency was to conceive of the subject matter of
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psychology in exclusively behavioral terms.
The behavioristic phase of the history of psychology
formally begins in 1913 with John B. Watson's manifesto,
"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." In this paper
Watson asserted:
The time seems to have come when psychology must 
discard all reference to consciousness; when it 
need no longer delude itself into thinking that 
it is making mental states the object of observa­
tion. We have become so enmeshed in speculative 
questions concerning the . . . mind, the nature 
of conscious content (for example, imageless 
thought, attitudes, and Bewusseinslage, etc.) that 
I . . . feel that something is wrong with our pre­
mises and types of problems which develop from 
them (1913, p. 163).
Going further, Watson prescribed the next step: "What we
need to do is to start work upon psychology, making behavior,
not consciousness, the objective point of attack" (1913,
pp. 175-176).
Another behaviorist, Walter S. Hunter, attempted to
delineate the meaning of behavior for psychologists in his
address in 1931, "The Psychological Study of Behavior."
In doing so he hoped to separate psychology from physiology.
In attempting to indicate the essential character­
istics of that behavior which constitutes the core 
of the subject matter of psychology, I have found 
it necessary to use such terms as external adapta­
tion, extrinsic behavior, and social environment.
If I were now to attempt a definition of contemporary 
American psychology, not as it ought to be, nor as 
I wish it were, but as I think it is, the result 
would be as follows: Psychology seeks to describe
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and explain, to predict and control, the extrinsic 
behavior of the organism to an external environment 
which is predominantly social. It is thus to be 
contrasted with physiology which describes and ex­
plains that behavior which is intrinsic to the 
various structures of the organism, behavior which 
is essentially subcutaneous and which involves 
adaptations to the highly uniform internal environ­
ment (1932, pp. 23-24).
Hunter's definition of psychology illustrates how behavior 
was frequently conceived during the behavioristic phase of 
the history of psychology.
The later behavioristic phase of the history of psy­
chology is characterized by its treatment of internal events—  
formerly called consciousness —  as intervening variables or 
theoretical constructs. Illustrating this trend are the 
addresses by Hull (1936), Tolman (1937), Mowrer (1954), and 
Osgood (1963). Their common conviction was well stated by 
Hebb, who said in his 1960 address: "Mind and consciousness, 
sensations and perceptions, feelings and emotions, all are 
intervening variables or constructs and properly part of a 
behavioristic psychology" (I960, p. 740).
Methodological objectivism - Methodological subjectivism 
Prediction 7: Methodological objectivism and Methodological
subjectivism will follow roughly the same pattern as Contentual 
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism in the history of 
American psychology, except that Methodological subjectivism 
will show a progressive decline after 1913 rather than gradual
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recovery. The basis of this prediction is general reading 
of standard sources in the field (e.g., Heidbreder, 1933; 
Boring, 1950; Brunswik, 1952; Marx & Hillix, 1963; Watson,
1971) and the findings of other studies (Allport, 1940, Coan, 
1968) .
Figure 5 shows that Methodological objectivism was 
quite widely accepted in the early decades of psychology's 
history and then, with the rise of behaviorism, became a pre­
scription of overwhelming significance in American psychology, 
and has maintained its importance to the present. At the 
same time Methodological subjectivism began as quite widely 
accepted and has tapered off to the point where it is no 
longer a viable conception in American psychology. Relatively 
speaking, Methodological subjectivism has not competed success­
fully with Methodological objectivism since before the rise 
of behaviorism in the second decade of the century. Since 
that time Methodological objectivism has been so dominant 
that it has incited relatively little opposition.
Congruent with these findings are the findings of 
Allport (1940) and Bruner and Allport (1940). Their findings 
show that there were relatively few articles published in 
American psychology which were based on strictly introspective 
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Fig. 5. Author's acceptance of Methodologi­
cal objectivism and Methodological subjectivism in 
75 APA presidential addresses coded by three judges. 
(The average acceptance of all 36 prescriptions is 
shown by the horizontal line.)
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studies in 1938. The authors were prompted to remark: "The 
entries under Category 10 [Introspective studies] indicate 
that the pages and pages of critical discussion devoted to 
the problems of introspection were scarcely justified by the 
slim output of articles based on strictly introspective pro­
cedures. In all years the figures are low" (1940, p. 766). 
On the other hand, the composite category designated 
"Methodological positivism" revealed both a large percentage 
of articles and a pronounced increase in the percentage of 
articles across the years.
The findings of this study are also related to those 
of Coan (1968). Coan's first factor, which was labeled Sub- 
jectivistic versus Objectivistic, showed "a progressive in­
crease in objectivism" from the decade of the 1880's to the 
decade of the 1950's. While showing no progressive increase, 
the present study shows an overall increase of major pro­
portions in the methodologically objective orientation of 
American psychology.
When psychology emerged as a discipline the first 
method used was self-observation or introspection. This 
method was usually combined with experiment? experimental , 
introspection was the classical method of psychology. Later, 
experiment alone became the preferred method.
In 1890, William James asserted in the Principles
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that introspection was psychology’s primary method: "Intro­
spective Observation is what we have to rely on first and 
foremost and always. The word introspection need hardly be 
defined— it means, of course, the looking into our own minds 
and reporting what we there discover" (1890, p. 185). George 
Trumbull Ladd was even more forceful in his address in 1893.
He said; "That no method can be developed in psychology which 
will enable us to dispense with introspection, or which will 
cease to be very largely dependent, for its own value, upon 
the value of the introspection which accompanies it, is too 
obvious to require discussion" (1894, p. 6).
However, the Zeitgeist— the spirit of the times— was 
changing, and in 1913 Watson declared: "Psychology as the 
behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental 
branch of natural science. . . . Introspection forms no 
essential part of its methods" (1913, p. 158). Watson was 
elected to the presidency of the APA two years after his 
classic statement. He began his address in 1915, "The Place 
of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology," by saying:
Since the publication two years ago of my somewhat 
impolite papers against current methods in psychology 
I have felt it incumbent upon me before making further 
unpleasant remarks to suggest some method which we 
might begin to use in place of introspection. . . .1 
wish in my remarks tonight to report what progress 
has been made in this direction (1916, p. 89).
Psychology was to adopt the method of conditioned reflexes,
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modeled after either Pavlov's conditioned secretion reflexes 
or Bekhterev's conditioned motor reflexes. This method, 
which did not depend for its validity upon verbalization, 
could be applied to either animal or human subjects, and so 
was thought to serve admirably the purposes of an objective 
psychology. In 1919, Watson published his most comprehensive 
text, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Here 
he presented the objective methods of human psychology. Watson's 
classification included the following.
I. Observation, with and without instrumental control.
II. The conditioned reflex methods.
(a) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned 
secretion reflexes.
{b) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned 
motor reflexes.
III. The verbal report method.
IV. Methods of testing.
When he included verbal report among the legitimate 
methods in psychology, Watson did not go back upon his 
commitment to objective methods. He considered verbal report 
a speech reaction or, more broadly, language behavior. The 
verbal reports themselves were the data and not the exper­
iences described by the verbal reports. In this sense, verbal 
report, like any other kind of behavior, is open to verifica­
tion by another competent observer, and is an expression of 
Methodological objectivism.
Despite some controversy, the use of objective methods 
in psychology became even more widespread in the wake of the
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behaviorist revolution. Walter S. Hunter described the
phenomenon in his address in 1931.
In America we seem to be emerging at last from an 
era of controversy concerning what psychology is 
or ought to be. For good or ill the onward march 
of experiment, which no mere speculation and con­
troversy can halt, has carried psychology along 
the way of the objective study of human behavior.
With the development of institutes for the study 
of the child and for the investigation of human 
relations, not to mention the post-war developments 
in the study of behavior tests and animal behavior, 
this objective tendency is ever more firmly estab­
lished (1932, p. 2).
In sum, around the turn of the century the methodologi­
cal issue was controversial, and Methodological subjectivism 
and objectivism vied for supremacy. But ever since the rise 
of behaviorism in the second decade of the century, there 
has been a growing emphasis upon objective methods in psychol­
ogy, with the implication that such methods lead to reliable 
results. Bergmann (1956), for example, recently remarked that 
"methodological behaviorism, like Functionalism, has conquered 
itself to death. It, too, has become a truism. Virtually 
every American psychologist, whether he knows it or not, is 
nowadays a methodological behaviorist" (1956, p. 270) . The 
reliance upon objective methods is one of the most salient 
characteristics of contemporary American psychology.
Peripheralism - Centralism 
Prediction 8 ; Peripheralism and Centralism will show roughly
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the same pattern as Contentual objectivism and contentual 
subjectivism in the history of American psychology (Allport, 
1940; Coan, 1968), although they will not be as widely 
accepted as the latter.
One of the noteworthy features of the results dis­
played in Figure 6, as contrasted with those for Contentual 
objectivism and Contentual subjectivism, is that Peripheralism 
and Centralism are not as widely accepted prescriptions. 
Furthermore, Peripheralism shows an increase through the 1930's, 
but then, unlike Contentual objectivism, decreases in acceptance 
to the present. The decline in the acceptance of Peripheralism 
since the growth of behaviorism in the 1930's, but not in 
Contentual objectivism, may be interpreted as a change in 
the behavioral prescription. The behaviorists began by 
delimiting the subject matter of psychology in terms of the 
criterion of public observation. Behavior had to be seen.
The later behaviorists, however, were more liberal: they 
admitted internal events into the realm of legitimate data, 
but they insisted upon conceptualizing those events in be­
havioral terms. Behavior as the major category of psychology 
now included internal events as well as external ones, so 
that Peripheralism, with its exclusive emphasis on external 
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Fig. 6. Author's acceptance of Peripheralism 
and Centralism in 75 APA presidential addresses coded 
by three judges. (The average acceptance of all 36 
prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line*)
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matter of psychology. Consequently, Peripheralism is not 
now a viable conception, except for a few exceptionally 
tough-minded behaviorists.
Centralism was widely accepted from the 18901s through 
the 1920's, and was dominant over Peripheralism during that 
time, but it has since decreased in strength so that its 
current status is moderate. The sharpest decrease in Centralism 
occurred during the 1930's, which was also the decade of the 
strongest acceptance of Peripheralism. This shift may be due 
to the influence of behaviorism.
Functionalism - Structuralism 
Prediction 9; Functionalism will increase in acceptance after 
the turn of the century and continue its pervasive influence 
up to and including the present. The most explicit expression 
of this prescription occurred shortly after the turn of the 
century in the form of a broad, loosely articulated movement 
known as functional psychology. Functionalism does not exist 
as a system of psychology today; it has been absorbed into 
the mainstream of American psychology. For this reason it 
has often been said that contemporary American psychology is 
functional in character (Heidbreder, 1933; Marx & Hillix, 1963; 
Watson, 1965; Chaplin & Krawiec, 1968; Watson, 1971). Struc­
turalism in the form of the school of structural psychology
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will collapse around the turn of the century, but Structuralism 
as a prescription will continue to be a viable conception, 
regardless of whether the data of psychology are conceived as 
mentalistic, behavioral, or physiological. This last aspect 
of the prediction is based on the writer's speculations stemming 
from prescriptive theory.
Figure 7 shows that Functionalism has increased in 
acceptance after the turn of the century and has maintained 
a consistent level of very wide acceptance since that time.
This was the predicted course of the functional prescription 
in American psychology. Structuralism, on the other hand, 
has decreased in acceptance since the turn of the century to 
a position of moderate acceptance, and is even weaker today.
Part of this trend probably reflects the demise of the structural 
school of psychology and was predicted, but the decline in 
acceptance was not predicted to be so great. It was thought 
that the structural conception would remain after the collapse 
of the structural school, implicit, if not explicit, in the 
formulation of the subject matter of psychology. Considering 
the relative acceptance of Functionalism and Structuralism, 
the results show that Functionalism has been consistently 
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Fig. 7. Author's acceptance of Functionalism 
and Structuralism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
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psychology since the second decade of the century.
Structuralism declined in acceptance around the turn
of the century, a trend which is a reflection of the demise
of the structural school of psychology. At this time, the
classical structural school was challenged by a broad, loosely
articulated movement known as functional psychology. Joseph
Jastrow helped to usher in this movement in his address in
1900, "Some Currents and Undercurrents in Psychology."
The conception that will serve as the background for 
my survey will be that of psychology as the science 
of mental functions. The attitude towards mental 
phenomena which this conception emphasizes came into 
prominence in the wake of the evolutionary wave that 
so wonderfully and so permanently altered the face of 
the waters. The conception of mental endowment as a 
growth-process and as a response to complex environ­
mental conditions at once cast a blinding light upon 
an area of dimly-lit chaos in which dogmatism and 
misconception and neglect held a confused occupation. 
Not alone the illuminating truth that human mentality 
was intimately and significantly related to the men­
tal endowment of animals was thus realized as a living 
and momentous reality, but, like the discovery of a 
new planet in the solar system, there entered our 
universe a new pivotal force. It brought us to realize 
that human history from its embodiment in the stone 
axe or the bone amulet, from the sculptured rocks of 
ancient America and the picture writings of ancient 
Egypt, from primitive cult to old-time science and 
to modern superstition, from savage myth to medieval 
legend and present-day folk-lore, is of a nature all 
compact. These and all other spheres of human achieve­
ment became suffused with the glow of a new interest, 
took on a richer coloring and shone with a fuller 
meaning in the light of this supremely significant con­
ception. Into the dry bones was breathed new life, 
and the thoughts of men were widened by a keener in­
sight of the increasing purpose that through the ages 
runs (1901, pp. 5-6) .
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Jastrow described Functionalism as an undercurrent but said 
he wanted to see it become one of the main currents in psy­
chology.
The advent of functional psychology prompted Titchener, 
the champion of structural psychology, to undertake a clari­
fication of structural and functional psychology in his paper 
"The Postulates of A Structural Psychology" in 1898. He 
contrasted them in the following way.
The point which I wish now to make is this: that,
employing the same principle of division, we can 
represent modern psychology as the exact counterpart 
of modern biology. . . .
1. We find a parallel to morphology in a very 
large portion of "experimental" psychology. The 
primary aim of the experimental psychologist has been 
to analyze the structure of mind; to ravel out the 
elemental processes from the tangle of consciousness, 
or (if we may change the metaphor) to isolate the 
constituents in the given conscious formation. His 
task is a vivisection, but a vivisection which shall 
yield structural, not functional results. . . .
2. There is, however, a functional psychology, 
over and above this psychology of structure. . . .
We may regard [the mind] . . .  as the collective 
name for a system of functions of the psychophysical 
organism. . . .
Just as experimental psychology is to a large 
extent concerned with problems of structure, so is 
"descriptive" psychology, ancient and modern, chiefly 
occupied with problems of function. Memory, recogni­
tion, imagination, conception, judgment, attention, 
apperception, volition, and a host of verbal nouns, 
wider or narrower in denotation, connote, in the 
discussions of descriptive psychology, functions of 
the total organism. That their underlying processes 
are psychical in character is, so to speak, an 
accident; for all practical purposes they stand upon
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the same level as digestion and locomotion, secre­
tion and excretion (1898, p. 449-450).
A structural prescription and a functional prescription 
existed side by side in American psychology at the turn of 
the century, each held primarily by a distinct group of 
psychologists. The structural psychologists were united by 
their belief that psychology should make its business the 
"structure" of mind, _i.,e., the mind's conscious contents, like 
sensations, images, and affections. The functional psycholo­
gists soon came to oppose this view, arguing that the mind 
was not a group of contents, but a system of activities which 
better enabled the individual to adjust to his environment.
The structural and functional prescriptions were 
each functioning effectively around the turn of the century, 
guiding different groups of psychologists in their activities. 
But in 1905, Mary Calkins attempted to reconcile the two 
prescriptions in her address, "A Reconciliation Between 
Structural and Functional Psychology." She wrote:
The object of this paper is to show that the two 
conceptions, structural and functional, are readily 
combined, if only the basal fact of psychology be 
conceived as a conscious self, that is, as a self­
being-conscious. The combination of the two pro­
cedures is— I shall argue— in this way made possible 
because a self-being-conscious is not only analyzable 
into elements but is also a complex of relations to 
its environment, social and physical (1906, p. 63).
While Titchener was sharpening the contrast between
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structural and functional psychology, and Calkins was trying 
to reconcile them, others sought to evaluate the current 
status of the new functional psychology. The best exposition 
was presented in 1906 by James Rowland Angell in his address, 
"The Province of Functional Psychology," Angell believed 
that the aim of functional psychology was interpreted in 
several different ways, and he delineated three conceptions 
of functionalism. The three conceptions were (1) functionalism 
conceived as the psychology of mental operations in contrast 
to the psychology of mental elements, (2) the functionalism 
which deals with the problem of mind conceived as primarily 
engaged in mediating between the environment and the needs 
of the organism, and (3) functionalism as psychophysical 
psychology. Angell later argued that these three conceptions 
are all aspects of a single problem, the problem "of deter­
mining just how mind participates in accommodatory reactions" 
(1907, p. 88) .
It may be said in summary that the functional school 
of psychology, like all schools, was founded upon protest 
and, with the demise of the structural school, became 
dominant. Since there was then nothing left to protest 
against, it too passed away. But the main tenet of the 
functional school— the prescription that psychology should 
concern itself with what the processes of mental life and
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behavior do to help the organism adjust to its environment—  
was quickly absorbed into the mainstream of American psychology. 
For this reason contemporary American psychology is often con­
sidered to be functional in character.
Quantitativism - Qualitativism 
Prediction 10: Quantitativism will increase in acceptance
(Bills, 1938; Allport, 1940; Watson, 1965), with a concurrent 
decrease in acceptance of Qualitativism.
Figure 8 shows an overall increase in the acceptance 
of Quantitativism. The specific pattern is a very pronounced 
increase in acceptance during the second decade of the cen­
tury, followed by a drop, and then strong recovery lasting 
several decades. Finally, there is a notable decrease in 
the 1960's. Qualitativism, by contrast, has maintained a 
consistent level of "average" acceptance from the 1890's to 
the 1960's. This finding differs from the prediction, which 
postulated a stronger initial acceptance of Qualitativism 
and subsequent decrease in strength. Considered in relative 
terms, Quantitativism has been dominant and Qualitativism 
counter-dominant in American psychology since the second de­
cade of the century.
The above findings are congruent with those of Allport 
(1940) and Bruner and Allport (1940). Their category, "The 
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statistical aid, ranging from simple measures of variability 
and correlation to complex factorial procedures. This cate­
gory showed the greatest increase of the 32 categories em­
ployed by Bruner and Allport. The authors concluded:
Quantitatively, the most striking change in 50 
years is the great increase in the use of statis­
tical aids in psychological research, shown in 
Category 11. In part this rise reflects the grow­
ing proficiency of psychologists in the use of 
techniques of critical investigation, and in part, 
no doubt, it reflects the preoccupation with quanti­
tative standards of excellence characteristic of 
most American cultural activities— even science 
(1940, pp. 766-767).
Coan's (1968) fourth factor, Quantitative versus 
Qualitative, showed a trend over time in psychological theory 
from quantitative to qualitative to quantitative emphases, in 
which the second quantitative emphasis was stronger than the 
earlier one. This finding differs from the present study and 
the Bruner and Allport study, which both show a unidirectional 
increase of major proportions in the quantitative orientation 
of American psychology.
Even in the early years of the history of psychology 
there were psychologists who were advocating the use of 
measurement. One of the strongest advocates of the quanti­
tative prescription at that time was J. McKeen Cattell, who 
as early as 1895 said:
Now it seems to me . . . that measurements have just 
the same place in psychology as in the material 
sciences, except in so far as they have not been as
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yet so successfully prosecuted. The immediate end 
of science, whether physical or mental, is to describe 
the world . . .  in so far as a description of the 
world is an end in itself, measurements are a part 
of this description, and by far the most exact, 
general and economical method of description hitherto 
devised (1896, p. 140).
The acceptance of Quantitativism was, to a large 
extent, a consequence of the general behavioristic recon­
ception of psychology's subject matter in terms of behavior. 
Behavior is concrete and tangible; it can be subjected to 
measurement. Although the quantitative prescription appears 
in APA addresses as widely diversified as those devoted to 
the psychology of music (Seashore, 1911), vocational guidance 
(Scott, 1919), and factor analysis (Thurstone, 1933), it is 
most explicit in Woodrow's address in 1941, "The Problem of 
General Quantitative Laws in Psychology." Woodrow expressed 
the sentiments of many psychologists when he wrote:
The viewpoint believed to be the most serviceable 
in the formulation of quantitative laws rests 
largely upon the nature of the primary, quantitative 
data of psychology. If one examines any large 
number of psychological investigations, he will find 
that the actual observations deal with the activities 
of organisms or the more or less immediate results 
of these activities. These activities are usually 
described in connection with the environmental cir­
cumstances under which they occur. . . . One after 
another, psychological systems come to the fore and 
then subside; but the measurements of psychology 
continue to be, as they have always been, measure­
ments of attributes of behavioral responses or their 
products and of the environmental conditions under 
which these responses occur. From the fact that the 
primary observations of psychology are in the first 
instance almost entirely observations of surface
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behavior and its products, and from the further 
fact that the attributes of such behavior are 
measurable, it follows naturally that psychology 
is very largely a quantitative science . (1942, pp. 1-2).
Today qualitative speculation, no matter how brilliant, 
"is apt to be considered worthwhile only if it be a prelude 
to a form in which it can be restated so as to be measured" 
(Watson, 1965). The use of quantitative techniques and pro­
cedures is so widespread that American psychology may be 
characterized as predominantly quantitative in nature.
Nomotheticism - Idiographicism 
Prediction 11; Nomotheticism will be dominant and Idio­
graphicism counter-dominant throughout the history of American 
psychology up to the present (Allport, 1940; Watson, 1965).
Figure 9 shows a similar pattern for Nomotheticism 
and Idiographicism: initial acceptance followed by attenuation
and then growing acceptance again. This pattern is not as 
striking for Idiographicism as it is for Nomotheticism, but 
the parallel between the two prescriptions is noteworthy. 
Nomotheticism shows very strong acceptance since the 1930's, 
although it drops precipitously during the last decade. 
Idiographicism shows moderately strong acceptance during the 
last three decades. In terms of relative acceptance, Nomo­
theticism has been dominant and Idiographicism counter-dominant 
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The relation of dominance and counter-dominance 
between Nomotheticism and Idiographicism has existed through­
out the development of American psychology. Being a scientific 
goal rather than an artistic one, the search for general laws 
was taken for granted as being the aim of psychology, while 
explaining particular events or individuals was of interest 
to a minority of psychologists. The strongest acceptance of 
Idiographicism was during the 1890’s; since that time there 
has been a decline, but most recently a slight increase in 
its acceptance. The increase in the acceptance of Nomotheti­
cism has been far more rapid, however.
The above finding of initial strength of Idiographicism 
followed by decline is supported by the findings of Bruner 
and Allport (1940). Their category of "Articles dealing 
with the single case" is substantially the same as the idio- 
graphic prescription, and it received the highest percentage 
of articles in the decade of the 1890's and then declined 
through 1938. With respect to the last decade they consider­
ed, 1938, the authors commented, "Most psychologists do not 
regard clinical cases, individual life histories, or single 
historical events as appropriate material for professional 
publication" (1940, p. 768). While this statement is still 
true, the findings of the present study, which extends beyond 
1938 to the present, show a moderate increase in the idio-
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graphic point of view in American psychology.
Purism - Utilitarianism 
Prediction 12: Purism will be accepted throughout the
history of American psychology. Utilitarianism will become 
accepted shortly after the turn of the century and then will 
increase steadily in acceptance, but will remain counter­
dominant in contemporary American psychology (Misiak & Sexton, 
1966) .
Figure 10 shows that Purism has been very widely 
accepted in the history of American psychology, although a 
noteworthy decline occurred during the last decade. Utili­
tarianism has also been very widely accepted, although not 
as strong as Purism, and it has become more widely accepted 
during the last few decades. Examination of the relative 
acceptance of these two prescriptions shows that Purism has 
been dominant and Utilitarianism counter-dominant in American 
psychology until the last decade, when the reverse was true.
Although both Purism and Utilitarianism have been 
very widely accepted in the history of American psychology, 
the acceptance of pure research has been, on the whole, 
considerably stronger than the acceptance of applied psy­
chology. It has been felt by most psychologists that pure 
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the latter depends upon a strong commitment to the former. 
However, a distinct trend is apparent: there has been a
marked increase in the acceptance of applied psychology in 
the last 40 years, and in fact it was more widely accepted 
in the 1960's than was pure psychology.
Bruner and Allport's (1940) category "Applied psy­
chology, " defined as including theoretical and experimental 
contributions aimed primarily at the direct application of 
psychological principles to life outside the laboratory, 
showed a decline in percentage of articles over time. How­
ever, in view of the activity of the American Association for 
Applied Psychology (AAAP) and the Society for the Psychologi­
cal Study of Social Issues {SPSSI), Allport (1940) was led 
to remark:
The conclusion to be drawn, I think, is not that 
our membership as a whole is less interested in 
the usefulness of psychology, but that a certain 
professional cleavage is developing. Psychologists 
using the fourteen journals studied are, in their 
writings, becoming more and more remote from living 
issues and more abstract in the presentation of 
their subject matter. The consulting, applied, and 
socially-minded psychologists are turning to other, 
more specialized, journals not included within our 
survey. Thus, the indication is that "pure" and 
"applied" psychology are parting ways to some ex­
tent— an event which some will deplore and others 
welcome (1940, p. 7).
This interpretation was elaborated by Bruner and Allport (1940)
in the following way.
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The year 1938 presents in fairly dramatic form two 
alternative courses for the future. Briefly, these 
courses might be designated as 'psychology for 
science's sake' and 'psychology for society's sake.' 
These designations do not imply, however, simply a 
choice between pure and applied psychology, nor 
between isolationism and participationism. For the 
course selected will determine inevitably the design 
of mental science in the future— the character of its 
presuppositions, the systematic nature of its con­
cepts, the structure of its theories, the fashioning 
of its techniques, as well as the content of its 
research (1940, p. 775).
According to a textbook account (Misiak & Sexton, 1966) , 
the contrast between pure and applied psychology was evident 
from the beginning in American psychology, but, although the 
issue was discussed, there was no sharp rift at that time, 
probably because applied psychologists held academic positions 
and contributed to psychological science. Gradually, as 
American psychology developed, the rift widened and the dual 
character of the discipline became a bipolarity between 
scientific and professional interests. The principle factor 
responsible for accelerating this trend was the role of 
psychologists in the two world wars, particularly World War II. 
The following discussion of this factor is taken from the 
presentation of Misiak and Sexton, and is offered to provide 
a context for later discussion of the views of some of the 
APA presidents on the Purism-Utilitarianism issue.
Psychology was given impetus by America's entry into 
World War I in 1917. Although psychologists performed many
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applied services in the war effort, their single most 
significant function was to devise effective techniques by 
which civilian recruits could be selected and allocated to 
military assignments. The success of psychologists in dealing 
with the manpower problem opened up new possibilities for 
applied psychology in education, business, and industry. 
Clinical psychology, vocational guidance, and industrial 
psychology made significant gains. Hall founded the Journal 
of Applied Psychology in 1917. After 1920, applied psychology 
began to develop as an independent field.
America's entry into World War II came in 1941, and 
once again psychologists were called on to select and classi­
fy military personnel in induction centers. They also engaged 
in "human factors engineering," the designing of military 
equipment according to human specifications. Once again the 
success of psychologists in these applied tasks gave prestige 
to psychology and accelerated the development of applied 
psychology. When World War II ended in 1945 there followed 
in America enthusiastic support for the behavioral sciences 
in general and psychology in particular. Psychology's success 
during the war led to an unprecedented demand for psychological 
services in the community. Formal recognition of professional 
psychology was achieved. At the same time many psychologists 
were happily engaged in research in academic settings. It
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was as if psychology— at least two major groups of psycholo­
gists— were moving in opposite directions. It could be 
estimated that the turning point was around 1945; prior to 
that time psychology was predominantly academically oriented, 
after 1945 it became more professionally oriented. The 
cleavage between pure and applied psychology grew to con­
siderable proportions.
The cleavage between pure or academic psychology 
and applied or professional psychology deepened during the 
1960's. Academic psychologists, who train future psycholo­
gists, are in the minority. In 1965 one estimate concluded 
that "6 out of 10 psychologists are primarily concerned with 
the applications of psychology" (Watson, 1965, p. 132).
Having provided an overview of the development of 
the pure and applied prescriptions in psychology, some specific 
views of APA presidents will be discussed. These are dis­
cussed at somewhat greater length for the Purism-Utilitarianism 
issue than for other prescriptions, because of the significance 
of the implications of this issue.
As early as 1893 George Trumbull Ladd spoke to the 
issue of psychology’s applications. He said: "The more I 
study and teach this science the deeper does the impression 
become that it is able and destined to contribute greatly to 
the welfare of mankind" (1894, p. 19). Ladd pointed out
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that this fact implied a certain responsibility, "which is 
of a quasi-ethical sort," upon the Association, and he added 
that the Association "should enter upon its career with a 
sufficiently generous estimate of its privileges and of its 
responsibility" (1894, p. 21).
Other addresses given before World War I which ex­
pressed the utilitarian theme included Dewey's (1899) address, 
"Psychology and Social Practice," which dealt with the appli­
cation of psychological knowledge to education and served as 
an impetus for the progressive education movement, and Bryan's 
(1904) address, "Theory and Practice,1 in which he stressed 
that all knowledge is potentially practical. In "The Measure 
of a Singer" (1911), Seashore dealt with a problem in the 
applied psychology of music: the measurement of an individual's
musical ability. He claimed that "measurements of the kind 
we commonly accept in psychology may be so employed as to 
furnish a serviceable invoice of the natural capacity, 
plasticity, skill and knowledge a particular individual may 
have for doing a particular thing" (1912, p. 212).
In 1917, Robert M. Yerkes gave his address, "Psychology 
in Relation to the War," in which he outlined the history of 
the organizing of psychological military service in that 
year. He noted:
The obvious and significant trend of our psychological
military work is toward service. Psychologists who
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develop methods or accumulate information which 
promises to aid us in winning the war are shortly 
appointed to positions which give them opportunity 
to apply their special knowledge effectively. At 
present our profession is importantly represented 
in the Department of the Adjutant General, in the 
Navy, the Signal Corps, the Medical Corps, the 
Sanitary Corps and the Quartermaster Corps (1918, 
p. 113).
However, Yerkes noted that the future demand for psychologists 
and psychological services threatened to outstrip the supply.
Walter Dill Scott published in 1903 the first book 
by a psychologist aimed to help business, The Theory of Ad­
vertising. Scott followed this with two other books, The 
Psychology of Advertising (1910) and Influencing Men in 
Business (1911), Considered the "father of applied psy­
chology" he was elected to the presidency of the APA in 1919, 
and gave his address on "Changes in Some of Our Conceptions 
and Practices of Personnel."
Although applied psychology received a great deal of 
support from the functional school of psychology, it was 
even more strongly advocated by classical behaviorism.
Drawing the ethical implications of his environmentalistic 
position, J. B. Watson sought to develop a social philosophy 
dedicated to the secular salvation of the human race. His 
"experimental ethics" was based on the assumption that since 
man is determined by the environment, he ought to be inten­
tionally molded by the social environment. With his usual 
enthusiasm, Watson envisaged a future society based on the
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principles of behavioristic psychology.
Behaviorism ought to be a science that prepares 
men and women for understanding the principles 
of their own behavior. It ought to make men and 
women eager to rearrange their own lives, and 
especially eager to prepare themselves to bring 
up their own children in a healthy way. I wish 
I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful 
individual we should make of every healthy child 
if only we could let it shape itself properly and 
then provide for it a universe in which it could 
exercise that organization— a universe unshackled 
by legendary folk-lore of happenings thousands of 
years ago; unhampered by disgraceful political 
history; free of foolish customs and conventions 
which have no significance in themselves, yet which 
hem the individual in like taut steel bands. I am 
not asking here for revolution; I am not asking 
people to go out to some God-forsaken place, form 
a colony, go naked and live a communal life, nor 
am I asking for a change to a diet of roots and 
herbs. I am not asking for 'free love.1 I am try­
ing to dangle a stimulus in front of you, a verbal 
stimulus which, if acted upon, will gradually 
change this universe. For the universe will change 
if you bring up your children, not in the freedom 
of the libertine, but in behavioristic freedom— a 
freedom which we cannot even picture in words, so 
little do we know of it. Will not these children 
in turn, with their better ways of living and 
thinking, replace us as society and in turn bring 
up their children in a still more scientific way, 
until the world finally becomes a place fit for 
human habitation? (1924, pp. 303-304).
In 1928, Watson dedicated his book, Psychological Care of
the Infant and Child, to "the first mother who brings up a
happy child."
In 1935, Albert T. Poffenberger gave his address,
"Psychology and Life." This address departed from tradition
and limited itself to the organization and administration of
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the APA, rather than to psychology as a discipline. The 
address took the form of a statement of recommendations of 
policy for the APA by its president. Poffenberger asserted 
that psychology was of necessity both a pure and applied 
science, touching particularly closely upon everyday life.
In recognition of this, he recommended that the APA take the 
following steps: (1) Define the homo psychologicus, (2) Pro­
pose minimum standards for his training, (3) Determine the 
training needed for at least the most active of the appli­
cations, and recommend the means for obtaining it, (4) Ex­
tend psychological service within the community, thereby 
increasing jobs for psychologists, (5) Protect psychology 
against the inroads of charlatans, (6) Insure against the 
misinterpretation of psychological findings and the spread 
of unsound conclusions therefrom.
In 1939, Gordon W. Allport presented his address,
"The Psychologist's Frame of Reference," which has already 
been cited numerous times in this chapter, including his 
reference to the growing cleavage between pure and applied 
psychology. Allport disparaged that psychology was in danger 
of losing sight of "the true source of the eminence of the 
elder sciences." He said: "Their enviable glory consists
in the unexampled power they have given mankind in predicting, 
understanding, and controlling the course of nature for
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mankind's own benefit. As a mature science psychology, too, 
will find its justification, . . .  in contributing to humanity 
the power to achieve these ends" {1939, p. 16).
America had been at war for two years when John E. 
Anderson gave his address in 1943, "Freedom and Constraint 
or Potentiality and Environment." In view of the amazingly 
effective organization of the country at that time, Anderson 
wondered what might be accomplished in peacetime by expending 
equal thought, energy, and effort upon human welfare. He 
said: "Our wartime experience suggests that the possibilities
of effectively utilizing human and material resources are 
almost limitless, if only the constraints inherent in our 
normal environments, which inhibit us from expending money, 
time, and energy, could be removed" (1944, p. 2). In succeed­
ing years there were presidents calling for the integration 
of pure and applied psychology (Murphy, 1943), or stressing 
that the two are interdependent (Hunt, 1951) , or discussing 
applied psychology in relation to some practical problem 
(Bruner, 1965; Hobbs, 1966).
The theme of the annual meeting of the APA in 1969 
was "Psychology and the Problems of Society." To honor that 
theme, George A. Miller presented his address on "Psychology 
as a Means of Promoting Human Welfare." In Miller's view, 
the impact of psychology will be felt, not through technologi­
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cal products, but through a new conception of man. The new 
conception— or paradigm, as he calls it— differs from the 
traditional one in emphasizing the multiple bases of behavior, 
positive reinforcement rather than punishment, the early pre­
vention of problems, emotional and irrational bases of be­
havior rather than the rational, focusing on causes rather 
than symptoms, etc. The difference might be characterized 
as a "proactive view" of human nature and the social order 
rather than a "reactive view." In order for this image of 
man to be absorbed by the public, Miller said that psy­
chologists must endeavor to give psychology away in every 
way possible.
The most recent address included in this study was 
"The Uncertain Future of Clinical Psychology," given by 
George W. Albee in 1970. Albee called for a complete 
separation between scientific and professional psychology.
He said: "I fear that all these basic incompatibilities between 
the science of psychology and the profession of psychology 
may be so serious as soon to require a separation or divorce 
. . . Looking ahead 10-20 years, I predict that there may be 
an American Scientific Psychological Association and an 
American Professional Psychological Association coexisting 
side by side" (1970, p. 1078). For the first time in the 
history of the APA the membership was being called upon not
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to close ranks in a spirit of cooperation but to pursue 
their separate ends. It is too soon to tell whether the 
current period is a significant turning point in which efforts 
to couple the science and profession of psychology are finally 
abandoned.
97
V. DESCRIPTIVE PRESCRIPTIVE TRENDS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
In addition to the findings concerning those pairs 
of prescriptions for which some prediction was made, there 
are other findings of interest. The findings from each pair 
of prescriptions not discussed in Chapter IV are examined 
here.
Conscious mentalism - Unconscious mentalism 
Figure 11 shows a sharp irregular decrease in 
Conscious mentalism from a point of very wide acceptance 
around the turn of the century. This pattern is probably 
a reflection of the general attenuation of the status of 
subjective phenomena in psychology, but is even more pro­
nounced than Contentual subjectivism because Conscious 
mentalism specifically emphasizes awareness as a special 
characteristic of mental activity and this is a character­
istic which is likely to be objectionable to tough-minded 
behaviorists. Unconscious mentalism, by contrast, shows an 
increase up through the 1920's, and then irregular decrease 
to the present. The strong acceptance of Unconscious mentalism 
in the 1920's is probably an effect of the introduction of 
psychoanalytic ideas and concepts into psychology during the 
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Fig. 11. Author's acceptance of Conscious 
mentalism and Unconscious mentalism in 75 APA 
presidential addresses coded by three judges. (The 
average acceptance of all 36 prescriptions is shown 
by the horizontal line.)
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was dominant and Unconscious mentalism counter-dominant in 
American psychology; since that time neither prescription 
has maintained a consistent position of dominance over the 
other.
The data of Bruner and Allport (1940) also show a 
pattern of rise and fall in their category relating to the 
unconscious, "Explicit manifestations of the unconscious." 
However, while the two findings are parallel in terms of 
showing a rise and fall of interest, the historical time in 
which interest was at its peak is different in the two 
studies: in 1908 for Bruner and Allport, and in the 1920's
in the present study. Parenthetically, this difference may 
be due to the more stringent criteria employed by Bruner and 
Allport: either the concept of the unconscious had to be used
in an explanatory manner or else some phenomenon had to be 
treated as a manifestation of the unconscious to qualify an 
article for inclusion in the category. In the present study 
an expression of acceptance of the concept was enough to meet 
the criterion of the prescription. The explanatory efficacy 
of the unconscious, as measured by Bruner and Allport, may 
have been more sensitive to the growing antagonism of be­
haviorism toward mentalistic explanations and thus show an 
earlier decline than the findings from this study.
100
Determinism - Indeterminism 
Figure 12 shows that Determinism has been a widely 
held prescription in American psychology, although it has 
not been consistently accepted. Rather, it was most widely 
accepted during the 1920's and 1930's, in the wake of be­
haviorism. In the 1940's there was a decrease in the 
acceptance of Determinism and simultaneous increase in the 
acceptance of Indeterminism. The findings show only two 
phases of the history of American psychology when Indeter­
minism was even moderately widely accepted. The first was 
just prior to the turn of the century, and the second was a 
temporary resurgence in the 1940's, which may have been due 
to the increased interest in clinical activities at the time. 
The overall finding, however, is that Determinism, although 
very much operative, incites very little opposition in 
twentieth century American psychology.
The rationale behind the adoption of the deterministic 
assumption in psychology was discussed by Warren in his pre­
sidential address in 1913. He said:
Let us face the issue squarely. Scientific re­
search points more and more in the direction of 
a rigid, mechanistic interpretation of the physi­
cal universe. It is time for scientists to 
recognize that the data of psychology conform to 
a uniformitarian pattern also.
Hitherto mental phenomena have been too 
often regarded as something apart from the 
world-order— something out of harmony with its 
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Fig. 12. Author's acceptance of Determinism 
and Indeterminism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal 
line.)
102
the heavenly bodies were considered something apart 
from the movements of terrestrial bodies. The 
burden of proof and the fear of anathema rested on 
those who sought to harmonize them. Now the com­
plexion of the world has changed. Chemists and 
physicists have demonstrated the uniformity and 
regularity of events in their domain. The doctrine 
of conservation is only one striking example. 
Physiologists are extending the same notion of uni­
formity to the more complex realms of cytology and 
organic processes. Animal psychologists have begun 
to trace out uniformities in the activities of 
organisms. Sociologists have discovered many 
regularities in the interaction of living creatures. 
All these sciences have done their best work under 
the inspiration of the uniformity hypothesis. If 
the glory of modern science is its determinism, why 
should uniformity be considered degrading in the 
sphere of mental events alone? If the 'reign of law1 
means automatism, should not the term automatism be 
purged of its stigma? Is psychology to remain under 
the imputation of holding a primitive conception of 
the world from which the other sciences are fast 
escaping? Must we not amend the traditional inter­
pretation of choice, reason, and volition, so as to 
bring these phenomena into harmony with the scientific 
conception of uniformity in nature? (1914, p. 86)-
Warren went on to ask of his audience: "With the uniformities
in behavior of simpler organisms staring up at us from below,
and the social uniformities of human groups staring down at
us from above, are we not bound to work under the assumption
that human choice is fully determined by natural antecedents?
(1913, p. 89) .
The attitude illustrated by Warren was adopted by 
the majority of American psychologists, and Determinism soon 
became part of their psychological creed. For example, in 
his textbook, Psychology: A Study of Mental Life (1921),
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Woodworth stated:
To the psychologist, conduct is a matter of cause 
and effect, of natural law. His business is to 
know the laws of that part of nature which we call 
human nature . . . For him, even the most capricious 
conduct has its causes, even the most inexplicable 
has its explanation— if only the cause can be un­
earthed {1921, p. 18).
In contemporary American psychology, Determinism is
so dominant that it incites practically no opposition. One
of the most vocal exponents of the deterministic viewpoint is
B. F. Skinner. In his book, Science and Human Behavior (1953),
Skinner wrote:
The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to 
the application of scientific method to the study 
of human behavior. The free inner man who is held
responsible for the behavior of the external biologi­
cal organism is only a prescientific substitute for 
the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course 
of a scientific analysis. All these alternative 
causes lie outside the individual {1953, p. 447).
While few psychologists would go so far as Skinner in insisting 
that all of the causes of human behavior are outside the 
individual, it is generally recognized that science in general 
and psychological science in particular depend upon an assump­
tion of determinism: that mental events and human action in 
general are not arbitrary, capricious, or uncaused, but are 
determined like the rest of nature.
Empiricism - Rationalism^
Figure 13 shows the overwhelming pervasiveness of 
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Fig. 13. Author's acceptance of Empiricism 
and Rationalism^ in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance 
of all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal 
line.)
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as a reliance on reason as the major, if not exclusive, 
source of knowledge, is for all practical purposes non­
existent in American psychology. Reason is involved in 
various phases of the scientific enterprise, but it is 
secondary to the more basic empirical commitment, and is not 
an autonomous prescription. So Empiricism remains unopposed, 
a finding that is consistent across decades.
Inductivism - Deductivism 
Figure 14 shows a consistent level of moderate 
strength for Inductivism from the 1890's through the 1930's, 
and then an increase in the 1940's and 1950's, followed by 
a decrease in the decade of the I960's. Deductivism has 
followed a cyclical course in American psychology in which 
it was very weak for three decades, rose to moderate strength 
during the war years, and then rose sharply in acceptance 
during the 1950's, but has decreased during the last decade. 
The apex of acceptance of Deductivism during the 1950's may 
be a reflection of the general increase in theory construction 
at that time.
Mechanism - Vitalism 
Figure 15 shows that neither Mechanism nor Vitalism 
has been widely accepted in American psychology. Mechanism 
was moderately accepted during the development of behaviorism, 
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and Deductivism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
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Fig. 15. Author's acceptance of Mechanism 
and Vitalism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance 
of all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal 
line.)
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The only noteworthy acceptance of Vitalism occurred around
the turn of the century, but even then it was not widely
accepted. Consequently, the following discussion focuses
on the status of Mechanism and Vitalism in the second, third,
and fourth decades of the century, when behaviorism was making
important gains in American psychology.
About the time that behaviorism was making its
appearance in psychology, the Mechanism-Vitalism issue was
of concern to some psychologists. The issue was discussed
by Warren in his address, "The Mental and the Physical"
(1913), and his discussion illustrates the rationale of
psychologists' general preference for Mechanism when they
do take a position.
Can vital phenomena be wholly explained in physical 
and chemical terms or not? The term vital force 
may be employed in two different ways: either to 
indicate our ignorance of certain physiological 
processes, or to designate a sort of process quite 
distinct from physical or chemical change. In 
the former sense it has no bearing on the dispute.
In the latter sense it presents a definite problem 
for investigation. Now what is known about vital 
forces? The advocates of vitalism claim only that 
certain vital phenomena are not fully explicable 
in physicochemical terms. They have no alternative 
explanation to offer— only the name Entelechy, which 
serves to label the unsolved problems but does not 
advance one whit our understanding of them.1 Driesch, 
for example, brings forward three separate proofs 
of vitalism;^ every one of these rests on the incon­
ceivability of imagining a machine so constructed 
as to perform certain processes observed in organisms. 
This is the inconceivability of antipodes over again.
A century ago it was inconceivable that the chemical 
composition of distant stars should ever be known;
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and it is not many years since the earth's curvature 
rendered the notion of radiotelegraphy absurd.
Mechanism is not synonymous with artificial machinery. 
Any process which involves only physicochemical 
changes is mechanistic, though it differ radically 
from a linotype or a refinery.
The organic processes are every year brought 
more and more within the domain of physics and 
chemistry.^ Unless some new force is definitely 
discovered, should not the scientist assume that the 
unexplained processes harmonize with those already 
worked out?^ Vitalism is a possible hypothesis, but 
it is not scientifically acceptable, for it stands 
without direct support. The present evidence from 
biology justifies the assumption that physicochemical 
processes govern the growth and activity of organisms, 
— that uniformitarianism and mechanism are inter­
changeable terms (1914, pp. 88-89).
Some of the behaviorists, in turn, were eager to re­
ject anything as unscientific as Vitalism, and they sometimes 
embraced Mechanism. J. B. Watson, in his debate with William 
McDougall in 1924, later published as The Battle of Behaviorism 
(1928), declared: "The behaviorist finds no scientific evi­
dence for the existence of any vitalistic principle . . . We 
need nothing to explain behavior but the ordinary laws of 
physics and chemistry" (1928, pp. 26-28). Another behaviorist, 
Karl Lashley, stated in his address, "Basic Neural Mechanisms 
of Behavior," that there was general agreement among psy­
chologists that "the final explanation of behavior or of 
mental processes is to be sought in the physiological activity 
of the body and, in particular, in the properties of the 
nervous system" (1930, p. 1).
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A secondary conception of Mechanism— that man is a
machine— was also held by a few psychologists. In his address,
"The Experimental Embryology of Mind" (1940) , Carmichael
claimed validity for the conception of man as a machine. He
summarized his address by saying:
In this paper I have attempted to demonstrate that 
the fetus may be described as machine-like in the 
precision and repetition of many of its patterns 
of response in the same stimulus situations. I have 
also suggested that the complex behavior of the adult 
organism may in certain aspects be viewed in a similar 
manner. That is, the machine character of the fetus 
does not seem to be lost as development progresses, 
provided only it is recognized in its early stages 
when it can be most clearly seen. The machine, as 
well as what it can do, becomes more complex, but 
it does not become in any sense non-mechanical.
This is still true, it seems to me, when the organism's 
behavior is of the sort that external observers call 
purposive, or when it is adaptively modified by 
learning (1941, p. 24).
In sum, although the Mechanism-Vitalism issue had its 
origin in the middle of the nineteenth century and was most 
controversial in biology, it was of concern to some psy­
chologists. Mechanism received its strongest acceptance 
from behavioristically-inclined psychologists. The associated 
doctrine— that man is nothing but a machine— seems to be 
essentially an article of faith, not implied by the more 
fundamental physiological hypothesis. Today the vast majority 
of psychologists accept neither Mechanism nor Vitalism as 
necessary assumptions of psychology.
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Molecularism - Molarism
Figure 16 reveals that Molecularism and Molarism 
have been moderately accepted as prescriptions in American 
psychology. Molecularism follows an irregular pattern of 
"average" degree of acceptance, fall, rise, and fall again. 
Molarism, by contrast, shows a somewhat more consistent 
level of moderate acceptance. The differences in status 
between these two prescriptions are not great; there is no 
dominance of one prescription over the other.
Brunswik (1950) predicted an historical trend from 
a molecular type of approach in psychology to a molar type 
of approach. In testing this hypothesis, Coan (1968) found 
a U-shaped progression from elementarism to holism to elemen- 
tarism, with the peak for holism in the 1920's. The present 
study shows no systematic trends. It shows more acceptance 
for Molecularism than for Molarism in psychology's early 
history, more acceptance of Molarism than Molecularism in 
the 1920's, and slightly more acceptance of Molarism than 
Molecularism in contemporary American psychology. The only 
conclusion that can be made on the basis of these results 
is that the evolution of Molecularism and Molarism in psy­
chology is not a simple unidirectional progression but is 
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Fig. 16. Author's acceptance of Molecularism 
and Molarism in 75 APA presidential addresses coded 
by three judges. (The average acceptance of all 36 
prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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Monism - Dualism 
Figure 17 shows a pattern in which the only out­
standing acceptance of either prescription is of Dualism 
during the first two decades of the century. It was at this 
time that the mind-body problem was discussed, especially 
the relative merits of interactionism (two separate and 
interacting processes) and parallelism (two separate but 
correlated series of events). Since that time there has 
been a sharp decline in metaphysical speculation and this 
is reflected in the findings: neither prescription was 
accepted at all during the last two decades.
These findings are corroborated by the findings of 
Bruner and Allport (1940) , who also found a decline in treat­
ments of the mind-body problem. Commenting on the nature of 
the shift, Allport remarked: "In the earlier literature 
solutions to the problem were boldly offered in monistic or
dualistic terms; today [1938] the fashion is to deny the
existence of the body-mind problem, the denial being generally 
effected with the aid of Vienna logic" (1940, p. 3).
John B. Watson may have set the example for modern 
psychologists in regard to the mind-body problem in his 
manifesto of behaviorism in 1913, "Psychology as the Be­
haviorist Views It." He declared forcefully:
In it [behaviorism] one avoids both the Scylla of 





























f 3 Monism 
□  Dualism
40
1891- 1901- 1911- 1921- 1931- 1941-




Fig. 17. Author's acceptance of Monism and 
Dualism in 75 APA presidential addresses coded by 
three judges. (The average acceptance of all 36 
prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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time-honored relics of philosophical speculation 
need trouble the student of behavior as little as 
they trouble the student of physics. The considera­
tion of the mind-body problem affects neither the 
type of problem selected nor the formulation of the 
solution of that problem. I can state my position 
here no better than by saying that I should like to 
bring my students up in the same ignorance of such 
hypotheses as one finds among the students of other 
branches of science {1913, p. 166).
Naturalism - Supernaturalism 
Figure 18 shows that Naturalism was strongly accepted 
in American psychology in the 1890*s. Since that time 
Naturalism has been moderately widely accepted, except for 
the last decade when it was not accepted at all.
The findings shown in Figure 18 are difficult to 
interpret, since the naturalistic prescription is usually 
taken for granted in psychology, as it is in all sciences.
The paradox is resolved when the results are interpreted 
(and this is the writer's personal conviction) as portraying 
a situation in which the naturalistic basis of American 
psychology is so deeply implicit that it provides only a 
little objective evidence of its existence. In the 1890’s, 
American psychology was becoming established and psychologists 
were eager to assert that psychology was a natural science 
along with the other sciences. Since that time Naturalism 
has been mostly taken for granted, while Supernaturalism was 














































Pig. 18. Author's acceptance of Naturalism 
and Supernaturalism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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Rationalism., - Irrationalism 
Neither Rationalisn^ nor Irrationalism has been 
widely accepted in American psychology, according to 
Figure 19. Rationalisn^ was moderately widely accepted 
during the beginning of psychology's history, when psychology 
was defined as the study of the conscious mind. In later 
decades Irrationalism became moderately accepted; this de­
velopment was probably influenced by the integration of 
selected psychoanalytic ideas into the mainstream of American 
psychology. On the whole, Irrationalism has been more widely 
accepted in the history of psychology than Rationalist!^.
One of the APA presidents, Walter Dill Scott, described 
the historical decline in the acceptance of Rationalist!^ in 
his address, "Changes in Some of Our Conceptions and Practices 
of Personnel."
A second change in our conception and practice of 
personnel administration is seen in the decreasing 
importance ascribed to Reason as a factor in de­
termining human action. For many centuries man was 
defined as the reasoning animal* Aristotle's "Logic" 
was the standard textbook for all students desiring 
to learn the best method of influencing and controlling 
men. For persuasion the syllogism was believed to 
be the most perfect tool. Arguments to be effective 
must be analyzed and presented in a logical form.
The hearer was supposed to criticize appeals by the 
most rigorous of logical standards.
The change in this point of view has come about 
so gradually that we fail to appreciate its extent.
At the hands of certain authors the importance of 
reason is minimized by an emphasis upon suggestion 
as descriptive of the process of influencing men.
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Fig. 19. Author's acceptance of Rationalisn^ 
and Irrationalism in 7 5 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal 
line.)
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important part instincts play not only in the 
behavior of young children but also in the more 
important acts of adults.
Still other scientists stress the significance 
of sentiments and emotions, of impulse and habit, 
or of other forms of human response not reducible 
to any standard type of reasoning. This change in 
our concept of the importance of reasoning is ob­
servable in the writings of modern psychologists, 
and is reflected also in the practices of the more 
progressive leaders in personnel administration 
(1920, pp. 85-86) .
Staticism^ - Developmentalism 
Figure 20 shows that Staticism^ has increased slightly 
in acceptance over time. The status of Developmentalism has 
followed an almost cyclical pattern over time: it was initially 
widely accepted, decreased to moderate acceptance for several 
decades, and then rose to wide acceptance again. The overall 
pattern of these two prescriptions relative to each other, 
is that Developmentalism has been dominant and Staticism^ 
counter-dominant throughout the history of American psychology.
Staticism^ - Dynamicism 
Figure 21 shows that Staticism^ has been consistently 
weak as a prescription in American psychology. Dynamicism, 
on the other hand, has increased in acceptance during the 
first few decades of the century, a trend that may have been 
enhanced by the advent of psychoanalysis, and then leveled 
off at the status of "average" acceptance. The psychoanalytic 
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Fig. 20. Author's acceptance of Staticism 
and Developmentalism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
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Fig. 21. Author's acceptance of Staticisrr^ 
and Dynamicism in 75 APA presidential addresses 
coded by three judges. (The average acceptance of 
all 36 prescriptions is shown by the horizontal line.)
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became part of American psychology. The importance of moti­
vation and the emphasis on change were also accepted in 
American psychology. The relation between these two pre­
scriptions is one in which Dynamicism is consistently 
dominant and Staticism^ counter-dominant. There is no evidence 
of a progression from Staticisn^ to Dynamicism, as Coan 
(1968) found, but simply an early trend toward wider acceptance 
of Dynamicism, followed by consistent "average" acceptance 
during the last 50 years.
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VI. PRESCRIPTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY:
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Having examined changes over time in the status of
contrasting prescriptions, this chapter considers the status
5
of prescriptions in contemporary American psychology. Con­
temporary American psychology is operationally defined in 
terms of the last two decades, 1951 to 1970. The data were 
combined for this period, and consequently the interpretations 
of the findings are restricted to this time span.
Prediction 14: The following prescriptions will be among
the most widely accepted prescriptions in contemporary 
American psychology (1951-1970), irrespective of temporal 
considerations: Conscious mentalism, Contentual objectivism,
Contentual subjectivism, Empiricism, Methodological objecti­
vism, Nomotheticism, Purism, Utilitarianism, and Quantita- 
tivism. This prediction is based on the writer's background 
reading and personal judgments.
The findings relevant to Prediction 14 are presented 
in Table 3.
5
Prediction 13, which concerns the relative proportion of 
explicitly and implicitly accepted prescriptions over time, 
is examined in Appendix H.
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Table 3
Ten Prescriptions with Highest Acceptance in 19 APA Presi­
dential Addresses Representing Contemporary American Psy­
chology (1951-1970) (Each number is the average of three 














Predicted to be among the most widely accepted of the 36 
prescriptions (N = 9) .
The average number of acceptance codings across 
judges out of 19 addresses was 5.4. There was wide varia­
tion around the mean, as expected. Table 3 shows the ten 
most widely accepted prescriptions in contemporary American 
psychology, as represented by the last 19 APA presidential
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addresses. Of the nine prescriptions predicted to be among 
the most widely accepted, eight were listed among the top 
ten in Table 3. Functionalism and Developmentalism were the 
unpredicted prescriptions occurring in this list, while 
Conscious mentalism, which was predicted, ranked nineteenth 
in acceptance.
While Table 3 shows the ranking of prescriptions in 
contemporary American psychology relative to all 36 pre­
scriptions, Table 4 shows the relative acceptance of contrast­
ing prescriptions by comparing their degree of acceptance.
The magnitude of the difference between the two prescriptions 
is used as an operational definition of the dominance of 
one over the other.
Considering the findings in Table 4 individually, it 
is evident that Empiricism is the most widely accepted pre­
scription in contemporary American psychology and that it 
incites no opposition from Rationalism^. There is no question 
that Empiricism provides a major part of the philosophical 
foundation of contemporary American psychology, as it does 
for all sciences.
Methodological objectivism is very widely accepted, 
while Methodological subjectivism is counter-dominant. 
Methodological objectivism is most widely accepted in academic 
psychology. In the opinion of the writer, Methodological
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Table 4
Prescriptions in 19 APA Presidential Addresses Representing Contemporary 
American Psychology (1951-1970) Arranged in Order of Dominance (Each num­
ber is the average of three judges. The mean for all prescriptions was 
5.4 acceptance codings.)
More Widely Accepted Less Widely Accepted Difference
Prescription Prescription
Empiricism (18.67) Rationalism^ (.33) 18.34
Methodological objectivism (16.00) Methodological subjectivism (3.00) 13.00
Quantitativism (12.00) Gialitativism (4.67) 7.33
Functionalism (9.33) Structuralism (2.67) 6.66
Determinism (6.67) Indeterminism (.33) 6.34
Developnentalism (8.67) Staticism^ (3.33) 5.34
Nanotheticism (10.00) Idiographicism (4.67) 5.33
Contentual objectivism (12.33) Contentual subjectivism (8.33) 4.00
Eynamicism (6.33) Staticism^ (2.33) 4.00
Centralism (4.00) Peripheralism (2.00) 2.00
Molarism (5.00) Molecularism (3.33) 1.67
Naturalism (1.67) Supematuralism (0) 1.67
Purism (13.67) Utilitarianism (12.00) 1.67
Irrationalism (2.67) Rationalism^(1.00) 1.67
Mechanism (1.67) Vitalism (.67) 1.00
Conscious men tali sm (3.33) Unconscious mentalism (2.67) .66
Deductivian (5.67) Inductivism (5.33) .34
Monism (0) Dualism (0) 0
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subjectivism can be seen in contemporary American psychology 
in the various forms of psychotherapy (including the technique 
of free association), in the use of phenomenological methods, 
and in the recent popularity of T-groups in their various 
forms.
Quantitativism is dominant, but it does stand in 
significant contrast to Qualitativism. Commenting on the 
relationship between these two prescriptions, Watson (1965) 
wrote:
Desire to follow a quantitative prescription in re­
search is very evident. The urge toward quantifi­
cation . . .  is drilled into all American psycholo­
gists. Speculation, no matter how brilliant, is 
apt to be considered worthwhile only if it be a 
prelude to a form in which it can be restated so 
as to be measured. Speculation leads to quantita­
tive hypothesis formation formulation and is not an 
end in itself (1965, p. 135).
Functionalism is dominant; Structuralism counter­
dominant. Functionalism is expressed in contemporary Ameri­
can psychology in "the stress on 'activities' as utilities,
in the acceptance and advancement of the applications of
psychology, and in the utilization of the contingent meaning 
of function in research planning and interpretation" (Watson, 
1965, p. 134).
Determinism incites no opposition from Indeterminism. 
This finding agrees with that of Watson (1965).
Developmentalism is dominant; Staticism^ counter-
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dominant. The acceptance of the developmental prescription 
may be underestimated in contemporary American psychology.
Nomotheticism is dominant; Idiographicism counter­
dominant. This relationship was not unrecognized. For 
example, Watson wrote: "The search for general laws, even 
if expressed within the modest limits of miniature theories, 
clearly marks American psychology as primarily nomothetic 
in character. There are, of course, staunch defenders of 
the idiographic, for example in Gordon W. Allport and many 
clinical psychologists" (1965, p. 136).
Contentual objectivism is dominant; Contentual sub­
jectivism counter-dominant. This relationship was predicted 
by the writer in Prediction 6. The findings show that the 
primary data of psychology are behavioral, and that sub­
jective experience is secondary.
Dynamicism is dominant; Staticism^ counter-dominant. 
American psychologists place more emphasis on change than 
they do on enduring aspects of psychology's subject matter.
The relationship between Molarism and Molecularism 
shows a lack of dominance, since the two prescriptions are 
about equally widely accepted.
Naturalism is too deeply implicit to provide objective 
evidence of its true degree of acceptance, in the judgment of 
the writer. It has no opposition from Supernaturalism. The
129
unopposed status of Naturalism was also pointed out by 
Watson (1965).
Purism and Utilitarianism are about equally widely 
accepted in contemporary American psychology.
The findings show that Deductivism and Inductivism 
are also about equally widely accepted in contemporary Ameri­
can psychology.
Neither Monism nor Dualism is accepted at all in 
contemporary American psychology.
In sum, it is apparent that certain prescriptions in 
contemporary American psychology are so dominant that they 
have no counter-dominant prescription. These are Empiricism, 
Determinism, and Naturalism. Other prescriptions in con­
temporary American psychology are dominant but do have 
counter-dominant prescriptions. Methodological objectivism 
is dominant; and Methodological subjectivism counter-dominant; 
Quantitativism is dominant, and Qualitativism counter-dominant; 
Functionalism is dominant, and Structuralism counter-dominant; 
Developmentalism is dominant, and Staticism^ counter-dominant; 
Nomotheticism is dominant, and Idiographicism counter-dominant; 
Contentual objectivism is dominant, and Contentual sub­
jectivism counter-dominant; and Dynamicism is dominant, and 
Staticisrr^ counter-dominant. Still other prescriptions mani­
fest no dominance, since the members of the pair are about
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equally widely accepted. These are Deductivism-Inductivism, 
Purism-Utilitarianism, and Molarism-Molecularism.
131
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This investigation is offered as a contribution to 
the study of historical change in American psychology. It 
makes use of a previously untapped source of scientific 
literature, the speeches given by the presidents of the 
American Psychological Association since its founding in 
1892, as the basis for a systematic historical analysis taking 
Watson’s (1967, 1971) prescriptive approach. The 75 APA 
presidential addresses were selected for analysis because
(1) they express the thinking of very eminent psychologists,
(2) they are likely to be sensitive to current issues and 
developments in the discipline, and explicit about the author's 
preferences and biases, and (3) they provide temporal con­
tinuity from 1892, thus making it possible to investigate 
trends in the history of American psychology. Watson's 
approach to the history of psychology is based upon a theo­
retical framework consisting of certain conceptions which
are particularly significant in terms of their role in the 
history of psychology, called prescriptions. Prescriptions 
are characterized by the orientative function they serve 
for psychologists and by the fact that they can be traced 
over an appreciable period of time, thus forming trends. 
Watson's prescriptions have been demonstrated to be important
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in the history of psychology, and consequently the list of 
prescriptions was adopted as the conceptual framework for 
this study. On the basis of the three reasons mentioned 
above, it was assumed that the APA presidential addresses 
constitute a body of scientific literature which reflects 
the prescriptions in American psychology. The ultimate goals 
of the study were to trace the status of the prescriptive 
conceptions in the development of American psychology, and 
to assess their status in contemporary American psychology. 
The specific objective was to compare the status of each 
prescription with all others and with an individual con­
trasting prescription, and by so doing to derive an 
empirically-based characterization of American psychology, 
both historical and contemporary.
It was assumed that the relative status of pre­
scriptions in American psychology could best be ascertained 
by using some form of systematic quantitative analysis, and 
the method adopted was that of content analysis. Three 
judges, including the author, each coded each of the 75 APA 
presidential addresses in terms of Watson's 36 prescriptive 
concepts. The results of this coding process were system­
atically recorded on a formal coding form. The concepts and 
rules governing the coding process were made explicit in the 
Coding Manual, which was followed by all three judges. The
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initial task of the judge was to determine, for a given 
address, whether each of the 36 prescriptions was Present 
or Absent. Prescriptions which were judged to be Present 
were considered further in terms of the author's position: 
Acceptance, Neutral, or Rejection. The Acceptance codings, 
which constituted 78.3% of the total Present codings, were 
then used as the basis for tracing the changes in the status 
of contrasting prescriptions over time. Eighteen graphs, 
each one portraying the status of two contrasting prescriptions 
by decades, were used to present the major portion of the 
findings.
Before presenting the findings with respect to the 
status of prescriptions in American psychology, some findings 
were presented which concerned the nature and scope of the 
APA presidential addresses. It was found that two major 
transitions have occurred in the tradition of APA presidential 
addresses. The first was a transition from broad addresses 
which encompass psychology as a whole, or treat a problem 
which transcends specific areas and is significant for 
psychology as a whole, to narrow addresses which are limited 
to a specialized area or problem within psychology. The 
transition occurred shortly after the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Before that time the presidents thought 
in broad terms and frequently discussed the philosophical
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foundations of psychology or psychology's relation to other 
sciences, while after that time the addresses were more 
limited in scope. The second transition which occurred in 
the APA tradition was less pronounced than the first and 
occurred later. It was the trend away from addresses which 
were expository in nature toward more formal research pre­
sentations. This trend showed its greatest shift in the 
1930's and 1940's, and has progressed to the point where al­
most 40% of the addresses since 1931 have been research-oriented. 
Considering these two trends together, it was concluded that 
the tradition of APA presidential addresses has been char­
acterized by a progression from broad expositions about psy­
chology to narrow research investigations within psychology.
It was also found that expository and research 
addresses express about the same number of prescriptions, 
although the proportion of implicitly expressed prescriptions 
is significantly larger in the research addresses than in 
the expository addresses.
The major portion of the findings concerned the 
status of the prescriptions in American psychology. It was 
found that American psychology, viewed in historical per­
spective, may be characterized by certain accelerated pre­
scriptive trends. These are: Methodological objectivism 
{use of methods open to verification by another competent
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observer), Contentual objectivism (psychological data viewed 
as behavior of individual), Quantitativism (stress upon 
knowledge which is countable or measurable), Nomotheticism 
(emphasis upon discovering general laws), Developmentalism 
(emphasis upon changes with time), and Utilitarianism (seek­
ing of knowledge for its usefulness in other activities).
American psychology, viewed in historical perspective, 
shows certain prescriptive trends which show a decrease over 
time. These are: Conscious mentalism (emphasis on awareness 
of mental structure or activity), Contentual subjectivism 
(psychological data viewed as mental structure or activity of 
individual), Structuralism (psychological categories are 
contents), Centralism (stress upon psychological events taking 
place within the body), and Methodological subjectivism (use 
of methods not so open to verification by another competent 
observer) .
Some prescriptions in the development of American 
psychology exhibit a pattern of rise and fall, with their 
strongest acceptance occurring at different times. Dualism 
(fundamental principle or entity in universe is of two kinds, 
mind and matter) was most widely accepted in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, and then almost completely 
disappeared. Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on unawareness 
of mental structure or activity) rose to its widest acceptance
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in the 1920's and declined after that. Peripheralism (stress 
upon psychological events taking place at periphery of body) 
rose to its widest acceptance in the 1930's and then declined, 
while Mechanism (activities of living beings completely 
explicable by physiochemical constituents) was most widely 
accepted in the second, third, and fourth decades and de­
clined thereafter. Dynamicism, on the other hand, increased 
in acceptance up through the 1920's, and then leveled off at 
a consistent degree of acceptance.
In addition, a relatively consistent pattern of 
acceptance in the development of American psychology was 
revealed by other prescriptions, including Empiricism (major, 
if not exclusive source of knowledge is experience), Purism 
(seeking of knowledge for its own sake), Functionalism 
(psychological categories are activities), Qualitativism 
(stress upon that which is different in kind or essence), 
and Molarism (psychological data most aptly described in 
terms of relatively large units). The specific pattern of 
each prescription was discussed within the context of the 
development of American psychology.
In terms of contemporary American psychology, it was 
found that certain prescriptions are so dominant that they 
have no counter-dominant prescription. These are Empiricism, 
Determinism (human events completely explicable in terms of
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antecedents), and Naturalism {nature requires for its 
operation and explanation only principles found within it). 
Other prescriptions in contemporary American psychology are 
dominant but do have counter-dominant prescriptions: Methodo­
logical objectivism is dominant, and Methodological sub­
jectivism counter-dominant; Quantitativism is dominant, and 
Qualitativism counter-dominant; Functionalism is dominant, 
and Structuralism counter-dominant; Developmentalism is 
dominant, and Staticism^ (emphasis upon cross-sectional view) 
counter-dominant; Nomotheticism is dominant, and Idiographi- 
cism (emphasis upon explaining particular events or individuals) 
counter-dominant; Contentual objectivism is dominant, and 
Contentual subjectivism counter-dominant; and Dynamicism is 
dominant, and Staticism^ (emphasis upon enduring aspects) 
counter-dominant. Still other prescriptions manifest no 
dominance, since the members of the pair are about equally 
widely accepted. These are Deductivism-Inductivism (investi­
gations begun with assumed established truths— with facts 
or observations), Purism-Utilitarianism, and Molarism- 
Molecularism (psychological data most aptly described in terms 
of relatively large units— relatively small units).
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APPENDIX A
Notes on the American Psychological Association
The American Psychological Association was founded on 
July 8, 1892, at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, 
on invitation of G. Stanley Hall, president of the university. 
This meeting, which Hall reports took place in his study 
(Hall, 1923), was the preliminary or organizational meeting. 
Later in the same year, on December 27, the first annual 
meeting was held at the University of Pennsylvania.
Although the published reports of the preliminary 
meeting state that seven psychologists attended (Anon., 1892? 
Anon., 1894), the validity of these reports has been questioned. 
A recent study addressed to the question of who attended the 
preliminary meeting (Dennis & Boring, 1952) concluded that of 
the 26 charter members, only 10-18 were actually present. 
Probably it will never be known for sure exactly who attended 
the organizational meeting. It is known, however, that Hall 
was elected president, that the scientific character of the 
organization was firmly established, that five new members 
were elected in addition to the 26 charter members, and that 
of these 31 persons, 18 attended the first annual meeting at 
the University of Pennsylvania on December 27, 1892.
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The membership of the APA has grown phenomenally 
since 1892. From 31 in 1892, to over 3,000 fifty years 
later, in 1942, to over 31,000 today. At this rate, one 
might estimate its membership to be over 200,000 by psychology's 
centennial in 1992. According to E. G. Boring, if the APA 
continues to grow at its present rate, by sometime in the 
twenty-second century there should be more psychologists 
than people in the worldI
The APA was founded in 1892 to advance psychology as 
a science. However, there has been a growing trend over the 
years toward professionalization. In the 1930's, three 
applied psychological organizations were formed: the Psycho­
metric Society (1938), the Society for the Psychological Study 
of Social Issues (SPSSI, 1936), and the American Association 
for Applied Psychology (AAAP, 1937). In 1945, the AAAP was 
incorporated into the APA, so that scientific and professional 
interests were united in a single national organization. The 
purpose of the reorganized APA became: to advance psychology
as a science, a profession, and a means of promoting human 
welfare. The American Psychologist was established in 1946 
and became the publication outlet of the Association. Today 
the purpose of the Association reads: "to advance psych­
ology as a science, and as a means of promoting human wel­
fare by the encouragement of psychology in all its branches
in the broadest and most liberal manner" (APA, 1970). 
Throughout its history the effort has been to keep the 
science and profession of psychology together.
APPENDIX B
Title of the Presidential Addresses of the American Psychological Association, 1892-1970
Year_____ President Title of Address  Place of Publication
1892 G. S. Hall History and Prospects of Experimental
Psychology in America (Not. published)
1893 G. T. Ladd The Problems of Psychology PR, 1894, 1, 1-21
1894 W. James The Knowing of Things Together PR, 1895, 2, 105-124
1895 J. McK. Cattell Psychology and the Other Sciences PR, 1896, 3, 134-148
1896 G. S. Fullterton The "Knower" in Psychology PR* 1897, 4, 1-26
1897 J. M. Baldwin On Selective Thinking PR, 1898, 5, 1-24
1898 H. Mtinsterberg Psychology and History PR, 1899, 6, 1-31
1899 J. Dewey Psychology and Social Practice PR' 1900, 7, 105-124
(also : S, 1900, 11, 321-332)
1
The following code has been used to save space: PR = Psychological Review; = Science;
PB = Psychological Bulletin; AP = American Psychologist.
1900 J. Jastrow Some Currents and Undercurrents 
in Psychology PR, 1891, 8, 1-26
1901 J. Royce Recent Logical Inquiries and Their
Psychological Bearings PR, 1902, 9, 105-133
1902 E. C. Sanford Psychology and Physics PR, 1903, 10, 105-119
1903 W. L. Bryan Theory and Practice PR, 1904, 11, 71-82
1904 W. James The Experience of Activity PR, 1905, 12, 1-17
1905 M. W. Calkins A Reconciliation of Structural and
Functional Psychology PR, 1906, 13, 61-80
1906 J. R. Angell The Province of Functional
Psychology PR, 1907, 14, 61-91
1907 H. R. Marshall The Methods of the Naturalist and
Psychologist PR, 1908, 15, 1-24
1908 G. M. Stratton Toward the Correction of Some Rival
Methods in Psychology PR, 1909, 16, 67-84
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1909 C. H. Judd Evolution and Consciousness PR, 1910, 17, 77-97
1910 w. B. Pillsbury The Place of Movement in Consciousness PR, 1911, 18, 83-99
1911 c. E. Seashore The Measurement of a Singer s, 1912, 35, 201-212
1912 E. L. Thorndike Ideo-motor Action PR, 1913, 20, 91-106
1913 H. C. Warren The Mental and the Physical PR, 1914, 21, 79-100
1914 R. S - Woodworth A Revision of Imageless Thought PR, 1915, 22, 1-27
1915 J. B. Watson The Place of the Conditioned Reflex
in Psychology PR* 1916, 23, 89-117
1916 R. Dodge The Laws of Relative Fatigue PR* 1917, 24, 89-113
1917 R. M. Yerkes Psychology in Relation to the War PR* 1918, 25, 85-115
1918 J. W . Ba ird (No address)
1919 W. D. Scott Changes in Some of Our Conceptions and
Practices of Personnel PR, 1920, 27, 81-94
1920 S. I. Franz Cerebral-mental Relations PR, 1921, 28, 81-95
1921 M. F. Washburn Introspection as an Objective Method PR* 1922, 29, 89-112
1922 K. Dunlap The Foundations of Social Psychology PR, 1923, 30, 81-102
1923 L. M. Terman The Mental Test as a Psychological
Method PR, 1924, 31, 93-117
1924 G. S. Hall (No address)
1925 M. Bentley The Major Categories of Psychology PR, 1926, 33, 71-105
1926 H. A. Carr The Interpretation of the Animal Mind PR, 1927, 34, 87-106
1927 H. L. Hollingworth Sensuous Determinants of Psychological
Attitudes PR, 1928, 35, 93-117
1928 E. G. Boring The Psychology of Controversy PR, 1929, 36, 97-121
1929 K. S. Lashley Basic Neural Mechanisms in Behavior PR, 1930, 37, 1-24
1930 H. S. Langfeld A Response Interpretation of
Consciousness PR, 1931, 38, 87-108
1931 W. S. Hunter The Psychological Study of Behavior PR, 1932, 39, 1-24
1932 W. R. Miles Age and Human Ability PR, 1933, 40, 99-123
1933 L. L. Thurstone The Vectors of Mind PR, 1934, 41, 1-32
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1934 J. Peterson Aspects of Learning PR, 1935, 42, 1-27
1935 A. T. Pofferiberger Psychology and Life PR, 1936, 43, 9-31
1936 C. L. Hull Mind, Mechanism, and Adaptive
Behavior PR, 1937, 44, 1-32
1937 E. C. Tolman The Determiners of Behavior at a
Choice Point PR, 1938, 45, 1-41
1938 J. F. Dashiell Some Rapprochements in
Contemporary Psychology PB, 1939, 36, 1-24
1939 G. W. Allport The Psychologists Frame of Reference PB, 1940, 37, 1-28
1940 L. Carmichael The Experimental Embryology of Mind PB, 1941, 38, 1-28
1941 H. Woodrow The Problem of General Quantitative
Laws in Psychology PB, 1942, 39, 1-27
1942 C. P. Stone Multiply, Vary, Let the Strongest Live
and the Weakest Die - Charles Darwin PB, 1943, 40- 1-24
1943 J. E. Anderson Freedom and Constraint or Potentiality
and Environment PB, 1944, 41, 1-29
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1944 G. Murphy The Freeing of Intelligence PB, 1945, 42, 1-19
1945 E. R. Guthrie Psychological Facts and Psychological
Theory PB, 1946, 43, 1-20
1946 H. E. Garrett A Developmental Theory of Intelligence AP, 1946, 1, 372-378
1947 C. R. Rogers Some Observations on the Organization
of Personality AP, 1947, 2, 358-368
1948 D. G. Marquis Research Planning at the Frontiers
of Science AP, 1948, 3, 430-438
1949 E. R. Hilgard Human Motives and the Concept of Self AP' 1949, 4, 374-382
1950 J. P. Guilford Creativity AP, 1950, 5, 444-454
1951 R. R. Sears A Theoretical Framework for Personality
and Social Behavior AP, 1951, 6 , 476-483
1952 J. McV. Hunt Psychological Services in the Tactics
of Psychological Science AP, 1952, 7, 608-622















0. H. Mowrer 
E. L. Kelly 
T. M. Newcomb
L. J. Cronbach
H. F. Harlow 
W. Ktthler 
D . 0. Hebb 
N. E. Miller 
P. E. Meehl 
C. E. Osgood 
Q. McNemar 
J. E. Bruner 
N. Hobbs
The Psychologist Looks at Language AP, 1954,
Consistency of the Adult Personality AP* 1955,
The Prediction of Interpersonal
Attraction AP, 1956,
The Two Disciplines of Scientific
Psychology AP, 1957,
The Nature of Love AP, 1958,
Gestalt Psychology Today AP' 1959,
The American Revolution AP, 1960,
Analytical Studies of Drive and Reward AP, 1961,
Scbizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia AP' 1962,
On Understanding and Creating Sentences AP' 1963,
Lost: Our Intelligence? Why? M' 1964,
The Growth of Mind AP, 1965,
Helping Disturbed Children: AP, 1966,





G. Lindzey Some Remarks Concerning Incest, the
A. H. Maslow 
G. A. Miller
G. W. Albee
Incest Taboo, and Psychoanalytic 
Theory 
(No address)
Psychology as a Means of Promoting 
Human Welfare 
The Uncertain Future of Clinical
AP, 1967, 22, 1051-1059
AP, 1969, 24, 1063-1075
Psychology AP, 1970, 25, 1071-1080
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APPENDIX C
Eminence of the APA Presidents 
Election to the office of president of the APA is an 
honor received by relatively few psychologists, yet even here 
one would expect to find individual differences in eminence.
A recent study of "Important Psychologists, 1600-1967" (Annin, 
Boring, & Watson, 1968) makes it possible to assess the rela­
tive eminence of 45 of the past 78 APA presidents, both 
individually and collectively.
Essentially, the method used inthe Annin et al. study 
was to prepare a list of 1,040 deceased persons contributing 
to psychology from 1600 to 1967, each of which was then rated 
on a scale fran 1 to 3 by an international panel of nine judges. 
A judge was instructed to give the person a score of 1 if he 
recognized the name in the history of psychology, even if he 
could not specify the person's contribution; a score of 2 if 
he could identify the person's contribution to psychology, 
even if not very precisely; and 3 if he considered the person 
of such distinction that his name should be included in a 
list of the 500 most important psychologists since 1600 and 
not living. Thus, the highest possibly score was 27. In the 
present comment, each score was treated as a separate category
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of eminence and called an "eminence score." Since the goal 
of the Annin et al. study was to report on approximately 
500 of the most important deceased contributors to psychology 
since 1600, the 1,040 names had to be reduced by about one- 
half. A decision to include persons scoring 11 or above 
yielded 538 names. A list of these 538 persons was published 
(Annin et al., 1968), while a list of those receiving scores 
of 10 or below was deposited with the American Documentation 
Institute. The published list was arranged by score and again 
alphabetically with dates of birth and death. The dates of 
birth and death were checked again in a follow-up study 
(Merrifield & Watson, 1970), and another study was made to 
ascertain the particular profession, nationality, and temporal 
period of the 538 persons (Watson & Merrifield, in press).
This latter study showed that about one-half of the 538 
most important contributors to psychology were psychologists 
per se, while the others were primarily identified with 
other fields. The ultimate goal of these studies was to pro­
vide the basis for a forthcoming bibliography which will 
contain about 50,000 primary and secondary references relevant 
to these important contributors to psychology (Watson, in 
preparation) .
Forty-seven APA presidents were among the deceased 
important contributors to psychology evaluated in the Annin
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et al. panel study (see Table 5).
Table 5 contains mostly familiar names and shows a 
preponderance of high eminence scores. However, it also con­
tains a few relatively unknown psychologists, at least to 
the nine present-day judges in the Annin et al. study. The 
lowest scores were 9, received by Joseph Peterson? 10, received 
by Henry R. Marshall; and 11, received by Walter D. Scott. The 
presence of these low scorers suggests that there may some­
times be grounds other than scientific eminence for the 
selection of a psychologist to be president of the APA. This 
inference agrees with one made previously based on the last 
20 APA presidents as part of a study in which scientific 
eminence was related to journal citations (Myers, 1970).
Of the 47 APA presidents in Table 5, 45 were included 
among the published list of 538 most important contributors to 
psychology. How distinguished are these APA presidents as a 
group compared with their peers? Perhaps the most appropriate 
comparison is with those contributors to psychology who were 
later classified as "American psychologists" by Watson and 
Merrifield (in press), rather than with the whole heterogeneous 
group of contributors. The most important American psychologists 
(N = 129) and the subgroup of APA presidents (n = 45) are alike 
on the variables of nationality and profession (except for 
three presidents classified as "American philosophers" —
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Dewey, James, Royce) but differ in degree of eminence: (a)
On the scale from 11 to 27, the mean of the eminence scores 
of American psychologists was 18.50 (Mdn = 19), while the 
mean of the APA presidents was 23.16 (Mdn = 24). (b) While
13.18% of the American psychologists scored in the highest 
category of eminence (indicating perfect agreement among the 
nine judges), 37.78% of the APA presidents scored in this 
category. These comparisons testify to the eminence of the 
APA presidents as operationally defined with reference to 
the Annin et al. study and the Watson and Merrifield study.
Kenneth R. Gibson
University of New Hampshire
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST - June 1972
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Table 5
Forty-Seven Deceased Presidents of the APA Arranged by Score 
for Importance to Psychology
President Eminence score Year(s) of
presidency
Gordon W. Allport 27 1939
James R. Angell 27 1906
John Dewey 27 1899
G. Stanley Hall 27 1892, 1924
Clark L. Hull 27 1936
William James 27 1894, 1904
Wolfgang Ktthler 27 1959
Karl S. Lashley 27 1929
Lewis M. Terman 27 1923
Edward L. Thorndike 27 1912
Louis L. Thurstone 27 1933
Edward C. Tolman 27 1937
John B. Watson 27 1915
Robert S. Woodworth 27 1914
Robert M. Yerkes 27 1917
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James McK. Cattell 
Edwin R. Guthrie
James M. Baldwin 
Walter S. Hunter
George T. Ladd 
Hugo Milnsterberg 
Carl E. Seashore
Harvey A. Carr 








Mary W. Calkins 
Raymond Dodge 
Shepherd I. Franz 











































Note. —  As judged by an international panel of nine 
psychologists. Score from Annin et al. (1968). 
aNot among the 538 most important psychologists whose names 
were published in the Annin et al. (1968) study. Their 
names were on a list of the remaining psychologists which was 
deposited with the American Documentation Institute.
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I, Introduction
In the broadjst sense, this study is addressed to the question, How 
has the conception of American psychology changed since the 19th century 
and what is its present status as a science? Until recently, textbooks 
on the history of psychology have often followed one of two theories of 
historical changet either the Great Man theory, which attributes the 
dynamics of history to the genius of great men, or the Zeitgeist theory, 
which attributes the dynamics of history to social forces, the "spirit 
of the times," Stimulated by the work of Kuhn in the history of the physi­
cal sciences, Watson has recently proposed a third alternative, known as 
prescriptive theory (1967). The present study focuses on a portion of 
American psychology of special significance, the presidential addresses of 
the American Psychological Association (APA), within the framework of this 
third alternative, using the method of content analysis. The immediate 
purpose of the study is to analyze the contents of the presidential addresses 
as official documents prepared by eminent psychologists who often look at 
their primary task as the presentation of a formal statement of their 
scientific and professional credo. In the broader sense, it is asstmed 
that the addresses constitute a rich source of information about the his­
torical changes that have taken place in American psychology. The essence 
of the study is to determine the growth and contemporary status of the 
views of American psychologists in as scientific a fashion as possible.
Taking his point of departure from Kuhn's recent analysis of the 
development of scientific revolutions (19^2), Watson has argued that 
psychology is still at a relatively early stage of scientific development 
(1967). Unlike the older, more mature sciences— which have reached the 
level of guidance by what Kuhn calls a "paradlgn"— psychology does not 
seem to have a single, unifying contentual model which defines the field 
and which is accepted by all psychologists. Persistent disagreement over
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fundamental Issues such as subject matter and methodology, the fact that 
schools of psychology still have their adherents, and the presence of 
national differences in psychology— ‘these facts suggest that psychology 
is still at the pre-paradigaatic stage of a science.
Psychologists are not neutral toward either the subject matter of 
the methods of their science. They have definite preferences or cognitive 
biases. They rely on habits of thougit which are partly a matter of 
temperament and partly due to the influenoe of their teachers, their reading, 
and the ethos of the school which they attended. These habits pf thought 
guide their psychological activities. The habits which can be traced 
historically over an appreciable period of time, thus forming trends or 
themes, are what Watson calls prescriptions. Examples of prescriptions 
are the emphasis upon discovering general laws (Nemotheticism), the stress 
upon psychological events taking place at the periphery of the body 
(Peripheral!sm), and the stress upon knowledge which is countable or 
measurable (Quantltativism), Prescriptions may be defined as attitudinal 
perspectives, basic orientatlve assumptions, or modes of conceptualisa­
tion, and they play an important role in enabling the psychologist to 
deal with the problems of subject matter and methodology.
In this content analysis, prescriptions will be used in one of the 
ways they function, that is, as contrasting pairs. For example, the 
emphasis upon discovering general laws (Nomo the ticism) contrasts with the 
emphasis upon explaining particular events or individuals (Idiographic!sm), 
the stress upon psychological events taking place at the periphery of the 
body (Peripheralism) contrasts with the stress upon psychological events 
taking place within the body (Centralism), and the stress upon knowledge 
which is countable or measurable (Quantltativism) contrasts with the stress 
on that which is different in kind or essence (Qualltatlvism), There are
166
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18 pairs of prescriptions* This study may be thought of as an attempt to 
quantify the prescriptions which hove been expressed In the presidential 
addresses of the APA.
II. The Coding System
167
In this content analysis* the process of coding an address with re­
spect to a prescription is a two-fold task. First* the judge must deter­
mine whether the author of the address expresses the prescription in 
question. This will take practice because a prescription is not a unit 
of communication for which physical guides exist. Second, if the author 
does not express the prescription* it is left blank on the Coding Formi 
but if he does express the prescription* the judge must determine his 
position or attitude toward it. The judge indicates which of three possi­
ble categories (existing along a single dimension) best describes the 
author's position. These categories aret
Acceptance j Neutral Rejection
1
1 I o -1
The specific meaning of these three categories* which together con­
stitute the coding system* is as follows.
(1) Acceptance - The prescription is supported, advocated, or other­
wise accepted by the author.
(2) Rejection - The prescription is disapproved, repudiated, or 
otherwise rejected by the author.
(3) Neutral - The prescription is mentioned, but the author does not 
take a position or reveal an attitude of acceptance or rejection. This 
does not mean that the author has no position, but rather that the pres­
cription* as expressed, is not accepted or rejected. If the author neither 
aocepts nor rejects the prescription, then it is neutral in status with 
respect to that particular manifestation.
168
-5-
In order to aid the judge in his two-fold coding task, the next 
section provides a dictionary of prescriptions with corresponding coded 
examples of prescriptions. The value of the content analysis rests on 
the extent to which the judges rely on this dictionary as the basis for 
coding. The dictionary and examples of the prescriptions constitute the 
essence of this Coding Manual.
The format of the dictionary is as follows. Each prescription is 
followed by Watson's definition in quotations (1967)* In most cases the 
meaning is amplified, either by myself or by relevant definitions taken 
from Warren, Dictionary of Psychology (193*0 or English and English, A 
Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytic Terms (1958)* 
Sometimes several variations of a prescription are given, or different shades 
of meaning are accentuated. An attempt has been made to relate the concept 
to contemporary psychology whenever possible by mentioning areas where it 
may be found.
Following the definition of each pair of contrasting prescriptions 
there are some examples of those prescriptions. Quoted passages which in­
clude the contrasting prescriptions together come before quotations which in­
clude only one prescription. Examples of single prescriptions are then ar­
ranged by tho author*s position in the order of Acceptance, Neutral, Rejection. 
The passages, and the examples of prescriptions found in each passage, are 
numbered consecutively. There are 1k5 examples of prescriptions, or an 
average of about eight examples per pair of contrasting prescriptions.
Following each sample passage are some comments relevant to the 
prescription(s) expressed and the author's position (except in cases where 
I felt the coding was self-evident). These are intented to clarify the 




Scne quoted statements or passages are clear-cut and easily coded* 
Others are extremely equivocal* Most fall between these two extremes*
It Is hoped that by standardizing the coding procedure as much as possible 
that high reliability between Judges may be obtained,
A problem exists in coding the sample passages which will probably not 
be as great during the coding of the actual articles* It is the problem 
of context* Bie sample passages axe frequently taken out of context* and 
this makes It especially difficult to determine the author's position* Is 
he making an argument and therefore commited to the prescriptions he ex­
presses (which should elicit the Acceptance category), or is he simply 
describing the subject matter and trying to be objective (which should 
elicit the Neutral category)? Questions such as this make for equivocal 
codings* As noted before, however, this problem should not be as great 
when the Judge is coding articles instead of isolated passages*
Unavoidably, the prescription which is being illustrated is sometimes 
accompanied by other prescriptions} these additional prescriptions are 
coded too* This means that in the sample passages there are different 
combinations of categories which may be used to describe the prescriptions* 
For example, with two prescriptions in a passage, there are (3) or nine 
possible combinations of categories which may be employed. These nine 
logical possibilities arei Acceptance, Acceptance} Acceptance, Neutral} 
Acceptance, Rejection} Neutral, Acceptance} Neutral, Neutral} Neutral, 
Rejection} Rejection, Acceptance} Rejection, Neutral} Rejection, Rejection* 
The number of logical possibilities increases exponentially as the number 
of prescriptions in the passagei three prescriptions = (3)^ or 2? combina­
tions, four prescriptions = (3)^ or 81 combinations, etc.
With this information about the coding system and general format of 




m .  Dictionary of Prescriptions with Examples 
Conscious mentalism - "Emphasis on awareness of mental structure or 
activity," Mentalism is the belief that there is a unique group of men­
tal phenomena not reducible without remainder to physical phenomena. 
Conscious mentalism refers to mental activity of which a person is fully 
aware at any given time.
Unconscious mentalism - "Emphasis on unawareness of mental structure 
or activity," Mentalism is the belief that there is a unique group of men­
tal phenomena not reducible without remainder to physical phenomena. 
Unconscious mentalism refers to mental activity which is outside the 
range of conscious awareness.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Many people, both inside and outside £psychologicalJ science, are satisfied 
with the assumption that consciousness alone is psychical} in that case 
nothing remains for psychology but to discriminate among psychical phenomena 
between perceptions, feelings, thought-processes a«d volitions. It is 
generally agreed, however, that these conscious processes do not form un­
broken sequences which are complete in themselves} there would thus be no 
alternative left to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes 
which are concomitant with the psychical ones and which wo should neces­
sarily have to recognize as more complete than the psychical sequences, 
since some of them would have conscious processes parallel to them but 
others would not. If so, it of course becomes plausible to lay the stress 
in psychology on these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence 
of what is psychical and to look for some other assessment of the conscious 
processes, The majority of philosophers, however, as well as many other 
people, dispute this and declare that the idea of something psychical being 
unconscious is self-contradictory.
But that is precisely what psycho-analysis is obliged to assert, , • . 
It explains tho supposedly somatic concomitant phenomena as being what is 
truly psychical, and thus in the first instance disregards the quality of 
consciousne s s•
In this passage conscious processes are deemphasized and unconscious 
processes emphasized as the primary data of psychology. An accurate ren­
dering in terms of the Coding System would bei Conscious mentalism—  
Rejection} Unconscious mentalism— Acceptance, (The passage also illustrates 
Contentual subjectivism, which will be defined later,)
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Passage 2 - Examples 3 A ^
Professor Kirkpatrick suggests that , , . psychology be broadened to 
include the functioning of all organisms, whether conscious or unconscious, 
and suggests the term organosis.
Hie reference to conscious and unconscious functioning warrents the codings 
of Conscious mentalism and Unconscious mentalism, respectively. Since the 
statement Is descriptive of Professor Kirkpatrick, it should be coded as 
Neutral with respect to the author's position. Codingi Conscious menta­
lism— Neutral; Unconscious mentalism— Neutral,
Passage 3 - Example 5
An investigation of normal, stable states, in which the frontiers of the 
ego are safeguarded against the id by resistances (anticathexes) and have 
held firm, and in which the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego, 
because they work together harmoniously— an investigation of that kind 
would teach us little, The only thing that can help us are states of con­
flict and uproar, when the contents of the unconscious id have a prospect 
of forcing their way into the ego and into consciousness and the ego puts 
itself once more on the defense against this invasion. It is only under 
these conditions that we can make such observations as will confirm or 
correct our statements about the two partners. Now, our nightly sleep is 
precisely a state of this sort, and for that reason psychical activity 
during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is our most favourable object 
of stucfcr.
Tho meaning of this passage revolves around the concept of the unconscious 
id, and the author gives our dreams as an example of unconscious activity. 
Coding! Unconscious mentalism— Acceptance. (This passage also illustrates 




Contentual objectivism - "Psychological data viewed as behavior of 
individual,” The point of view concerning the subject matter of psychology 
which focuses on what is open to external observation, namely, the beha­
vior of organisms.
Contentual subjectivism - "Psychological data viewed as mental 
structure or activity of individual," The point of view which focuses 
on mental states as the primary subject matter of psychology. Some of the 
terms which reflect either acceptance or rejection of Contentual subjecti­
vism arei mind, consciousness, experience, soul, spirit, psyche, private 
events, imagery, cognitive processes, covert behavior, internal response 
states.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
What we need to do is to start work upon psychology, making behavior, not 
consciousness, the objective point of attack,
Codingi Contentual objectivism— Acceptance! Contentual subjectivian—  
Rejection,
Passage 2 - Examples _3 & ^
Nobody has as yet invented a complete terminology that avoids all reference 
to mental activity! and even if it were possible to construct such a new 
language, it would have to be learned and understood through the medium of 
consciousness, because all communication requires not merely the behavioris­
tic processes of signalling through spoken or written or gesture language, 
but also the reference to the past experiences of the individual who re­
ceives the signals.
The author's defense of the concepts of "mental activity" and "conscious­
ness" is an expression of Contentual subjectivism. The reference to a 
"complete terminology that avoids all reference to mental activity" suggests 
Contentual objectivism, which is repudiated by the author, Codingi Con­
tentual subjectivism— Acceptance; Contentual objectivism— Rejection,
Passage 3 - Examples 5 & 6
I believe we can write a psychology, define it as Pillsbury, and never go 
back upon our definitioni never use the terms consciousness, mental states,
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mind, content , . , Imagery, and the like.
Since the author believes a psychology can be developed without 
Contentual subjectivism, he simultaneously implies a commitment to Con­
tentual objectivism, Codingi Contentual objectivism— Acceptance! Con­
tentual subjectivism— Rejection.
Passage k - Examples 7 & 8
Enough has been said to show that there are certain aspects of human 
nature in which the interrelations of behavior and consciousness are so 
intimate and so essential to the facts involved that an artificial separa­
tion of the two distorts the facts and leads to one-sided interpretations 
or abstractions. We must therefore conclude that psychology should not 
split into two new sciences nor limit itself exclusively to either con­
sciousness or behavior, because both are mere abstractions from the con­
crete events to be studied.
The author rejects tho dichotomy between behavior and consciousness, 
so the paragraph may be coded asi Contentual objectivism— Rejectioni 
Contentual subjectivism— Rejection.
Passage 5 - Example 9
The behaviorist asksi Why don't we mako what we can observe the real 
field of psychology? Lot us limit ourselves to things that can bo ob­
served, and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we 
observe? Wo can observe behavior— what the organism does or says. And 
lot us point out at oncei that saying is doing— that is, behaving.
Speaking overtly or to ourselves (tliinklng) is just as objective a type 
of behavior as baseball.
This is a statement of the rationale of Contentual objectivism, which 
should bo coded as Acceptance. (In addition, tho identification of thinking 
with speaking to ourselves warronts tho coding of Peripheral!sm— Acceptance.) 
Passage 6 - Examples 10
[Psychology's J theoretical goal is tho prediction and control of behavior.
• • • Tho behaviorist, in his efforts to got a unitary scheme of animal 
response, recognizes no dividing lino between man and brute. The behavior 
of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of 
the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation.
Codingi Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,
Passage 7 - Example 11
I have a profound admiration and respect for tho large amount of fine
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original work done by all the workers In scientific psychology* But I 
confess that a very large part of their work as well as their method seems 
to me to be unpsychological. They are studying something, but it is not 
consciousness or psyche, and psychology is the science descriptive of con­
sciousness. That should be the root of the matter, whereas, with them, it 
is at most a convenient general abstract term to hold together a lot of 
abstractions, from the activity of the concrete psyche.
The author defines the subject matter of psychology as consciousness, 
thus revealing his commitment to Contentual subjectivism. Codingi Con­
tentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage £ - Example 12
, « , yet there remain many facts of psychological observation • • • [which]
, , , are subjective in their very nature and cannot be observed by any­
body but the person who experiences them. What is to be done with this 
subjective material in our science? European psychologists evidently have 
not worried themselves much over this question, but in this country a 
group of psychologists have arisen who feel that the recognition of sub­
jective facts is irreconcilable with scientific accuracy and measurement 
and should be excluded from the subject-matter of psychology. Whether we 
are to agree with this movement or not will depend upon our answers to 
the two questionsi What is psychology? and, What are its objectives? We 
must therefore understand the full significance of these important questions.
The description of "subjective facts" is a statement of Contentual 
subjectivism. The allusion to the behaviorists' rejection of such con­
ceptualizing is not quite explicit enough to be coded for Contentual objecti­
vism, The passage is historical and descriptive! the author's position 
should be considered Neutral, Codingi Contentual subjectivism— Neutral,
(The reference to scientific measurement warrants a coding of Quantltativism, 
to be defined later,)
Passage 9 - Example 13
"States of consciousness," like the so-called phenomena of spiritualism, 
are not objectively verifiable and for that reason can never become the 
data for science,
Codingi Contentual subjectivism— Rejection.
Passage 10 - Example 14
* The time seems to have come whon psychology must discard all reference 
to consciousnessf whon it need no longer delude itself into thinking that 
it is making mental states the object of observation. We have become so 
enmeshed in speculative questions concerning the , , , mind, the nature of
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conscious content (for example, imageloss thought, attitudes, and Bewusseinslage, 
etc,) that I , , , feel that something is wrong with our premises and types 
of problems which develop from them,
Codingi Contentual subjectivism— Rejection,
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Determinism - "Human events completely explicable in terms of ante­
cedents." The doctrine that human behavior is determined by (or is a 
necessary consequence of) antecedent factors, which may be external (e.g., 
temperature) or internal (e.g., motives). It follows that human behavior 
is predictable, in principle, from knowledge of these antecedent factors, 
although such knowledge has never been complete.
Indeterminism - "Human events not completely so explicable in terms
of antecedents."
the theory that man can act or choose reflectively in relative 
independence of given stimuli (Warren, 193*0#
The chief form of indeterminism Is the doctrine of free will, which asserts
that man's deliberate choices may transcend the matrix of cause-and-effoct.
free-will doctrine = the theory that the course of thought and 
volition is or may be directed by the individual himself, regard­
less of external influences and (according to some) regardless 
of internal or mental constitution (Warren, 193*+)#
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of 
scientific method to tho study of human behavior. The free inner man who 
is hold responsible for the behavior of the external biological organism 
is only a proscientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are 
discovered in the course of a scientific analysis. All these alternative 
causes lie outside the individual.
This is a rejection of Indeterminism and simultaneous acceptance of 
Determinism. The author's repudiation of the "inner man" in favor of the 
"external biological organism" may be interpreted asi Contentual subjecti­
vism— Re joctionj Contentual objectivism—-Acceptance, (In addition, a 
coding of Peripheral!sm— Acceptance would not be inappropriate, due to 
the emphasis on the external biological organism and external causes of 
human behavior,)
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & **
Man, we once believed, was free to express himself in art, music and 
literature, to inquire into nature, to seek salvation in his own way. He 
could initiate action and make spontaneous and capricious changes of
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course , , , But science insists that action is initiated by forces im­
pinging upon the individual, and that caprice is only another name for 
behavior for which we have not yet found a cause.
This is a rejection of Indeterminism and argument for Determinism, 
Codingi Indeterminism— Rejection* Determinism— Acceptance.
Passage 3 - Examples 5 & 6
To me this kind of world would destroy the human person as I have come to 
know him in the deepest moments of psychotherapy. In such moments I am 
in relationship with a person who is spontaneous, who is responsibly free, 
that is, aware of this freedom to choose who he will be, and aware also 
of the consequences of his choice. To believe, as Skinner holds, that all 
this is an illusion, and that spontaneity, freedom, responsibility, and 
choice have no real existence, would be impossible for me.
Codingi Indeterminism— Acceptance* Determinism— Rejection. (Since 
the author is a psychotherapist, a coding of Utilitarianism is also jus­
tified, )
Passage 4 - Example 7
To the psychologist, conduct is a matter of cause and effect, of natural 
law. His business is to know tho laws of that part of nature which we call 
human nature . , . For him, even the most capricious conduct has its causes, 
even the most inexplicable has its explanation~if only the cause can be 
unearthed . . .
The emphasis on the concepts of causo, effect, and law suggest a coding 
of* Determinism— Acceptance, (The author's conviction that psychology be 
limited to tho realm of nature also suggests a coding of Naturalism—  
Acceptance,)
Passage 5 - Example 8
Freedom is man's capacity to take a hand in his own development. It 
is our capacity to mold ourselves. • • , But by our power to be conscious 
of ourselves, we can call to mind how we acted yesterday or last month, 
and by learning from theso actions we can influence, even if ever so 
Ittle, how we act today. And we can picture in imagination some situation 
tomorrow— say a dinner date, or an appointment for a job, or a Board of 
Directors meeting— and by turning over in fantasy different alternatives 
for acting, wo can pick the one which will do best for us.
Hore tho emphasis is on freedom as reflective choice. Codingi In­
determinism— Acceptance. In addition, the author's mention of "our power 
to be conscious of ourselves." suggests a coding of Conscious mentalism—  
Acceptance,
Empiricism -"Major, if not exclusive source of knowledge is experience," 
The approach which relies on sense experience or sense perception— what the 
senses receive from the environment— in the search for truth, The kind of 
experience referred to in this original conception is common, everyday, 
practical, experience, without systematic questioning of nature.
However, the modern form of Empiricism emphasizes controlled observa­
tion, experiment, and recording of data. In this latter sense, Empiricism 
is synonymous with experimentalism, Thus thore are two conceptions of 
Empiricism, a broader and a narrower one, There common feature is tho 
emphasis on sonso experience as tho major source of knowledge. Even though 
oxporlmentalism adds tho element of control, it is still basod on tho 
assumption that oxperionco is tho major sourco of knowledge.
Rational!smi (vs. Empiricism) - "Major, if not exclusive source of 
knowledge is reason." Tho approach which relies on reasoning or thought 
in tho search for truth. This concoption of Rationalism]_has boon associated 
with scholastic logic and recourse to authority during tho Middlo Agos,
Somo of tho modern forms of Rationalism arot rational consideration 
of empirical data (interpretation), theorizing, use of models (including 
mathematical models), and philosophical psychology. What thoso various 
activities havo in common is tho use of reason or thought as a major sourco 
of knowledge.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The processes of science are characteristic of humans in that they move by 
tho union of empirical fact and rational thought in a way which cannot bo 
disentangled. There is in science, as in all our lives, a continuous to 
and fro of factual discovory, then of thought about tho implications of 
what wo have discovered, and so back to the facts for testing and discovery 
— a stop by stop of experiment and thoory, left, right, loft, right, for­
ever, This union of two methods is tho very basis of scionco.
This is an explication of tho integration of Empiricism and Rationalism^
in scientific activity. They are inexplicably intortwined. Codingi
Empiricist!— Acceptancei Rationalism^— Acceptance.
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Passage 2 - Examples 3 &
Modem science has two inseparable components— tho empirical and the 
theoretical. Hie empirical component is concerned primarily with observa­
tion f the theoretical component is concerned with the interpretation and 
explanation of observation. A natural event is explained when it can be 
derived as a theorem by a process of reasoning from (1) knowledge of the 
relevant natural conditions controlling it, and (2) one or more relevant 
principles called postulates.
Coding! Qnpiricism— Acceptance; Rationalism-^— Acceptance, (Since
tho typo of reasoning favored by the author is deductivo reasoning, his
statement should also receive a coding of Deduetivism— Acceptance. Another
appropriate coding is Naturalism— Acceptance,)
Passage 3 - Examplo 5
. . .  I, as an experimental student, fool that something is wrong with our 
premisos and types of problems which dovelop from them,
Tho author makes explicit his commitment to exporimontalism, so the
coding is Empiricism— Acceptance, (A coding of Methodological objectivism
— Acceptance is also appropriate.)
Passage k - Examplo 6
, , , and I look to neurophysiological theory for an eventual emendation 
and supplementation of behavior theories.
The emphasis on theory warrants a coding of Rationalism^— Accoptanco,
and the specification of behavior thoory warronts a coding of Contontual
objectivism— Accoptanco,
Functionalism - "Psychological catogorios aro activities." The belief
that psychology should concern itself with what the processes of mental
life and behavior do.
the doctrine that an essential feature of all psychological pro­
cesses is the part which they play in tho adaptive functions of 
the organism (Warren, 193*0.
Hence, any doctrine or practice that lays stress upon function, use, adapta­
tion, or adjustment.
Structuralism - "Psychological categories aro contents."
Whon the catogorios of psychology aro conceived as montalistic, 
Structuralism takes the view that psychology should bo concerned with the 
"structure" of tho human mind, or alternately, tho "structures" of personality. 
In tho first subclass, tho focus is on conscious "contents," like sensations, 
images, and affections. Those aro the elements of which tho mind is com­
posed. In the socond subclass, tho focus is on personality conceived as 
made up of systems or stable acquisitions rather than as a single process.
For example, the id, ego, and superego aro personality structures.
On the other hand, when the categories of psychology are conceived as 
bohavioral, Structuralism takes the view that psychology should bo concerned 
with tho "structure" of behavior, e.£.» tho conception that personality is 
build up out of habits.
Passago 1 - Examples 1 & 2
The point which I wish now to make is thisi that, employing the samo 
principlo of division, we can represent modern psychology as the exact 
counterpart of modern biology. . ...
1. We find a parallel to morphology in a very largo portion of "ex­
perimental" psychology, Tho primary aim of the experimental psychologist 
has boon to analyzo the structuro of mindj to ravel out the elemental 
processes from tho tanglo of consciousness, or (if we may change tho 
metaphor) to isolate the constituents in tho given conscious formation.
His task is a vivisection, but a vivisection which shall yield structural, 
not functional results. * . •
2. There is, however, a functional psychology, over and above this 
psychology of structuro, . . .  Wo may rogard [the mind) . . . as the collec­
tive name for a system of functions of tho psychophysical organism, . . .
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Just as experimental psychology Is to a large extent concerned with 
problems of structure# so Is "descriptive" psychology# ancient and modern# 
chiefly occupied with problems of function#. Memory, recognition, imagina­
tion, conception, judgnent, attention, apperception, volition, and a host 
of verbal nouns, wider or narrower in denotation, connote, in the discussions 
of descriptive psychology, functions of the total organism# That their 
underlying processes are psychical in character is, so to speak, an acci­
dent! for all practical purposes they stand upon tho same level as digestion 
and locomotion, secretion and excretion.
This passage contrasting structural and functional psychology warrents 
codings of Structuralism and Functionalism, respectively, (The description 
of structural psychology includes expressions of Molecularism in the roforencos 
to "elemental processes" and "constituents in the given conscious formations#") 
The concepts of mind, consciousness, and psychical process throughout should 
be coded as Contentual subjoctivism, Tho author's purpose is descriptive, 
so his position should bo considered as Noutral on all prescriptions,
Codingi Structuralism*— Neutral! Functionalism— Neutral| Molecularism—
Neutral! Contentual subjectivism— Neutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & h
We have seen that man tends to organize his behavior and thought and 
to adapt to the environment. These tendencies result in a number of 
psychological structures which take different forms at different ages.
The child progresses through a series of stages each characterized by dif­
ferent psychological structures before ho attains adult intelligence,
Codingi Functionalism— Acceptance! Structuralism— Acceptancei Con­
tentual objectivism— Acceptance i Contentual subjoctivism— Acceptance | 
Devolopmentalism— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Examplo J5
To put tho whole case as concretely as possible, tho hypothesis treats 
human cognition as part and parcel of the way of life of a species of 
living creatures— as one of the ways in which hunan beings, as biological 
organisms, roact adaptively to their environment.
This is a statement of Functionalism, but tho author's position is 
not clear. Tho preference is for an Acceptance rather than Neutral coding, 
since the author is summarizing a previous argument.
-19-
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Passage 4 - Examplo 6
Psychology is one of the sciences of human nature which . . . deals 
with the concrete ways in which human beings are impressed by, and respond 
to, their physical and social environment,
Codingi Functionalism— Acceptance,
Passage 5 - Example *]_
It is proposed to define intelligence as capacity for variability or versa­
tility of response.
This definition means that with greater intelligence thoro is greater 
capacity to succeed or to fail, to make greater and raoro successes or 
failures, to adapt or to maladapt, to learn more things, to make more 
applications of what has boon learned, to make finer distinctions, to spin 
more theories, to make a larger number of trial and error responses, to 
act in terms of more ends, including more romote ends, etc. But it must 
not bo forgotten that it means more mistakes as well as more successful 
responses, Tho finer intelligence can mako more abstractions and generali­
zations, can bo more general and comprehensive, more productive and 
original, can do more unhabitual things, solvo more problems, and find 
moro solutions for tho same problems than can tho poorer intelligence; tho 
rango or scope of analysis and selection is vastly incroasod. Reflex moans 
relative invariability; intelligence means variability, flexibility, 
versatility, plasticity, resourcefulness.
This passage is functional in substance. Since tho author is giving 
his own definition, tho coding is Factionalism*—Acceptance, (The author 
mentions the ability to "make moro applications of what has been learned," 
and to "spin more theories," Those abilities suggest tho prescriptions of 
Utilitarianism and Rationalism-^ ., respectively,)
Passage 6 - Examplo 8
In short, whether or not a potential stimulus becomes effective depends 
on the individual. It depends on tho species to which he belongs, on the 
anatomy of the sense organs, the stage of maturation, tho capacities for 
sonso organ adjustment, the habits of attention, the activity in progress, 
and the possibilities of oducating tho attention of tho individual. Such 
facts make up the field of perceptual development and perceptual learning.
At the lower levels they are called facts of sensory physiology; at the 
higher levels, facts of attention or exploration, but they are all one 
problom.
The emphasis on adjustment and activity in this passage warrants a 
coding of Functionalism, Since the author is attempting persuasion, tho 
most appropriate coding is Functionalism— Acceptance. (In the last sentence 
the author mentions a continuum with sensory physiology at one end and
attention at the other end. Those levels seem to corrospond to the mole­
cular (sensory physiology) and molar (attention, exploration), but dis­
cussion of these prescriptions will be reserved until later,)
Passage 7 - Example 9
As to structural analytic or idea-psychology. This form of psychology 
is strictly analytical of psychoses, states of consciousness, ideas • , ,
It is after the elements in any psychosis and their quantity , , ,
Structural psychology is here defined in terms of analysis of states 
of consciousness into basic elements, a conception that corresponds to 
one example of Structuralism, The inclusion of consciousness justifies a 
coding of Contentual subjectivism, and the specification of molecular 
units justified a coding of Molocularism, The author is describing struc­
tural psychology and has not yet indicated his attitude toward it, so 
those prescriptions should be coded as Neutral, Codingi Structuralism- 
Neutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral; Molocularism— Neutral,
Passage 8 - Example 10
The total personality • . , consists of throe major systems. These are 
called the id, the ego, and the superego.
Coding! Structuralism— Acceptance,
Passago 9 - Example 11
It is obvious that the different kinds of habits based on training, 
oducation, and discipline of any sort are nothing but a long chain of 
conditioned reflexes.
This is a behavioral example of Structuralism, Conditioned reflexes 
aro the units out of which habits are built. Coding! Structuralism—  
Acceptance,
Passago 10 - Example 12
Personality is the sum of activities that can be discovered by actual 
obsoryatipn^of^behayior_.over a long _enough time to give reliable informa­
tion, In other^  words, personality is but the end product of our habit 
systems. , , , Among these activities, however, there aro dominant systems 
in the manual field (occupational), in the laryngeal field (groat talker, 
raconteur, silent thinker), and in the visceral field (afraid of people, 




Iho author concoivos of personality as a structure rather than a 
process* It is the sum of a person's habits or habit systems revealed 




Inductivism - "Investigations begun with facts or observations." The 
approach which is characterized by reasoning from particular facts to 
general principles. More specifically, it is the sort of inference which 
attempts to reach conclusions about all the members of a class from obser­
vation of only some of them,
Deductivism - "Investigations begun with assumed established truths,"
Iho approach which is characterized by reasoning from assumed established
truths (premises) to valid conclusions.
deduction = a type of inference or reasoning from premises or 
propositions to more concrete and specific truth (Warren, 193*0.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
There aro two broad and diametrically opposed schools of thought concerning 
tho most effective methods for integrating diverse data. Tho difference 
botwoon the two schools lies, not in tho presence or absonce of theory, but 
in tho way theory is brought into the picture. In one case, tho theories 
are formulated first and then tested deductively by means of experiment,
Tho other method is to experiment first and let the theories emerge induc­
tively from the data.
The most explicit prescriptions in this passage are Deductivism and 
Inductivism, The author also mentions theories and how they are experi­
mentally tested, which warrants codings of Rationalism^, Empiricism, 
and Methodological objectivism. Coding! Deductivism— Neutral; Inductivism 
— Neutral; Rationalism^— Neutral; Empiricism— Neutral; Methodological 
o bjectivism— Neutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & ^
Throughout the history of moder science there has been a running debate 
between two groups of researchers on tho issue of the utility of theories. 
On one side have appeared the defenders of abstraction and speculation, the 
people who, like James (1892) calling for a "Lavoisier or Galileo of 
psychology," see theory as an essential step in tho scientific process.
For them, tho mere recitation of accumulated "facts" would never constitute 
a system of knowledge, but rather they seek tho groat theoretical insight 
that will reveal the secrets of nature. Counter to this devotion to 
generalized statement is tho attitude of the research 'workers who are 
usually called "pure empiricists," From Newton's (1713) celebrated and 
probably misunderstood "Hypotheses non fingo" to Skinner's (1950) "Are 
learning theories necessary?" there has been a steady line of defense 
drawn for tho position that what matters in science is the patient collee-
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tion of data, to which end worrying about heady abstractions will be more 
of a diversion and waste of time than a help to prediction and control*
Coding* Deductivism*— Noutralj Inductivism— ‘Neutralj Rationalism^
— Neutralj Empiricism— Neutral; Naturalism— Neutral,
Passage J3 “ Examples 5 & 6
I never faced a Problem which was more than the eternal problem of 
finding order, I never attacked a problem by constructing a Hypothesis*
I never deduced Theorems or submitted them to Experimental Check* So far 
as I can see, I had no preconceived Model of behavior— certainly not a 
physiological or mentalistic one andf I believe, not a conceptual one*
The author rejects the deductive approach in psychology. He favors 
the inductive approach of simply "finding order" in nature. He also re­
jects mentalistic data in favor of behavioral data, although this bias 
is secondary to tho inductive-deductive theme. Coding! Deductivism—  
Rejection! Inductivism— Acceptance! Contentual subjectivism— Rejection! 
Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,
Passago k - Example 7
An adequate impetus is supplied by the inclination to obtain data showing 
orderly changes characteristic of the learning process. An acceptable 
scientific program is to collect data of this sort and to relate them to 
manipulable variables, selected for study through a common sonse explora­
tion of the field.
The author favors the inductive approach in psychological science. 
Coding! Inductivism— Acceptance! Methodological objectivism— Acceptance, 
Passage 5 - Examples 8
Tho grand aim of all science is to cover tho greatest number of empirical 
facts by logical deduction from tho smallest number of hypotheses or axioms.
Coding! Deductivism— Acceptance! Empiricism— Acceptance,
Passage 6 - Example 9
The progress of science comes about through tho experimental testing 
of theorems, l/ftion agreement is found, tho postulate system generating 
the theorem remains in the running! when disagreement is found, a search 
is made for the faulty postulate, if such there be, and the postulate is 
then revised. Possibly, if no faulty postulate can be found, a new postu­
late may have to be added. Thus the system is self-correcting, and only 




This is an example of the "hypothetical-deductive method" or what is 
prescriptively called Deductivism, The author seems to be making an 
argument so his position may be considered as Acceptance, Codingi Deduc- 
tivism— Acceptance; Empiricism— Acceptance; Methodological objectivism—  
Acceptance,
Passage 7 - Example 10
I, The definitions and postualtos of a scientific system should be 
stated in a clear and unambiguous manner, they should be consistent with 
one another, and they should be of such a nature as to permit rigorous 
deductions,
II, The labor of deducing the potential implications of tho postulates 
of the system should be performed with meticulous care and exhibited, 
preferably step by step and in full detail. It is these deductions which 
constitute the substance of a system,
IH, Tho significant theorems of a truly scientific system must take 
the form of specific statements of the outcome of concrete experiments or 
observations. The experiments in question may be those which have already 
been performed, but of particular significance are those which have not 
previously been carried out or oven planned. It is among these latter, 
especially, that the crucial tests of a theoretical system will be found,
IV, Tho theorems so deduced which concern phenomena not already known 
must be submitted to carefully controlled experiments. The outcome of these 
critical experiments, as well as of all previous ones, must agree with the 
corresponding thoorems making up the system.
This is a more detailed account of the "hypothetical-deductive method," 
Codingi Deductivism— Acceptance; B&piricism— Acceptance; Methodological 
objectivism— Accoptanco; Rationalism-^— Acceptance,
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Mechanism - "Activities of living beings completely explicable by
physiochemical constituents." In addition to this basic meaning, there
is a derived meaning of Mechanismi
mechanism * a machine or machine-like system, fitted to perform 
certain activities in fairly precise manner. . . .  As applied to 
human behavior, the term refers to those activities which are 
machine-like in their constancy and regularity (Warren, 193*0.
These two meanings are reconciled by the fact that for behavior to be
machine-like it must first be completely explicable by physiochemical
constituents.
Vitalism - "Activities of living beings not so explicable by physio­
chemical constituents."
The doctrine that phenomena of life possess a character sui 
generis by virtue of which they differ radically from physio­
chemical phenomena. The vitalist ascribes the activities of 
living organisms to the operation of a "vital force" (Ross,
1970).
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
No other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within 
the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by 
these forces, one has either to find the specific way or form of their 
action by means of the physical-mathematical method or to assume new forces, 
equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, redu­
cible to the force of attraction and repulsion.
This passage illustrates a rejection of Vitalism and an explicit
endorsement of Mechanism. Codingi Vital!sm— Rejection* Mechanism— Aceeptance,
Passage 2 - Examples 3 & h
The behaviorist finds no scientific evidence for the existence of any 
vitalistic principle . . .  We need nothing to explain behavior but the 
ordinary laws of physics and chemistry. . .
Coding* Vitalism— Rejection! Mechanism— Acceptance* Contentual
objectivism— Acceptance •
Passage 3 - Example 5
. • • let us try to think of man as an assembled organic machine ready to 
run . . . .  Take four wheels with tires, axles, differentials, gas engine, 
body; put them together and we have an automobile of a sort. The auto­
mobile is good for certain kinds of duties. . . .  In a similar way this
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man, this organic animal, this John Doe, iho so for as parts aro concerned 
is mado up of head, arms, hands, trunk, legs, feet, toes and nervous, 
muscular and glandular systems, • • is good for certain jobs.
This analogy says that man is like a machine, rather than is a machine, 
but the best overall description is one of Mechanism— Acceptance,
Passage ^  - Example 6
Man is a machine, but he is a very complex one. At present he is far 
beyond the powers of men to construct— except, of course, in the usual 
biological way. , , , as our understanding of human behavior increases we 
appeal less and less to explanatory fictions and we can then accept the 
fact that the essential differences between machines and men concern com­
ponentry, The problem of simulation is the technical problem of working 
with the stuff of which tho human body is made.
Coding* Mechanism— Acceptance; Contentual objoctivism— Acceptance, 
Passage _5 - Example 7,
A strictly mechanistic study of man cannot deal with 'fellow-members of 
socioty viewing each othor, * Such conceptions belong only to a psychology 
which recognizes human beings as something more than merely infinitely 
complex mechanisms.
This kind of psychology has always oxisted, since Aristotle, and will 
continue to exist as an honorable member of tho group which , , , wo usually 
speak of as the natural sciences. It is only this kind of psychology which 
deserves to bo called 'objective psychology,' because it alone studies 
tho objective or concroto events occurring to human beings . , ,
The author is using the word "mochanistic" in the prescriptive sense, 
and ho is reacting negatively to this conception. He favors instead m 
psychology which studios tho objective and concrete events occurring to 
human beings, Codingi Mechanism— Rejection; Contentual objoctivisn—  
Acceptance,
Passage 6 - Example 8
The vital forco causes a decomposition of the constituents of food, and 
destroys the forco of attraction which is continually exerted between their 
molecules , , , The phonomonon of growth, or incroaso in tho mass, pro- 
supposos that tho acting vital forco is more powerful than tho resistance 
which the chemical force opposes to tho decomposition or transformation 
of tho elements of the food.
This description of digestion and growth illustrates the use of the 
concept of "vital force," Codingi Vitalism— Acceptance,
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Passago £ - Example 9
Wo find both structural and functional psychologists to bo chary and 
wary of psyche* They fear its recrudescence, just as biologists fear any 
recrudescence of vitalism,
Codingi Vitalism— Neutral; Structuralism-Neutral; Functionalism-
Neutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral,
Mothodological objectivism - "Uso of methods open to verification by 
another competent observer*’*
Methodological subjectivism - "Use of methods not so open to verifica­
tion by another competent observer,"
Preliminary
In the past, the concepts of objoctivity-subjoctivity have been used 
indiscriminately in psychology to refer to either subject matter or method.
Hie prescriptive approach makes a distinction between subject matter and 
method as referents of these terms. Hie former, called Contentual objecti- 
vism-subjectivism, has already been defined; the latter, Methodological 
objoctivism-subjoctivism, is considered here. Iho nood for this distinc­
tion is due to tho fact that psychology became differentiated from philoso­
phy not in terms of its subject matter, but bocauso of its application of 
the experimental method to problems of mind, Wundt, for oxample, took a 
methodologically objective approach to contontually subjoctive problems.
Later, with the advent of the behaviorists, tho subject matter of psychology 
bocame objective too,
Paradox
Tho utility of tho method of introspection has been a thorny issue in 
tho history of psychology, Tho controversy stems from Wundt's and Titchoner's 
uso of experimental introspection, or describing one's ojqjeriences under 
controlled laboratory conditions. Experimental introspection is distinguished 
by its control of a variable, its discipline, tho training required, and 
its technical vocabulary. The paradox of this mothod in terms of tho present 
content analysis is this; Compared to the philosophy out of which psychology 
grow, it is methodologically objective, because it is experimental; com­
pared to behaviorism, it is methodologically subjective, because it is 
introspectivo,
Resolution
The resolution of this paradox lies in tho realization that experimental 
introspection can be either methodologically objective or subjective, depending 
upon which component— experiment or introspection— is considered dominant 
by the writer. That is, it depends upon tho author's moaning, which can be 
assortained only by considering the context of his statomont. It can be 
assumed that the experimental component was accepted, in principle if not 
in practice, by all writers in tho history of American psychology, Ihe issue 
concerns the introspective component.
Guidelines
Tho following guidelines should bo considered when using Methodological 
objoctivism-subjoctivism as coding categories.
(1) Certain methods are typically referred to when tho contrast is 
with philosophy and tho omphasis is on observation and experiment, thus they 
should be coded as Methodological objectivism. Those methods (somo of which 
are described by synonyms) include classical introspection, experimental 
introspection, controlled introspection, systematic experimental introspec­
tion, and experimental phenomenology,
(2) Certain other mothods are typically referred to when the compari­
son is with othor psychological methods. They should be coded as Methodolo­
gical subjectivism. Those mothods include uncontrolled introspection, 
phenomenological observation and description (without controls), existen­
tial analysis, and froo association,
(3) Many references encounterod in tho psychological literature do
not fall easily into either of tho above two classes. They are moro directly 
dependent upon context for their meaning. Those terms include introspection, 
introspective observation, introspoctionism, and introspoctive psychology.
The general rule is to consider these references as instances of Methodolo­
gical subjectivism unless there is specific reason for doing otherwise.
Verbal report
A special case which depends upon context is the use of verbal report. 
There are at least two main uses of verbal report* as observation and as 
speoch reaction, (1) Verbal report is sometimes interpreted as an indica­
tion or observation of something else, namely, inner experience (thoughts, 
feelings). Another competent observer cannot verify the truth value of 
the subject's verbal reports when they refer to intra-psychic events, so 
it is best described as Methodological subjectivism. This use of verbal 
report exists in clinical psychology, counseling psychology, and psycho­
pharmacology, (2) Verbal report is sometimes taken at face value as a 
speech reaction, as language behavior, or in Skinnerian terms, verbal be­
havior, In this use, verbal report, like any other kind of behavior, is 
open to verification ty another competent observer, and is an expression 
of Methodological objectivism. It exists in psychophysics and in psycholo­
gical testing.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 &  2
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experi­
mental branch of natural science, , , , Introspection forms no essential 
part of its mothods , . ,
The emphasis on objectivity and the rejection of introspection (without 
qualification of what kind of introspection) suggest the codings of methodo­
logical objectivism— Acceptance; Methodological subjectivism— Rejection.
Tho passage should also receive codings of Contentual objectivism— Accep­
tance; Empiricism— Acceptance; Naturalism— Acceptance,
Passago 2 - Examples 3 & ^
But most of tho work in the new science is carried on without intro­
spection, tho only door into the specific subject-matter of psychology.
The author's commitment to introspection warrents a coding of Methodo­
logical subjectivism— Accoptance, and since it is the only genuine method, 
all objective methods are simultaneously excluded. Also, the author's
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reference to the "specific subject-matter of psychology" warrants a coding. 
Codingi Methodological sub jectlvlsm— Acceptance* Methodological objectivism 
— Rejections Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Example 5
Only by looking inward can we gain a knowledge of mental processes* 
only by looking inward undor standard conditions can we make our knowledge 
scientific, , . . 'Wb must always fall back upon experimental introspection. 
For our own mind is our only moans of interpreting tho mind *df another 
organism* we cannot imagine processes in another mind that we do not find 
in our own.
Ihe author specifically refers to experimental introspection, so it 
is coded as Methodological objectivism. Since this method is used to 
study mind, Contentual subjectivism is also expressed. Codingi Methodolo­
gical objectivism— Acceptance * Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example 6
It remains to give a somewhat more extended discussion of objective 
methods as employed in human psychology, . . .
When we come to look them ovor, , , , we find that most of them fall
within the following general classification!
I, Observation, with and without instrumental control,
II. The conditioned reflex methods,
(a) Methods employed in obtaining conditioned secretion reflexes.
(b) Mothods employed in obtaining conditioned motor reflexes,.
Ill, Iho verbal report mothod.
IV. Methods of testing.
Tho author considers verbal roport as an objective method, so that is 
how it should be coded, Codingi Methodological objectivism— Acceptance, 
Passage 5 - Example 7
The kind of introspection which prevailed in Leipzig and Cornell was rigorous 
and pedantic, with strict rules and woll-deflned procedures, Ihe subjects 
used in laboratory experiments had to be thoroughly trained in it, and 
their reports supplemontod by measurements with instruments such as the 
chronoseope. This typo of introspection is referred to as classical.
The emphasis on experiment and quantification warrants codings of 
Methodological objectivism— Noutral; QuantitAtivism— Neutral,
Passago 6 - Example 8
The Wllrzburg group introduced systematic experimental intro spec tion, a name 
proposed by N. Ach (1905), a member of the school.
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To code this statement, a judge may follow the Guideline which speci­
fies that systematic experimental introspection is an expression of Methodo­
logical objectivism. The author’s position is Noutral.
Passago ? - Example $
Introspective Observation is what we have to roly on first and fore­
most and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined— !t means, 
of course, tho looking into our own minds and reporting what wo thero 
discover. Every ono agrees that we there discover statos of consciousness,
Tho author is commitod to Methodological subjectivism and Contentual 
subjectivism, Codingi Methodological subjectivism— Acceptance i Contentual 
sub joctivism— Acceptance,
Passago 8 - Example 10
Wo gather tho material for our work from a varioty of sourcos— from what 
is convoyod to us by tho information given us by tho patient and by his 
froo associations, from what he shows us in his transference*, from what 
wo arrivo at by interpreting his dreams and from what ho betrays by his 
slips or parapraxos,
Tho method of freo association is an oxprossion of Methodological 
subjectivism, Codingi Methodological subjoctivism— Accoptancoj Conten­
tual subjectivism— Acc op tanco,
Passago 9 ~ Example 11
Watson, Moyor, and Weiss soem to lead in a willingness to abandon to 
tho dogs tho introspoctivo observation of conscious responses. Many aro 
glad to sound praises to their high scientific standard when they insist 
that science must stick to observable facts and their relations, and when 
they load against any return of psychology to tho abandoned fortress 
in which names aro roifiod or deified,
"Introspective observation of conscious responses" is a phrase which 
reveals both Methodological subjectivism and Contentual subjectivism. The 
idea that "scionce must stick to observable facts and their relations" may 
bo considered a general statement of Contentual objoctivism. The author 
is describing tho position of others, not taking a position himself,
Codingi Methodological subjectivism— -Neutral; Contentual subjectivism—  
Noutral j Contentual objoctivism— Neutral,
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Passage 10 - Example 12
(The phenomenological method} consists of examining whatever is found 
in consciousness, or in other wards, the data or phenomena of consciousness. 
Its primary concern is not tho act of consciousness, but tho object of 
consciousness, that is, for instance, all that is perceived, Imagined, 
doubted, or loved, Ihe ultimate goal is to reach and grasp tho essences 
of things appearing in consciousness.
There is no indication here that tho author's conception of the 
phonomenological method is of an experimental nature, Codingi Methodolo­
gical sub joctivism— Noutral; Contentual subjectivism— Neutral; Qualita- 
tivi sm— Noutral.
Passage 11 - Example 13
Ihe psychologists' use of "introspection" as its principal method has been 
another very serious bar to progress.
Faced with a lack of context to help determine the author's conception 
of "introspection," a judge may follow tho Guideline which considers such 
references as expressions of Mothodological subjectivism, Codingi Methodo­
logical subjectivism— Rejection.
Molocularism - "Psychological data most aptly described in terms of 
relatively small units. The strategy demanding that the subject matter 
of psychology be analyzed into its basic components and described as such.
If the subject matter is conceived as consciousness, then molocularism 
takes the form of a soarch for the elementary units of consciousness (£•£• * 
sensations, images, affections); if the subject matter is conceived as 
behavior, it takes tho form of a soarch for tho elementary units of behavior 
(e.g., habits, roflexos, conditioned responses, muscular movemonts, glan­
dular socretions). Molecularism is sometimes referred to as elomentarism 
or atomism. Contemporary operant research, which moasuros rate of res­
ponding, illustratos a molecular approach to behavior.
Molarism - "Psychological data most aptly described in terms of rela­
tively largo units,"
molar behavior; 1, a large-unit segment of tho total behavior 
stream that possesses essential unity, , , . 3. a behavior unit 
considered as an emergent phenomenon, having qualities not statable 
as a sum of tho parts (English & English, 1958)*
The following are oxamplos of relatively molar behaviors; going swim­
ming, having a dato, studying for an exam,
Iho torms [molecular and molar]characterize not so much two classes 
of behavior as two ways of describing or conceiving the same beha­
vior event. Going to class would probably bo called molar beha­
vior , . , but tho same phenomenon can also bo described as a 
sequonco of molecular units, i,e,, as a sories of stepping movemonts 
or even as a succession of nouromuscular processes (English & English, 
1958).
Passage 1. - Examples 1 & 2
On tho ono hand, he has defined behavior in terms of its strict underlying 
physical and physiological details, , , , Wo shall designate this as tho 
molecular dofinition of behavior. And, on the other hand, ho has come to 
recognize . , , that behavior, as such, is more than and different from 
tho sum of its physiological parts. Behavior, as such, is an "omorgont" 
phenomenon that has doscriptive and dofining proportios of its own. And 
wo shall designate this latter as the molar dofinition of behavior.
The author's preference for Molarism is rovoalod try his phrase "has 
come to rocognizo . , , that behavior, as such, is more than and different
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from tho sum of its physiological parts," Codingi Molecularims— Rejection* 
Molarism— Acceptance; Contentual objectivism— Acceptanco.
Passage 2 - Examples 3 &  }*
Ever since Tolman, bohavior theorists have been agreeing that psychology 
is concerned with molar responses, not molecular ones. Accordingly we try 
to observe and moasuro what an organism is doing, not how all its muscles 
aro contracting. With this kind of observation on the response sido thoro 
should be a corresponding kind of observation on tho stimulus side. We 
should try to discover what an organism is responding to, not what excites 
all the little receptors,
Ihe concopts of molar and molecular aro used here in tho prescriptive
sonse, with an oxtonsion to stimuli, Ihe author makes clear his acceptanco
of Molarism and rejection of Molocularism, Codingi Molarism— Acceptance;
Molecular ism— Rejection; Contentual objectivism— Acceptance,
Passage _3 - Examples J? & _6
An act of behavior has distinctive properties all its own, to be identified 
and described irrespective of whatever muscular, glandular, or neural 
processes underlie it. The molecular facts of physics and physiology upon 
which behavior rests have identifying properties of their own, which are 
not the properties of behavior as molar,
Codingi Molocularism— Rejection; Molarism— Acceptance; Contentual
objectivism— Acceptanco.
Passage fy - Example 7
The aim of tho psychologist is throe-fold. Ho seeks (1) to analyze con­
crete (actual) mental exporienoe into its simplest components, (2) to dis­
cover how these elements combine, what aro the laws which govern their 
combination, and (3) to bring them into connoction with their physiologi­
cal (bodily) conditions,
Codingi Molocularism— Acceptanco; Structuralism— Acceptance; Con-
tontual subjectivism— Acceptanco,
Passage Jj - Example 8 I
As to structural analytic or idoa-psychology, This form of psychology 
is strictly analytical of psychoses, states of consciousness, ideas, as 
more phenomena, abstracted from any active psycho. It is aftor tho ele­
ments in any psychosis and their quantity, so as to construct a psychic- 
automaton. It is hold to bo scientifically irrelevant to ask whose 
psychosis one is analyzing. Ideas are atoms, instead of being experienced 
functionings of a self. Explanation is sought in non-psychic terms by
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reference to physiological distinctions. It treats its analyzod elements 
as real parts, whose mechanical composition is tho mental life. Whether 
there is any personal mind back of the stroam of ideas, says Titchenor, 
is a question that cannot bo raisod in psychology.
Ihe author's protest is against Molecularism, Structuralism, and
Mechanism, Ho is not objocting to montalistie data in psychology but
rather to its artificial analysis into elements and thoir "mechanical
composition" ("Ideas are atoms, instead of being experienced functionings
of a self,"). Ho calls this "structural analytic or idea psychology."
Since tho author foels that the solf or "personal mind" is missing in
structural psychology, his position also illustrates Contentual subjectivism.
Coding* Molocularism— Rojoction; Structuralism— Rejection; Mechanism—
Rejection; Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance,
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Monism - "Fundamental principlo or ontity in univorso is of one kind,"
tho view that ultimate reality is of only one kind or quality,
Tho view that the phenomena of psychology are of tho same kind 
as, or aro completely reducible to, those of tho physical sciencos 
(English &  English, 1958).
A general namo for thoso thoories which deny the duality (i,o, 
tho existence as two ultimato kinds of substance) of matter and 
mind. Thus materialism and idealism or spiritualism aro both 
species of monism; the namo is ofton applied specifically to a 
blind variety, viz, the doctrine that physical and psychical 
phenomena aro alike manifestations of a reality which cannot be 
identified with either matter or mind (Murray, 1888-1928),
Dualism -"Fundamental principle or entity in universe is of two kinds,
mind and matter,"
tho theory that reality consists of two different, relatively 
independent substances; moro specifically, tho assumption that 
psychic and physical phenomena aro both real but aro fundamentally 
different in nature (Warren, 193*0.
Tho major varieties include Intoractionism (two separate and interacting
processes), parallelism (two soparato but correlated sorios of ovonts), and
occasionalism (one typo of ovont is tho occasion for God to produco other
typo of ovont),
Passago 1 - Examples 1 &  2
I fool that behaviorism is tho only consistent and logical functionalism.
In it ono avoids both tho Scylla of parallelism and the Charybdis of inter­
action, Thoso time-honored relics of philosophical speculation need trouble 
the student of bohavior as little as they trouble tho student of physics,
Tho consideration of the mind-body problem affects noither tho type of 
problem solocted nor tho formulation of tho solution of that problem, I 
can state my position hero no bettor than by saying that I should like to 
bring my students up in tho samo ignorance of such hypotheses as one finds 
among tho students of other branches of science.
The author explicitly rules out intoractionism and parallelism, which 
aro varieties of Dualism, and by implication Monism as well, since it too 
is an alternative "solution" to tho mind-body problem. The author also 
expresses a commitment to tho study of behavior (Contentual objoctivism), 
and to conceptualizing that study as a form of functionalism, Codingi 
Dualism— Rejection; Monism— Rojection; Contentual objectivism— Acceptance!
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Punc tl ona 1± sm— Ac c ep ta nc o.
Passago 2 — Example 3
I plead for a monistic, naturalistic view of the mental and tho 
physical . . ,
Codingi Monism— Acceptance; Naturalism— Acceptance,
Passage J3 - Example h
The appearance of now qualitative characteristics in tho psychological 
univorso not found in the physical universe, points to the need for another 
concept of uniform sequence than those already described,
Tho emphasis on tho qualitative difference between the "psychological
universo" and tho "physical universe" suggests a coding of Dualism, although
this is equivocal, Tho author sooms to be taking this for granted, so tho
coding is Dualism— Acceptanco; Qualitativism— Acceptance,
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Naturalism - "Nature requires for its operation and explanation only
principles found within it," The assumption that explanation of events
should bo sought within tho same system as tho one in which tho events
occurred, namely, tho systom of spatio-temporal phenomena,
a philosophy which holds that tho universe, , , is self-existent, 
self-explanatory, self-operating, and solf-directingj that the 
world procoss is not teloological and anthropocentric, but pur­
poseless and only incidentally productive of man. Also, that 
human lifo-physical, mental, moral and spiritual— is an ordinary 
natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary 
operations of nature (Ross, 1970),
When oxplicit mention is made of the naturalistic basis of modern science,
it should be coded as Naturalism,
Supernaturalism - "Nature requires for its operation and explanation 
transcendent guidance as well as principles found within it," The assump­
tion that tho explanation of events should be sought within a different 
systom than tho system of spatio-temporal phenomena in which tho events 
occurred,
supernatural = belonging to a higher order or.system 'than that 
of nature, or transcending tho ordinary course of nature (Warren,
193*0.
Supornaturalism is accepted when a psychologist conceptualizes scientific 
psychology within a thoistic religious framework,
Passago 1 - Examples 1 4  2^
When I speak of tho psychological tradition I strongly emphasize the fact 
that tho science of psychology has not enjoyed a continuous naturalistic 
development. As is well known, tho evolution of psychology includes 
periods in which scholars not only limited their studies to human inter- 
bohavior and neglected tho behavior of other organisms, but, in addition, 
failed to describe and interpret that intorbohavior as natural events. 
Instead, they thought of it as at least partially oxtranatural. Such 
theological and metaphysical periods must, however, bo taken strictly into 
account because thoy articulate with and influence the naturalistic stages 
of psychological tradition. In fact, these scientific dark spots continue 
to influence tho curront course of psychological history,




Passago 2 - Examples 3 &  4
Throughout this period [the Patristic and Medieval Period]) the ideal 
of investigating any kind of events was set aside in favor of such other 
interests as man's salvation, his place in a thoistic cosmos, and his rights 
and duties with respect to God and State. Since tho theological and church 
civilization placod man and his habitation at tho center of the universe, 
his ossential behavior was envisaged as of a spiritual order. By means 
of verbal and symbolic formulations man, in part at least, was removed 
far from his actual place in a spatio-temporal world and mado into a 
being who, because he was endowed with a soul, was in part akin to God 
and the angels. Psychological thinking lost the sense of scientific 
investigation and became preoccupied with ehristological doctrines.
This is an explication of tho concopt of Supornaturalism, which should 
be coded as Noutral, Tho author contrasts this with "[man's] actual place 
in a spatio-temporal world" and "the sonse of scientific investigation,” 
which is enough to rocoivo codings of Naturalism and Methodological 
objectivism. Codingi Super naturalism— Neutral; Naturalism— Neutral; 
Methodological objectivism— Noutral; Contentual objoctivism— Noutral,
Passage 3 - Examples &  6
No man can give a rational account how it is possible that such a general 
flood should coma, by any natural means. And if it be supernatural that 
grants the thing I am proving, namely, such a Supreme Being as can alter 
the course of nature.
Codingi Naturalism— Rejection; Supernaturalism— Acceptance.
Passage 4 - Example 7
Psychology as tho bohaviorist views it is a purely objective experi­
mental branch of natural science,
Tho author makes oxplicit tho fact that Naturalism is tho philoso­
phical basis of modern science when ho refers to "natural science," Also, 
sinco tho author identifies himsolf as a behaviorist, tho statement should 
be coded for Contentual objectivism. In addition, ho says that behavioristic 
psychology is purely objoctivo and experimental, a characteristic which 
rovoals commitments to Methodological objectivism and Empiricism, Codingi 
Naturalism— Acceptanco| Contentual objoctivism— Acceptance; Methodological 
objectivism— Acceptance; Empiricism— Acceptance.
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Pa ssa go 5 ~ Example 8
, . . tho concoption of God as self-conscious Mind and Will struggling with 
tho forcos of chaos and constantly expressing Himsolf, not only through 
all tho various lovols of law and order in tho universe, but also through 
all its qualitative aspocts~and supremely through the highest creative 
capacities of man himself, including tho latter's scientific triumphs. Not 
only does this conception not conflict with tho claims of scionce, but 
also, since God is conceived as involved in all of lifo and as active on 
all levels, rather than as shrinking, His roalm is really expanding. It 
also moans that man can come to tho aid of God as well as God to tho aid 
of man, in the common task of building a now world.
The dominant prescription in this passage is Supernaturalism. A secon­
dary proscription is Qualitativism ("qualitative aspects"). Tho author's 
position is ono of acceptance of these proscriptions. Codingi Super­
naturalism— Acceptance j Qualitativism— Acceptance,
Passage 6 - Example 9_
To seek the cultural roots of transcendentalism and supernaturalism, 
one must turn to tho evolution of tho church which grow up in the Roman 
state, competed with it, and replaced it in the history of Western Europe,
Codingi Supornaturallsm— Neutral.
Passage 7_ - Example 10
Tho intellectual aspect of this new culture, Transcendentalism, is well 
named sinco its votaries built their doctrines and boliefs on the premise 
that they were in contact with a reality which transcends the things and 
events of everyday life, and which is known by means that contrast with 
observation and observational inference, tho stand-bys of ordinary 
scientific investigation.
This dofinition of Transcendentalism is equally appropriate as a 
dofinition of Supernaturalism, which is contrasted with "observation and 
observational inference." Codingi Supernaturalism— Rejectionj Empiricism 
— Acceptance; Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,
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Nomotheticism - "Emphasis upon discovering general laws."
characterizing procedures and methods designed to discover general 
laws (English & English, 1959 )•
Examples of nomothetic research areas include the principles of learning*
theories of emotion, national stereotypes, language development, stages
of cognitive growth.
Idiographloism - "Emphasis upon explaining particular events or
individuals."
pertaining to, or characterizing, an account of particular indi­
vidual cases or events (English & English, 1958),
Clinical and counseling psychology, when the stress is on individual
patients or clients, are idiographic activities in psychology.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
It is because of their essential stereotypy and lack of variation that 
psychologists like to draw their generalizations from lower animals.
But for my part I venture the opinion that all of the infrahuman verte­
brates in the world differ less from one another in psychological 
functioning and in complexity of organization, than one human being does 
from any other.
And so I wonder whether the time has not come for students of personality 
to shake themselves loose from a too-rigid response set, and perhaps even 
to reverse it. Instead of growing impatient with the single case and has­
tening on to generalization, why should we not grow impatient with our 
generalizations and hasten to the internal pattern?
Ihe author of this passage is talking about ihe ncmothetic and
idiographic approaches to personality, and stating his preference for the
latter. Coding) Nomotheticism*— Rejection) Idio graphic ism—-Acceptance,
Passago 2 - Examples 3 & 4
The idiographic point of view is an artistic one that strives for a non- 
scientific goal) the nomothetic, a caricature of science that bears little 
resemblance to anything that exists today. Since no useful purpose is 
served ly retaining these mischievous and difficult terms, they had best 
disappear from our scientific vocabularies,
Codingi Idiographicism-—Rejection) Nomo theticism— Rejection,
Passage 3 " Example _5
Thejscienco of personality must by its very nature be nomothetic.
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Coding i Nomo the ticism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example 6
Here we see the issues drawn clearly. Is personology to be an art, 
devoted to word portraits that seek to evoke in the reader the thrill of 
recognition, tho gratifying (if perhaps illusory) feeling of understanding 
unique individuals? Or is it to be a science, which enables us to study 
these same persons in all their uniqueness and to derive from such study 
general propositions about the structure, development, and other significant 
aspects of personal!-ty? If we elect for a science, we must abandon art 
whenever it takes us in a different direction than the one demanded by the 
scientific method, and we must recognize that the ideal of an idiographic 
science is a will-o'-the-wisp, an artistic and not a scientific goal.
Science may be supplemented by art, but not combined with it.
The predominant theme of this paragraph is the author's rejection of 
Idiographic! sm. At first it may seom that he is clearing tho way for a 
nomothetic approach to personality, but closor scrutiny indicates that he 
is advocating a comprehensive, inductively-based science. Evidence for 
Inductivism may bo found in his preference for "a science, which enables 
us to study these samo persons in all their uniqueness and to derive from 
such study general propositions about the structure, development, and other 
aspects of personality," Codingi Idiographicism— Rejection* Induetivism 
— Acceptance! Methodological objectivism— Acceptance,
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Peripheralism - "Stress upon psychological events taking place at
periphery of body."
a point of view that emphasizos, for psychological explanation, 
the events that take place at the periphory or boundaries of 
tho body rather than ovonts in tho central nervous system (English 
& English, 1958)•
poripheralist position. A view hold by some psychologists that 
all thinking goes on in action (in speech or other movements) 
(Hllgard, Atkinson, &  Atkinson, 1971)*
Centralism - "Stress upon psychological events taking place within 
the body."
centralist psychologyi a point of view that gives major importance 
in explanation of behavior to events that take place in the brain 
(English & English, 1958)*
centralist position. A theoretical position held by certain 
psychologists who believe that thin ling can best be explained as 
processos going on inside tho brain or nervous system, with muscu­
lar movements as mere accompaniments or facilitators of tho central 
processos (Hllgard, Atkinson>& Atkinson, 1971).
Passage 1 - Examples 1 &  2
Another distinction which is perhaps of growing importance is that 
betwoen "centralists" and "periphoralists," The former hold that behavior 
cannot be accountod for by correlations between stimuli and responses but 
that account has to bo taken of central procosses in tho brain or nervous 
systom that determine the course of both perception and response. To this 
extont they call in question the , , , ^viewpoint forj| . . .  correlating 
events at the "periphory" of the organism, that is, the stimuli impinging 
on it and the . . .  obsorvablo responses made.
Coding* Centralism— Neutral* Poripheralisra— Neutral* Contentual 
objectivi an— Noutral.
Passage 2 - Sxamplo 3
We thus think and plan with the whole body. But since, as I pointed 
out above, word organization is, when present, probably usually dominant 
over visceral and manual organization, we can say that "thinking" is 
largely subvocal talking— provided wo hasten to explain that it can occur 
without words.




Passage 3 - Example 4
A stimulus arouses in a rocoptor an impulse, a, which is transmitted to 
the cortox. In the cortex, the impulse is propagated along a series of 
neurons, b, until, somo time later, it leads to some motor impulse, c, to 
an effector, at which time tho rosponse occurs. Blinking would correspond 
to tho nervous impulses in the cortex, b,
Biis is an oxposition of tho centralist position in psychology.
Codingi Centralism-Neutral,
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Purism - "Seeking of knowledge for its own sake,"
Utilitarianism - "Seeking of knowledge for its usefulness in other 
activities,"
the philosophical doctrine that makes practical usefulnoss tho 
criterion of value (English & English, 1958),
Utilitarianism is expressed wherever the application of knowledge is evident,
£,jj, , clinical, counseling, educational, and industrial psychology.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Tho matter I wish to examine is an aspect of a familiar issue in psychologyl 
the relation between our scionce and its applications. Concern with the 
issue is about as old as the field itself, Titchenor, for example, dealt 
with it* ho proposed that wo reserve the namo psychology for the science 
and designate its application as psychotechnology.
Here the author states what in proscriptivo terms is called tho Purism 
— Utilitarianism issue. On the basis of what is given, the author*s 
position should be coded as Neutral, Coding* Purism— Neutral* Utili­
tarianism— Noutral.
Passage 2 - Examples 3. & 4
Hie point is rather that wo note a marked difference of emphasis between
toxt-books of functional psychology and toxt-^ books of other sciences,
A text-book of physics will discuss various types of engines and machines, 
but it will discuss them as illustrative of physical laws, A text-book 
of physiology may discuss various types of pathological phenomena, but it 
will discuss them in connection with physiological methods and physiological 
principles. The text-books of functional psychology, on the other hand, 
tend— it is true, in varying degree— to make of psychology either an 
introduction to philosophy or an aid to individual and social welfare. In 
so far as these tendencies prevail* in so far as functional psychology, 
in its exposition of psychology proper, goes out to meet tho problems of 
philosophy or of our customary human life* in so far there is real danger 
that tho pains and seriousness which are the due of psychology as scionce 
are withdrawn from psychology and expended in those other fields,
Tho author takes a position against psychology as "an aid to indi­
vidual and social wolfaro" and for psychology as "science," Therefore, 
this passage should bo coded for Utilitarianism and Purism, Since the 
focus of tho author's protest is tho application of knowledge rathor than 
functional psychology as such, Functionalism should probably bo coded as 
Neutral, Codingi Utilitarianism— Rejection* Purism— Acceptance*
210
Functionalism-Neutral,
Passage 3 ** Example _5
^Tho psychologist's^ business is to know the laws of that part of nature 
which wo call human naturo, and to use those laws, as fast as discovered, 
for solving tho problems presented by the human individual or group.
Coding! Utilitarianism— Acceptance} Naturalism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example 6
I have deliberately borrowed the phrase "the welfare of man" from 
tho ethical codo of the American Psychological Association, In my view, 
it is the ethical responsibility of all psychologists— as individuals 
and as monitors of their scientific and professional associations— to see 
to it that psychology is used for peace rather than war, for reducing the 
arms raco rathor than intensifying it, for eliminating ethnocentrism and 
prejudice rathor than fostering than, for removing social and economic 
injustices and inequalities rather than perpetuating them. Since Hiroshima 
wo can no longer pretend that science or scientists can plead innocence 
with respect to the social consequonces of their scientific activities.
The author mentions specific social problems to which he believes 
psychological knowledge should be applied, including peace and war, the 




Quantitativism - "Stress upon knowledge which is countable or measure- 
ablo."
quantity = a characteristic whoso variations admit of numerical 
expression (Warren, 19340•
A concern with moasureability, or comparison of results of various quanti­
ties, or counting with the aim of being objective, e.jg., characteristic 
current research in psychological testing, psychophysics, learning, 
Qualitativism - "Stress upon that which is different in kind or 
essence,"
Having to do with the most distinguishable aspects of experience- 
sour, blue, middle Ct etc. These are called "qualitative" aspects 
of experience or merely "qualities," in contrast to the intensive 
or "quantitative" aspects of experience, such as the sourness of 
what is sour, the brightness of blue, the loudness of middle C,
etc, (Munn, Fernald, & Fernald, 1969).
Examples of areas in psychology which are likely to reflect qualitativism
and psychotherapy and counseling.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
To mako a clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
differoncos lot us define quantitative differences as those which can be 
stated in terms of amount or position. Two facts or relations are quali­
tatively different when ono cannot be described completely in terms of 
a different amount or arrangement of the other, A new quality is dis­
covered when there is something in the fact or in tho relation more than
in the mere summation of the qualities previously described.
Coding: Quantitativism— Neutral; Qualitativism— Neutral,
Pas sago 2 - Examples _3 & 4
When you can measure what you are spoaking about, and express it in num­
bers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when 
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and un­
satisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowlodge, but you havo
scarcely, in your thou^vts, advanced to the stage of science.
This passage is a endorsement of Quantitativism, Qualitativism is 
almost synorymous with lack of moasureability, so that is tho best des­




Passage 3 - Examples Jj & 6
This problem of measuremont has roraainod a stumbling block oven at the 
present writing. Since tho pioneer work of Weber and Fochnor and Helmholtz, 
psychologists have found many opportunities fro exact measurement in their 
subject-matter; yot thoro remain many facts of psychological observation 
to which direct measurement cannot be applied , , .
In addition to montion of tho problem of measurement, the author
boliovos thoro are many psychological facts to T-jhich direct measurement
cannot bo applied. This belief assumes that such facts are qualitative
in nature. Coding; Quantitativism—-Neutral; Qua litativisn— -Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example 7
A broad view of tho placo of psychology in science should recognize that 
psychology is especially favored in any effort to discover qualitative 
differences, The data with which it deals are moro complex, moro rare in 
nature and more likely to show now qualities of content and relationship. 
Psychology should, therefore, bo especially keen to detect and to describe 
qualitative differences in facts and in thoir relations,
Tho author of this passage seems to be using tho word "qualitative"
in tho prescriptive sense, and his position is clearly one of acceptance.
Codingi Qualitativism*—Acceptance,
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Rationalism, (vs. Irrationalism) - "Emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sonso and intellect," The belief that the essenco
of man is his rationality, or that intellectual factors play a greater role
in human life than emotional ones,
rational behavior, rational conduct = behavior of organisms which 
rests upon reasoning or which is interpreted or judged as proceeding 
in a logical mannor (Warren, 193*0#
Soma personality theories reflect this proscription.
Irrationalism - "Intrusion or domination of emotive and conative 
factors upon intellectual procossos," Tho conception of human nature in 
which personal, particularly emotional, factors interfere with intellectual 
processes. The rosult of this interference may be illogical or irrational 
acts, Man is often swayed by emotion rather than reason. The extreme 
irrational view is that man is the pawn of his instincts and passions.
Some personality thoories reflect this prescription.
Passage 1 - Examples 1 & 2
Man is sometimes referred to as a rational animal. Re is intelligent) 
ho exorcises reason; ho uses logic; and he argues from a scientific 
standpoint. Indeed, man is considorod by man to bo the only rational 
animal.
An individual's action or behavior, of courso, is sometimes considered 
irrational. This is tho opposite of rational, Tho irrational person 
defies tho laws of reason; ho contradicts that which is considorod rational 
by some particular community of people.
Coding* Ratdonalispig— Noutral; Irrationalism-Neutral,
Passago 2 - Example 3
When wo speak of man-tho-scientist we aro speaking of all mankind and not 
merely a particular class of mon who have publicly attained the stature 
of "scientists," . . .  we may , , , propose that every man is, in his own 
partiaular way, a scientist. , . , Now what would happen if we were to re­
open the question of human motivation and use our long-range view of man 
to infer just what it is that sets the courso of his endeavor? , , • Might 
not tho individual man, each in his own personal way, assume moro of tho 
stature of a scientist, over seeking to predict and control the course of 
events with which he is involved? Would he not have his theories, test 
his hypotheses, and woigh his experimental evidence? And, if so, might not 
the differences between tho personal viewpoints of different mon corres­




Tho general conception of man as scientist, and the specific emphasis 
on testing hypotheses and weighing evidence, argue for codings of Rationalising 
— Acceptance; Empiricism— Accoptance; Methodological objectivism— Acceptance; 
Rationalism]— Acceptance,
Passage 3 - Example 4
Wo may insist as much as we like that the human intellect is weak in 
comparison with human instincts, and bo right in doing so.
This is a statomont of oxtrome Irrationalism, which is accepted by 
tho author. Codingi Irrationalism— Acceptance,
Passage 4 - Example 5
The logical laws of thought do not apply in tho id, and this is true above 
all of tho law of contradiction. Contrary impulsos oxist side by side, 
without cancelling oach othor out or diminishing each other i at the most 
they may converge to form compromises under the dominating economic 
pressure towards tho discharge of energy.
This passage is primarily an expression of Irrationalism, which is 
accepted by the author, Codingi Irrationalism— Acceptance; Structuralism 
— Acceptance; Bynamicism— Acceptance,
Staticismi (vs. Developmentalism) - "Qnphasis upon cross-sectional 
view," The view which stresses the control of behavior in the present, 
or viewing the most prominent features of the subject matter irrespective 
of changes with time, Staticism^ exists in animal psychology! one pro­
cedure in animal studies is to control the history of the animals as much 
as possible so that all the animals will have the same developmental his­
tory and their behavior may then be studied as a function of the experi­
mental condition. This type of behavioral explanation is conceived as 
the interaction of variables in the present situation,
Developmentalism - "Qnphasis upon changes with time," Emphasis upon 
continuous change in an organism over time. Specifically, emphasis on 
the historical roots of present behavior, focusing on accumulating ex­
perience as the individual grows and learns, Ihe following areas reflect 
Developmentalismi developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive 
growth, and certain personality theories.
Passage 1 - Example 1
Ihe purpose of this study was to demonstrate that the development 
of adequate depth perception depends partly upon the activity of the 
organism, Thus, one kitten travelod about the experimental room using 
normal self-locomotion, while the other traveled the same route passively, 
riding in a gondola. By these restrictions, and by rearing the kittens 
in darkness, their visual experiences were controlled and kept essentially 
the same. When tested later for depth perception, the active kitten 
showed normal visual development and the passive one was retarded.
In this study, the experimenter controlled tho visual experiences 
of the animal subjects so that he could tost the effects of activity on 
their depth perception. This is a static explanation, not a developmental 
one, Codingi Staticism^— Acceptancej Dnpirlclsm— Acceptancej Methodolo­
gical objectivism— Accoptance,
Passage 2 - Example 2
• , , we shall here strongly defend the thesis that neither past nor 
future psychological facts but only the present situation can influence 
present events. This thosis is a direct consequence of the principle that
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only what exists concretely can have effects. Since neither the past nor 
the future exists at the present moment it cannot have effects at the 
present. In representing the life space therefore we take into account 
only what is contemporary.
The author shows a strong preference for the static type of explana­
tion, Coding* Staticism]— Acceptance,
Passage _3 - Example 3
Functional psychology is a bit less abstract. It has at least 
processes instead of cross-sections of consciousness, or rather of the 
psycho-physical organism in its reaction to oxternal environment.
The reference to "cross-sections of consciousness" suggests Staticism^ 
toward which the author implies disapproval, Tho object of the cross- 
sectional view is consciousness, so it should also be coded for that 
feature. The author’s position is ambiguous, but the suggested coding is* 
Functionalism— Acceptance} Staticism-j— Rejectionj Contentual subjectivian 
— Neutral,
Passage 4 - Example 4^
Whenever we try to understand growth, it is well to remember the 
epigenetic principle which is derived from the growth of organisms in 
utero. Somewhat generalized, this principle states that anything that 
grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, 
each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts ^ avo 
arisen to form a functioning whole.
This is a statement of Developmentalism, which is accepted by the 
author, although Developmentalism need not include the epigenetic prin­
ciple, Coding* Developmontalism— Acceptance.
Passage jj - Example jj
Haro is my answeri Psychology is one of the sciences of human nature which. 
from the existential and tho genetic point of view, deals with the con- 
crote ways in which human beings are impressed by. and respond to. their 
physical and social environment.
Tho word "genetic" connotes a developmental, and "existential" a sub­
jective, point of view. The main part of the definition is an example 
of Functionalism, Because It is the author’s own definition, the three 
proscriptions are accepted. Coding! Developmentalism— Acceptance}
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Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance} Functionalism— Acceptance.
Passage 6 - Example 6
Personality can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the 
human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to bo aware of, and to 
interact with, a widening social radius, beginning with the dim image of 
a mother and ending with mankind, or at any rate that segment of mankind 
which "counts" in the particular individual's life.
Coding* Developmentalism— Acceptance,
Passage 7 - Example 7
, , , psychology— the science which describes and explains the evolution 
— the self-realizing and ripening of the soul, self, personality, or 
spirit that forms the central subject-matter of psychology,
The most striking feature of this statement is its omphasis on sub­
jective phenomena as the subject matter of psychology, which makes it an 
example of Contentual subjoctivism, But the words "evolution", "self- 
realizing," and "ripening" connote personal growth or development, The 
author is presenting his personal conception of psychology, so all the 
prescriptions are acceptod, Codingi Developmentalism— Acceptance}
Contentual subjectivism— Accoptance, 
Passage 8 - Example 8
(psychoanalysis] implies moro than the mere analysis of composite phenomena 
into simpler ones. It consists in tracing back one psychical structure to 
another which preceded it in time and out of which it developed , , , Thus 
from the very first psycho-analysis was directed toward tracing developmen­
tal processes, It , , , was led , , , to construct a genetic psychology 
• • *
This passage shows the omphasis on developmental processes in psycho­
analysis, and should rocoivo a coding of Developmentalism, Also tho reference 
to psychological structures warrants a coding of Structuralism, Since the 
author is describing psychoanalysis, and not necessarily defending it, his 
position should bo codod as Neutral, Codingi Dovolopmentalism— Neutral} 
Structuralism— Neutral,
Static!sm? (vs. Eynamicism) - "Dnphasis upon enduring aspects," A 
lack of change is considered characteristic of some aspects of the subject 
matter, ».£•, traits, defense mechanisms.
Dynamicism - "Emphasis upon change and factors making for change."
Hie conception of the subject matter of psychology as undergoing change,
either from internal motives or social factors.
dynamic = pertaining to the cause* and effects of behavior and 
mental activities, often with special emphasis on motivation 
(Warren, 193*0.
Examples of areas where Eynamicism may be found include psychoanalysis, 
field theory, and group dynamics.
Passage _1 - Examples 1 & <2
It should be kept in mind that those drawings [lewin's diagramsJ represent 
momentary situations. There is nothing fixed or static about them, and 
they are constantly changing as a result of dynamic forces.
This quotation rofers to diagrams which represent the person in his 
"life space" at a particular moment, a method for which Lewin became 
famous. The author rejects Staticisir^  and accepts Eynamicism. In addi­
tion to these two prescriptions, the kind of atemporal, cross-sectional 
view which is being referred to suggests Staticism^. Hence, this quotation 
illustrates a position in which ono type of Staticism is rejected and the 
other type is accepted. Codingi Staticisnig— Rejection; Eynamicism—  
Acceptance; Staticism^— Acceptance.
Passage 2 - Example 3
. . , it has been possible to follow the devolopment of several hundred 
individuals over a period of about a dozen years, and while many have 
shown sharp fluctuations in weight, we have discovered no case in which 
there has been a convincing change in the somatotype. . . .  It can be 
said that the case has yet to occur in which a nutritional disturbance 
has caused a physique either to become unrecognizable or to simulate 
another somatotype strongly enough to cause any justifiable confusion,
Tho emphasis on the permanence of somatotypes, which the author 
bases on empirical evidence, warrants a coding of Staticismg— Acceptance* 
Bnpiricism— Acceptance; Methodological objoctivism— Acceptance.
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Passage 3 - Example 4
It is clear that the inferences involved in identifying a trait imply 
consistency. Thus, by definition, a trait is known only by virtue of 
certain regularities or consistencies in the manner in which an individual 
behaves.
Codingi Staticisn^— Neutral,
Passage 4 - Example _5
Our purpose is not merely to describe and classify the phenomena, 
but to conceive them as brought about by tho play of forces in the mind 
. . . which work together or against one another. We are endoavouring 
to attain a dynamic conception of mental phenomena.
This statement expresses Eynamicism coupled with Contentual subjectivism. 
The former prescription is expressed as the underlying "play of forces," 
while the later is expressed by the specification that the forces are "in 
the mind." Tho author is committed to both prescriptions, Codingi 
Eynamicism— Acceptanco} Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance.
Passage Jj - Example 6
The human organism is a complicated energy system, deriving its energy from 
the food it eats and expending it for such purposes as circulation, res­
piration, digestion, nervous conduction, muscular activity, perceiving, 
remembering, and thinking. There is no reason to bolievo that the energy 
which runs tho organism is essentially any different from the onorgy 
which rims tho universe. Energy takes many forms— mechanical, thormal, 
electrical, and chomical--and is capablo of boing transformed from one 
form into another, Tho form of energy which operates tho throe systems 
of personality is called psychic energy. . . .  It performs work or is capable 
of performing work as does any form of energy. Psychic onorgy performs 
psychological work— e._g,, thinking, porcoiving, and remembering--just as 
mechanical energy performs mechanical work,
Tho conception of man as a complicated onergy system warrants a coding 
of Eynamicism— Acceptanco, Since the form of enorgy is psychic onergy, 
tho author may be regardod as favoring montalistic terminology and his con­
ceptual bias coded as Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance, Tho reference 
to three systems or structures of personality suggests Structuralism, 
which is also accepted by tho author. Codingi Eynamicism— Acceptanco } 
Contontual subjectivtai— Acceptance j Structuralism— Acceptance.
Passage 6 - Example 7
Tho forces which wo assume to exist behind tho tensions caused ty tho
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needs of the id are called instincts, They represent the somatic demands 
upon tho mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they 
aro of a conservative naturej the state* whatever it may bo, which an 
organism has reached gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state 
so soon as it has been abandoned.
Coding* Eynamicism1—Acceptance| Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance}
S true turalism— Acc eptance *
Passage 7_ - Examplo 8
We approach the id with analogies 1 wo call it a chaos, a cauldron full 
of seothing excitations* We picture it as being open at its end to soma­
tic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which 
find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substra­
tum, It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has 
no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring 
about satisfaction of the instinctual! needs subject to the observance of 
tho pleasure principle.
This vivid description of the id justifios a coding of Eynamiciso.
The id is a personality structure, which moans the author accepts Structura­
lism, Sinco the author uses montalistic torminology ("psychic expression"), 
a coding for Contentual subjectivism also sooms warranted, Codingi 
Eynamicism— Acceptanco} Structuralism— Accoptancoj Contentual subjoctivism 
— Acceptance,
Passage 8 - Examplo 9
Psychical energy is released whon the psychic system (tho person) 
attempts to return to equilibrium aftor it has been thrown into a state of 
disequilibrium. Disequilibrium is produced by an increase of tension 
in ono part of tho systom rolativo to tho rest of the system, either as 
a result of external stimulation or internal change. When tension through­
out tho system becomes equalized again, tho output of energy is halted and 
the total system comes to rost,
Codingi Eynamicism— Acceptance} Contentual subjectivism— Acceptance, 
Passago 9 - Example 10
[Psycho-analysis isj a dynamic conception which reduces mental life to the 
interplay of reciprocally urging and chocking forces,
Codingi Eynamicism— Neutral} Contontual subjoctivism— Accoptanco,
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IV. General Guidelines for Coding
(1) Dio prescriptions should bo treated singly and individually, Diis 
moans that when a judge is coding an address he should consider each of 
tho 36 prescriptions soparatoly as much as possible, so that whatever 
relations exist among proscriptions are pormitted to emerge from the data,
(2) Die question arises as to whother a judge should code for the 
prescriptions as they become evident in an article or wait until he has 
finished reading tho article in its entirety. It has been found by the 
writer that tho strategy of immediately coding is superior. It reduces tho 
strain on the judge's memory. But the judge must be alert to changes in 
tho author's position as ovidonco increases, and mako revisions accordingly. 
Die suggestion offered is that tho coding bo done at tho time a prescription 
bocomos evidont, subject to later revision.
(3) If a proscription is montioned twico in tho same address, with 
tho author's "position" oxprossed differently, tho genoral rule is that 
codings of Acceptance or Rojoction take precedence ovor a coding of Neutral,
(1+) A prescription should generally bo verbalized explicitly in an 
addross for it to be coded, Somo of the ways prescriptions are expressod 
include1 reference by name or synonym, description of general meaning, 
a sub-type or specific instance of its uso,
(5) How much ovidonco must be prosent for an addross to bo codod into 
a particular category on a particular proscription? Diero can be no 
amount spocifiod. It may bo as little as one sentence, one phrase, or 
ovon one word. At tho other oxtromo, thoro could conceivably be as much 
as a whole addross dovotod to tho explication of a single proscription.
(6) Since tho proscriptive approach was formulated to encompass tho 
history of psychology from ancient timos on, thoro is considerable varia­
tion in expression of prescriptions in tho rolativoly short history of
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Amorican psychology. Nevertholoss, the coding should bo basod solely on 
tho contents of tho addrossos. In no caso should tho judgo's decision bo 
basod on -what he thinks is tho generally accepted position in American 
psychology, indopondent of tho address in quostion. For example, if there 
is no evidence in an addross for the accoptanco of Naturalism, Nomothetic!sm, 
Detorminism, or Functionalism, thoy should not be coded.
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Coding Fbrm 
for Content Analysis 
of Presidential Addresses of APA
Code Number of Address_________________________
Name of Coder   ..._____________________
Date of Coding____________     __
-— — ■(Leave Blank)— —
Author of Address ___       .
Year of Presidency_____________________________
Title of Address______      ...______
Instructions» Code the address with respect to the prescriptive concepts 
below. Circle the number in one of the corresponding three categories 
which most closely reflects the author's position. Make the decisions on 
the basis of the information in the Coding Manual. When a prescription is 
not present in the address leave the categories blank.
Prescription Acceptance
1






















Rationalism-^ (vs. Empiricism) j 1 0 -1
Functionalism ; ii 0 -i !... . »
Structuralism i 0
.
Induetivism j 1 0 *







































CoCiG Numb'.r of Ar!H-i*agg Ha to of Codin^_-_ -M-pill
if 3.**!G o f  J u d ? G
•— (Lonvs Blank)—
Author o' Address Year o'* Presidency,
Titls of Address__________________________________________
Motst At the end o" thin Codin^ iform you T.dll bo asked about tha nature 
and scope of tho address. ;Jach of theso two questions requires a 
dichotonous docision.
Instructions! Gods tho address ■ i th respect to the prescript^^ concepts 
bolo'-r, by circling the aooropriate symbol. Consider implicit as "oil as 
explicit proscriptions, Jhen a prescription is not expressed in the address 














Conscious ’iiontnlisrr. Acc. Meut. Hoj, 1 2 3'J £ I
Unconscious mentalism Acc. Mout. ifcj- 1 2  3 h 3 I
Contentual objectivism Acc. Ncut, Hoj. 3 2 3 !- E I
Contentual subjoctivism Acc. ft cut. aej. 1 2 3 ii I
: Joterminism Acc. Kout. Hoj. 3 2 3 I
Indetermini sm Acc. ft out. Ho j. 1 2 3 c I
'rinpirlcism Acc* Ncut. Raj, 1 2 3 h E I
Rationalism^ (vs. Empiricism) Acc. II out. Rej, 1 2 3 A 3 I
Functionalism Acc. Ncut. Haj. 1 2 3 A E I
Structural! r"i Acc, T'eut, Uoj. 1 2 3 A 3 I
Indue tivi an Acc. Ncut. Roj. 1 2 3 A li I
Doduetivism Acc. Jiout, Raj. 1 2 3 E I
T'cehanism Acc. I’uut, Roj, 1 2 3 A 7 I
’/Italian Acc. lout. Rej. 1 2 3 A E I
!othodolordcal objectivism Acc. M n U t. Raj. 3 2 3 A 1j I
'' cthodolo fric-a 1 sub jcetivi sm Acc. Mfiut. R«j. 1 2 3 A 3 I
I oloculnrism Acc. 7 out. tcj. 1 2 3 '+ E I
Kolarism Acc, 7 out. Roj* 1 2 3 A i'i I
Konism Acc, 11 out. Aoj. 1 2 3 n.a* I
dualism Acc.  ^cut. :iJ1 * 1 2 3 ■I- Z  I
KatuTalisri Acc. Hcut, Raj. 1 2 3 s I
Suooma turali sm Acc. I] cut. Raj* 1 2 3 A 3 I
nomotheticism Ace, Nnut. Roj. 3 2 3 A s I
Idiofraphicism Acc, Nout. Roj, 1 2 3 3 I
Poriphornlism Acc. II cut. Roj. 1 2 3 A r>2i I
Centralism Acc, I! out. iej. 1 2 3 '■I tS I
Pori an Acc, flout. Rej. 1 2 3 A e I
Utilitarianism Acc. 7 cut. Roj. 3 2 3 A L ' I
;;unn ti ta tivi sm Acc, ilout. Roj. 1 2 3 E I
lualitativisn Acc. KrtUt, Aej. 1 2 3 4 3 I
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Rationalism^ (vs. Irrationalism) Acc. Neut. Hoj. 1 2 3 h E I
Irrationalism Acc. Neut. Raj. 1 2 3 i* S I
Static!SPij (vs, Tovolopmentalisn)Acc. Neut. Rej. 1 2 3 k E I
Developmental! sn Acc, Neut, Rej. 1 2 3 fir E I
Statieism^ (vs, Dynanicism) Acc. Nout, Raj. 1 2 3 1,■ r 3 I
Dynamicism Acc. Neut, Roj. 1 2 3 h E I
I. nature of Addross (check category)i
  Sxpository-orjuntation (Characterized by an exposition of the
meaning of sons aspect of or all of psychology, whose burden 
does not directly dopend upon ampirical data,)
_____ dosearch-orientation (Characterized by the presentation of in­
formation feasod upon empirical, but not necessarily experi­
mental, data, or tho presentation of a viewpoint deriving from 
empirical data.)
H, Scope of Addrossi
Broad (Encompasses psychology as a 'hole, or treats a problem 
■ Jhich transcends specific areas and is significant for psych­
ology as a whole.)
Narrow (Limited to a soecialized area or oroblcm within psych-




This appendix contains three kinds of results per­
taining to the reliability of judges: (1) information con­
cerning the use of the coding categories by the three judges;
(2) inter-judge reliability coefficients; (3) intra-judge re­
liability coefficients. Inter- and intra-judge reliability 
values are given for both of the major decisions made by the 
judges: Presence or Absence of prescriptions, and the author's
position (Acceptance, Neutral, Rejection).
The conventional method of measuring reliability is to 
use the percentage of agreement of coding responses among the 
judges involved, _i._e., the percentage of judgments on which 
two judges agree, out of the total number of judgments. In 
this study, the agreement is represented by simultaneous 
Presence or Absence codings, or by simultaneous Acceptance, 
Neutral, or Rejection codings. However, the writer considered 
the percentage-of-agreement method to be incomplete when used 
alone, because it does not reveal the percentage of agreement 
due to chance. Agreement would be expected to increase, by 
chance alone, as fewer categories are used in the coding system. 
Hence, there is no way of telling how far the actual empirical
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agreement exceeds the chance level of agreement. For this 
reason, a supplementary method of reporting reliability was 
used.
The method of measuring reliability developed by Scott 
(1955) was found suitable for the writer's purposes. Scott's 
Index of Inter-Coder Agreement, jai, may be interpreted as the 
extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance. It is 
appropriate for nominal scale coding, it corrects for both 
the number of categories in the coding question and the fre­
quency with which each is used, and it varies from 0 to 1.
The most important factor to consider, however, is that Scott's 
Index provides a conservative measure of reliability. Since 
it is a measure of the extent to which the coding reliability 
exceeds chance, it will almost always yield lower values than 
the corresponding empirical percentage agreement values, and 
hence it is not directly comparable to reliability values 




Average Number of Prescriptions Coded Present in Each 
Address Out of 36 Possibilities
Judge Prescriptions/Address
Judge 1 (Gibson) 12.3
Judge 2 (Goodman) 13.0
Judge 3 (Merrifield) 15.5
Table 7






A N R 1 2 3 4 E I
Judge #1 (Gibson) 75 16 7 41 23 19 14 68 31
Judge #2 (Goodman) 83 11 5 21 23 28 25 64 35
Judge #3 (Merrifield) 76 16 6 15 20 26 37 72 27
Mean 78 14 6 26 22 24 25 68 32
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Table 8
Percentage of Agreement Between Judges on 
Coding the Presence or Absence of 36 Prescriptions in 
Each of 75 APA Presidential Addresses 




Note. —  Mean of three coefficients = .76(.50).
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Table 9
Percentage of Agreement Between Judges on 
Coding the Author's Position on Prescriptions Expressed in 
Each of 75 APA Presidential Addresses.
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)




Merrifield 80(.46) 83 (.49)
Note. —  Mean of the three coefficients = .82(.47).
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Table 10
Intra-Judge Reliability on Coding Presence or 
Absence of 36 Prescriptions in Each of 
Four ApA Presidential Addresses
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)
Judge Reliability
Judge 1 (Gibson) .88 (. 75)
Judge 2 (Goodman) .78 (.53)
Judge 3 (Merrifield) .90 (.80)
Note. —  Mean of three coefficients = .85 (.69).
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Table 11
Intra-Judge Reliability on Coding Author's Position on 
Prescriptions Expressed in Four APA Presidential Addresses 
(Scott's Index is in Parentheses.)
Based on the Number of Prescriptions Coded Present on Each
of Two Codings for Each Judge
Judge Reliability
Judge 1 (Gibson) . 97 (.90)
Judge 2 (Goodman) . 91 (. 62)
Judge 3 (Merrifield) .84 (.42)




The expression of a prescription in an address is 
defined operationally in terms of Present codings. Prominence 
is thus the relative frequency of Present codings of a 
particular prescription in comparison with all others.
Prediction 5: Since the prescriptive approach was formulated
to encompass the history of psychology from ancient times on, 
there is undoubtedly extreme variation in the expression of 
prescriptions in the relatively short history of American 
psychology. In this period, the following prescriptions will 
be among the most prominent of the 36 prescriptions, irrespec­
tive of temporal considerations: Conscious mentalism, Con-
tentual objectivism, Contentual subjectivism, Empiricism, 
Methodological objectivism, Methodological subjectivism, and 
Nomotheticism. The following prescriptions will be among the 
least prominent of the group: Vitalism, Monism, Dualism,
Naturalism, Supernaturalism, Idiographicism, Rationalism^ 
Irrationalism, Staticism-^, and Staticisi^. This prediction 
is based on the writer's general background reading and per­
sonal judgments.
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The following computer printout contains a ranking 
of the 36 prescriptions in terms of their prominence; from 
most frequently expressed to least frequently expressed. It 
shows which prescriptions were most frequently expressed in 
the presidential addresses and therefore the ones most rele­
vant to modern American psychology. In this context “relevance1' 
means expressed in American psychology, whether it be an 
acceptance of the prescription, a neutral expression of the 
prescription, or a rejection of the prescription. Of the 
seven prescriptions predicted to be among the most prominent, 
six are among the top ten listed in the printout. The most 
frequently expressed of all the prescriptions was Empiricism. 
Contentual subjectivism and Contentual objectivism, two of 
the basic prescriptions pertaining to the nature of the sub­
ject matter of psychology, were both among the most prominent, 
as predicted. Methodological objectivism was more frequently 
expressed than either Contentual subjectivism or Contentual 
objectivism, which suggests that American psychology is 
oriented toward the use of objective methods at least as much 
as toward a particular conception of its subject matter.
Some of the most prominent prescriptions were unpredicted.
These include Purism, Functionalism, Utilitarianism, and 
Quantitativism.
The printout also shows which prescriptions were
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least frequently expressed in the presidential addresses and 
therefore the ones least relevant to modern American psy­
chology. Of the ten prescriptions predicted to be among the 
least prominent, eight are among the lowest ten liste'd 'in 
the printout. With the exception of Naturalism, the pre­
scriptions at the bottom of the list played some role in 
American psychology but that role was minor in comparison to 
the role of other prescriptions. Many of these prescriptions, 
such as Supernaturalism and Vitalism, are more relevant to 
other historical periods. In the case of Naturalism, it 
appears that this prescription is so strongly accepted in 
psychology that it is taken for granted and provides no ob­
jective evidence for its existence.
The role of prescriptions in psychology may take 
different forms. The most frequent form of expression of a 
prescription is that of acceptance on the part of an author.
In fact, 78.3% of all prescriptions were judged accepted in 
this study. However, there was considerable variation around 
the mean. The printout shows the proportion in which each 
prescription was Accepted, Neutral, and Rejected relative to 
the total number of times it was expressed. The prescriptions 
which are most likely to be accepted when they are expressed 
(over 90% of the time) are: Inductivism, Nomotheticism, Em­
piricism, and Purism. The prescriptions which are most
239
likely to be rejected when they are expressed are Super­
naturalism (63% of the time), Rationalism^ (43%) , and 
Vitalism (35%).
In terms of the Dimension of Centrality, the pre­
scriptions which were most often salient when they were 
expressed were Empiricism (44%) and Contentual subjectivism 
(43%). In the case of Empiricism, the 44% is based on 32 
times the prescription was considered Salient out of 73 times 
it was expressed. Contentual subjectivism was considered 
Salient 25 times out of 58 times expressed. The data show 
that when Empiricism and Contentual subjectivism are expressed 
they are salient themes almost one-half of the time. On the 
other hand, Supernaturalism and Unconscious mentalism were 
never salient themes in the addresses, but were mostly 
incidental when they were expressed.
The mode of expression of the prescriptions was pre­
dominantly Explicit: 68% Explicit vs. 32% Implicit, for all 
prescriptions (Appendix F-9). All but four prescriptions 
were more frequently Explicit in expression than Implicit.
The four exceptions were Nomotheticism (74% Implicit), Purism 
(70%) , Staticism^ (56%) , and Inductivism (53%) .
APPENDIX G
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APPENDIX H 
Form of Acceptance of Prescriptions
This appendix considers the relative proportion of 
explicitly and implicitly accepted prescriptions over time.
Prediction 13: There will tend to be a higher proportion of
explicitly accepted prescriptions before 1930 than after, 
because during the period of the schools of psychology the 
issues were controversial, whereas afterward psychologists 
became more tolerant of alternative viewpoints and less likely 
to defend their own. Therefore, the proportion of implicitly 
accepted prescriptions will increase as one moves closer to 
the present.
Figure 22 shows that the form of acceptance of the 
prescriptions considered together has changed over time: the 
explicit form of expression has decreased in proportion, while 
the implicit form has increased. There is a higher proportion 
of Explicit codings of prescriptions which were accepted be­
fore 1930 than after, as predicted, and the proportion of 
Implicit codings increases as one moves closer to the present. 
Overall, the relative proportions have changed from about 
70% explicit - 30% implicit, to about 55% explicit - 45% im­
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Fig. 22. Explicit and implicit forms of 
acceptance of 36 prescriptions coded in 75 APA 
presidential addresses by three judges.
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Name in Full: Kenneth Richard Gibson
Date of Birth: November 29, 1943
Place of Birth: Detroit, Michigan
Secondary Education; Traverse City Senior High School
Collegiate Institutions Attended:
Albion College 1962-1966 B.A.
Western Michigan University 1966-1968 M.A.




Summer Fellowship, University of New Hampshire, 1970 
Research Fellowship, National Institute of Mental Health, 
1971-1972
Publications;
Gibson, K. R. Review of J. R. Kantor, The scientific 
evolution of psychology. Vol. II. Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1970, _6, 201-203,
Gibson, K. R. Review of D. P. Schultz, A history of 
modern psychology. Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences, 1970, jS, 285.
Gibson, K. R. Eminence of the APA presidents. American 
Psychologist (Comment section), 1972, J27, 582-583.
Positions Held;
Psychometrist, Traverse City State Hospital, Michigan, 
Summers: 1966-1968
Instructor in Psychology (part-time), University of 
New Hampshire, 1970-1971
Assistant Professor of Psychology, Westminster 
College, 1972-1973
